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The recent wave of takeovers requires reexamination of the
conclusions drawn from the traditional model of corporate gov-
ernance. The traditional model is based on the concept that
shareholders are "owners" of the corporation who, by virtue of
such ownership, are entitled to control the corporation and have
it serve their interests alone. This concept supports shareholder
rights to elect the board of directors, to vote on certain corpo-
rate matters, and to rely on the fiduciary duty of directors to
operate the corporation in the best interests of the shareholders.
This traditional ownership model rests on the theory that soci-
ety should recognize the rights of shareholders to control corpo-
rations because the shareholders have the incentive to maximize
profits.' This incentive causes them to utilize factors of produc-
tion most efficiently and to strive to maximize the satisfaction of
human wants.
Takeovers raise a number of questions that challenge the val-
idity of this model. Should acquisition of a particular number of
shares automatically entitle a person to treat the corporation as
her "property"? Are corporations merely commodities that can
be bought and sold, or are they political and social institutions
that must be handled in a different way? In decision making,
should directors take into account only the interests of share-
holders when other constituencies such as employees, creditors,
and communities also have a stake in the enterprise? Do share-
holders trading their shares in the stock market really have the
t 0 1989 Lynne L. Dallas, all rights reserved.
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1. E.g., A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
299-302 (rev. ed. 1967).
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incentive to use corporate resources in ways consistent with the
long-term health of the American economy?
Similar questions were raised in the 1930's in the wake of the
stock market crash. At that time, Berle and Means challenged
the traditional ownership model in their classic work, The Mod-
ern Corporation and Private Property.2 They focused upon the
separation of share ownership and control, cataloguing in great
detail the economic and legal changes relevant to control of the
public corporation. Shareholders, according to Berle and Means,
had become passive owners who assumed no responsibility for or
control over the operations of the corporation. Control was in
the hands of nonowner managers. It could, therefore, no longer
be assumed that those controlling the corporation would use the
resources of the corporation most efficiently and seek to maxi-
mize the satisfaction of human wants.3 The traditional model,
based on the significance of ownership to control, was no longer
valid. Berle and Means concluded that government was justified
in intervening in the governance of corporations to ensure
greater attention to the needs of society, including employees,
creditors, and communities, as well as shareholders.4 If owner
motivation no longer translated into efficiency from a societal
point of view because the corporation was controlled by nonown-
ers, government should intervene to ensure that the corporation
is operated in a socially responsible manner.
2. Id.
3. Id. at 299-302.
4. Id. at 312. While this was Professor Berle's theoretical conclusion in The Modern
Corporation and Private Property, he maintained in an article written about the same
time that, as a practical matter, the corporation should be operated in the sole interest of
shareholders, until a "clear and reasonably enforceable scheme of responsibilities to
someone else" could be devised. Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A
Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1367 (1932). But see Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Man-
agers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); Dodd, Is Effective Enforcement of the
Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable?, 2 U. CHi. L. REV. 194 (1934).
5. Professor Dodd also maintained that property rights should be protected only if
they benefit society as a whole. He stated that "business is permitted and encouraged by
the law primarily because it is of service to the community rather than because it is a
source of profits to its owners." Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?,
supra note 4, at 1149 (1932). He further maintained that:
If certain businesses. . . continue to be allowed unregulated profits, it will be as
a matter of legislative policy because the lawmakers regard the competitive con-
ditions under which such businesses are carried on as making regulation of prof-
its unnecessary, and not because the owners of such enterprises have any consti-
tutional right to have their property treated as private in the sense in which
property held merely for personal use is private.
Id. at 1149. See also Berle, Corporate Decision-Making and Social Control, 24 Bus. LAW.
149, 150 (1968). But see Berle, supra note 4, at 1368 ("Either you have a system based
on individual ownership of property or you do not.").
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Berle and Means could have attacked the traditional owner-
ship model by focusing exclusively on the size and complexity of
the modern corporation. Responsibility for and control over cor-
porate operations even by an owner-manager is largely attenu-
ated in such a corporation. Decisions will necessarily be made
by nonowners. Indeed, the effect of the separation of share own-
ership and control becomes less significant as the size and com-
plexity of corporations increase. Nevertheless, Berle and Means
concentrated on the separation of ownership and control as the
most important factor in the governance of the modern corpora-
tion. The focus on separation of ownership and control, rather
than the size and complexity of the public corporation, was
largely dictated by a simplistic concept of the firm, embodied in
the entrepreneurial model, which also underlies the traditional
model.
In this entrepreneurial paradigm, the firm is controlled by an
all-powerful entrepreneur. The entrepreneur determines firm
goals and assures conformity to those goals by making side pay-
ments, such as wages to employees, and by instituting a system
of internal administrative controls." To Berle and Means, it was
the bifurcation of the identity of the entrepreneur into owners
and managers that necessitated a reexamination of corporate
governance to ensure the social responsibility of the corporation.
The significance of the separation of share ownership and con-
trol has largely dominated the corporate law literature since
Berle and Means challenged the traditional ownership model.
Their work has spawned numerous proposals for reforming cor-
6. Berle and Means were clearly concerned with actual responsibility and control
over corporate property. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 1, at 305; Berle, supra note 4,
at 1369. They were also concerned with legal responsibility, which is diminished for the
owner-manager in a large complex corporation for the simple reason that the owner-
manager cannot be expected to take responsibility for all aspects of the corporation's
operations.
7. Cf. J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 59-71 (2d ed. 1971) (arguing that
organized intelligence or technocrats at middle levels are the brain of the enterprise).
But cf., M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 164 (1976) (arguing that
important policy decisions are made in the office of the Chief Executive). This observa-
tion concerning size and complexity may also explain some of the negative findings as to
the effect of "owner control" on the performance of public corporations. See R. POSNER,
ECONoMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 394 n.1 (3d ed. 1986). Contrary to the understanding of
many corporate law scholars, there are reasons why even small firms managed by owners
should not provide the standard for efficiency. Owner-managers "may or may not be
motivated only by the search for profits" and "may habitually consume on the job."
Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J. L. & ECON. 375,
383 (1983). For a discussion of incentives, see infra notes 101-54 and accompanying text.
8. R. CYERT & J. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 27-28 (1963).
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porate governance. 9 Proposals have been made to increase own-
ers' control of the corporation through modifications of the fed-
eral proxy rules. 10 Proposals have also been made for greater
monitoring of managers and for including independent, public
interest, and constituency representatives on boards of direc-
tors." At the core of many of these proposals, sometimes as a
hidden premise, is the notion that the reforms would not be nec-
essary absent a separation of share ownership and control. 2
Beginning in the 1960's, law and economics writers began to
attack the significance attached by Berle and Means and their
progeny to the separation of share ownership and control. 3 The
law and economic writers developed a more complex conceptual-
ization of the firm, which I will call the "efficiency model."' 4
9. E.g., COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE: THE ALI-ABA
SYMPOSIUMS 1977-1978 (D. Schwartz ed. 1979); SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
96TH CONG., 2D SESS., STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY (Comm. Print 1980)
[hereinafter SEC ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT]; AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, Principles of Cor-
porate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations; Symposium: Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1247 (1979); Symposium on Corporate Governance, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1979).
10. E.g., SEC ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 9, at 63-225.
11. See, e.g., M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 149-85 (1976); R.
NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 124-28 (1976); C.
STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 152-83
(1975); Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate
Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099 (1977); Moscow, The
Independent Director, 28 Bus. LAW. 9 (1972); Solomon, Restructuring the Corporate
Board of Directors: Fond Hope-Faint Promise?, 76 MICH. L. REV. 581 (1978).
12. Additional bases offered to support various corporate law reform proposals are
the concession theory and the principle of affected interests. The concession theory
maintains that corporations obtain their authority and privileges (such as limited liabil-
ity for shareholders) from the government and, therefore, may be regulated in the public
interest. See Comment, Broadening the Board: Labor Participation in Corporate Gov-
ernance, 34 Sw. L.J. 963 (1980); Hessen, A New Concept of Corporations: A Contractual
and Private Property Model, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1327 (1979). The principle of affected
interest is a democratic concept that maintains that those groups affected by the corpo-
ration have a right to be heard. E.g., R. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION 123 (1970). Corpo-
rations affect the public, according to this principle, and thus may be regulated in the
public interest.
13. E.g., Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV.
259 (1967).
14. In developing the model, I draw upon what is known as the property rights litera-
ture [hereinafter the incentive-residual rights approach] and the agency cost literature.
E.g., Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization,
62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of
the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 375 (1983); Easterbrook & Fischel, Close Corporations and
Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271 (1986); Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control
Transactions, 91 YALE L. J. 698 (1982); Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law,
26 J. L. & ECON. 395 (1983); Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J.
POL. ECON. 288 (1980); Fama & Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 327 (1983); Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 301 (1983); Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259
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In this model, the firm is a "nexus of contracts" or a market-
place where various constituencies contract for their own protec-
tion. The entrepreneurial concept of the firm is rejected. Owner-
ship of the firm disappears as a meaningful concept under this
model because no one can own a "nexus." Shareholders are
merely parties to one contract that comprises the firm. More-
over, control of the firm is shared among various constituencies.
Control is reflected in the terms of various contracts entered
into by individuals. According to this model, it makes little sense
to focus upon shareholders' "ownership" and control when vari-
ous constituencies share control. It also makes little sense to
speak of "corporate" social responsibility because the firm is
only a "nexus." Various constituencies can obtain the protection
they need by bargaining for contract terms.
Adherents to the efficiency paradigm are less concerned than
were Berle and Means with the behavior of nonowner managers,
who are described as "agents," constrained by the terms of con-
tracts with various constituencies, or by market forces. While
managers have the incentive to "shirk," the costs of their shirk-
ing ("agency costs"), to the extent it is cost effective to do so,
are decreased by the terms of these contracts. For example,
shareholders bargain for their own protection by contracting for
certain voting rights, for a board of directors composed of share-
holder representatives that will monitor managers, and for the
imposition on directors of fiduciary duties to act in the share-
holders' best interest. Moreover, shareholders monitor managers
through stock trades both by facilitating takeovers, which dis-
(1982); Fischel & Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corpo-
rate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261 (1986); Jensen
& Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Klein, Contracting Costs and Residual Claims:
The Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 367 (1983); Klein, The Mod-
ern Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521 (1982)
[hereinafter Klein, The Modern Business Organization]; Winter, State Law, Share-
holder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
Where indicated, the transaction cost approach is also discussed. E.g., 0. WILLIAMSON,
THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985) [hereinafter 0. WILLIAMSON, CAPITAL-
ISM]; 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS
(1975); Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197 (1984) [hereinafter Wil-
liamson, Corporate Governance]; Williamson, The Economics of Organization: The
Transaction Cost Approach, 19 J. EcON. LITERATURE 548 (1981); Williamson, The Mod-
ern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes, 19 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1537 (1981);
Williamson, Transaction Cost-Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22
J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979); Williamson & Ouchi, The Markets and Hierarchies Program of
Research: Origins, Implications, Prospects, in PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATION DESIGN
AND BEHAVIOR 347 (1981) [hereinafter Williamson & Ouchi, The Markets and
Hierarchies].
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place inefficient managers, and by providing necessary informa-
tion to the labor markets concerning the efficiency of managers.
The separation of share ownership and control, to the extent
that it is meaningful to speak of firm "ownership,'" is efficient for
society. Shareholders are able both to obtain the advantages of
centralized management by persons with substantial business
expertise and to engage in cost-effective monitoring. Various
corporate reform proposals that would give shareholders greater
control and increase the monitoring of managers would not be
efficient, or shareholders or other constituencies would have con-
tracted for these rights. If it were efficient, for example, for the
board to assume a more active monitoring role or for indepen-
dent or constituency directors to be elected to the board, share-
holders would contract to do exactly this. The process of natural
selection in the marketplace will cause the evolution and sur-
vival of those governance arrangements that are most efficient.
While the efficiency model thus represents a more complex
concept of the corporation than the traditional ownership model,
it rehabilitates the conclusions of the traditional model. It sup-
ports existing corporation law by providing that shareholders
shall have the rights to elect directors, to vote on certain mat-
ters, and to rely on the duty of directors to act in the best inter-
est of shareholders, although it opposes corporate reform pro-
posals that would expand or strengthen these rights. The model
also reaffirms the traditional model's notion that these rights
should be possessed by shareholders rather than other constitu-
encies. To support their position, adherents of the efficiency
model rely upon the natural selection argument mentioned
above, as well as two additional arguments. One is the tradi-
tional ownership argument that shareholders have profit incen-
tives that ensure the efficient utilization of resources. 5 Unlike
the traditional model, however, major emphasis is placed on the
effect of the profit incentive on stock trading activities, rather
than on actual management of the company. The other argu-
ment is that shareholders' investments are purportedly more
nonredeployable and firm-specific than those of other constitu-
encies; thus shareholders would not make these investments un-
less they had these rights."0
15. The incentive-residual rights literature makes this argument. This literature is
referred to supra note 14, and is discussed infra text accompanying notes 119-54.
16. This argument is found in the transaction cost literature referred to supra note
14 and is discussed infra text accompanying notes 174-227.
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Because efficiency-model theorists support the efficiency of ex-
isting governance arrangements, they oppose legislation that
would challenge the shareholder-centered nature of corporate
law. They would oppose legislation passed in response to the
takeover phenomenon which allows directors to take into ac-
count the interests of other constituencies who also have a stake
in the enterprise 7 or which otherwise regulates takeovers in the
interests of employees and communities.' Shareholders seeking
profits may properly buy and sell companies like commodities,
because society in the end will benefit if shareholders profit.
This Article introduces a new model of corporate governance,
which challenges, as did Berle and Means, the conclusions drawn
from the traditional ownership model. Rather than focusing
upon the inefficiencies of the large complex firm resulting from
the separation of share ownership and control, however, this new
model, which I call the power model, focuses upon the political
nature of decision making in the large corporation, which exists
regardless of the identity of the entrepreneur."9
Under the power model, the firm is not a "nexus" or market-
place, but an organic institution with its own internal structure
and processes that impact on control of the firm. Management is
not an "agent," but holds a strategic position in the firm that it
utilizes to minimize the influence of other constituencies. Rather
17. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (1987 Supp.); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.
251.5 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. ANN. § 351.347(1)(4) (1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.59(E) (Anderson Supp. 1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42 § 8363(b) (Purdon Supp.
1986); see Newlin & Gilmer, The Pennsylvania Shareholder Protection Act: A New Ap-
proach to Deflecting Corporate Takeover Bids, 40 Bus. LAW. 111 (1984).
18. Control share acquisition provisions ostensibly intended to protect investors may
actually be designed to protect the interests of other constituencies. Johnson, Minne-
sota's Control Share Acquisition Statute and the Need for New Judicial Analysis of
State Takeover Legislation, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 183, 185 (1986).
19. I draw upon a number of sources in the management science and sociological
literature to create this model. See generally R. BURT, CORPORATE PROFITS AND COOPTA-
TION (1983); R. CYERT & J. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (1963); H.
MINTZBERG, POWER IN AND AROUND ORGANIZATIONS (1983); C. PERROW, COMPLEX ORGANI-
ZATIONS: A CRITICAL ESSAY (3d ed. 1986); J. PFEFFER, ORGANIZATIONS AND ORGANIZATION
THEORY (1982); J. PFEFFER & G. SALANCIK, THE EXTERNAL CONTROL OF ORGANIZATIONS: A
RESOURCE DEPENDENCE PERSPECTIVE (1978); W. SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATU-
RAL AND OPEN SYSTEMS (1981); W. ScoTT, T. MITCHELL & P. BIRNBAUM, ORGANIZATION
THEORY: A STRUCTURAL AND BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS (1981); P. SELZNICK, TVA AND THE
GRASS ROOTS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF FORMAL ORGANIZATION (1966); J. THOMPSON,
ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION (1967); Hickson, Astley, Butler & Wilson, Organization as
Power, 3 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 151 (1981); Hickson, Hinings, Lee, Schneck &
Pennings, A Strategic Contingencies' Theory of Intraorganizational Power, 16 ADMIN.
SC. Q. 216 (1971); Meyer & Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure
as Myth and Ceremony, 83 Am. J. Soc. 340 (1977); Jacobs, Dependency and Vulnerabil-
ity: An Exchange Approach to the Control of Organizations, 19 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 45 (1974).
FALL 1988]
Journal of Law Reform
than being merely a facility for exchange, the firm is very much
an actor in its environment that seeks to increase its discretion
and autonomy by decreasing its dependence on various constitu-
encies. It has various strategies that it utilizes to decrease their
influence. The firm is not merely responsive to an environment
but acts to modify that environment. Control of the firm can be
understood in terms of power coalitions bargaining with one an-
other, not freely, but in the context of social, historical, and po-
litical relationships (often determined by legal rules). Control ar-
rangements in the firm ultimately reflect cultural and political
values that are reflected in the reality that firms have created
and with which in turn they must deal. Under the power model,
property rights and, hence, shareholder voting rights, are not
understood on the basis of efficiency considerations but are un-
derstood as resulting from a number of historical, cultural, and
political forces.
As this Article will demonstrate, arguments upon which the
efficiency model relies concerning natural selection, shareholder
incentives, and the firm-specific nature of shareholder invest-
ments are largely outcome determinative, intended to justify, on
a supposedly objective basis, the status quo and existing power
arrangements. The validity of the efficiency paradigm is uncon-
vincing because it rests on ambiguous terminology, unsupported
assumptions about human motivation, and the summation of va-
rious costs and benefits. Virtually any control arrangement can
be rationalized if enough cost, benefit, and incentive factors are
taken into account, because there is no way to weigh any of
these variables. Moreover, because the status quo can be ex-
plained on the basis of power considerations, there is no reason
to presume that that which exists is efficient. Indeed, power is a
better explicator of the real world. Principles based on the effi-
ciency model-that shareholders should elect board members
and that managers owe fiduciary duties to shareholders-appear,
under the conceptual lens of the power model, to be legitimizing
myths ensuring the political acceptability of power wielded by
managers."0
Because the power model rejects the efficiency model's pre-
sumption that existing control arrangements are efficient, the
important questions to ask in connection with any corporate or
market phenomena become who benefits and who loses or, in
terms of efficiency, "efficient for whom?" and "at what costs to
others?" Governments are justified in asking these questions
20. See infra text accompanying notes 228-307.
[VOL. 22:1
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and reaching conclusions. The burden is not on governments to
justify their conclusions, as the efficiency theorists argue, but on
those opposing them, because what exists in the private sector is
not necessarily more efficient from a societal perspective.21 Any
assessment of corporate or market phenomena, such as take-
overs, must be understood as involving values and judgments,
rather than the pseudoscientific application of formulas and "ev-
olutionary" theories.
The model of the corporation that is used by corporate law
scholars, whether consciously or unconsciously, is extremely im-
portant. It tends to determine upon what aspects of corporate
governance writers will concentrate. For example, Berle and
Means, viewing the world with the entrepreneurial model, fo-
cused upon the bifurcation of the identity of the entrepreneur,
the separation of share ownership from control. Law and eco-
nomics writers, conceiving of the firm as a nexus of contracts,
have focused upon the many constraints on managerial behavior.
They have strived to explain relationships of various constituen-
cies with the firm as resulting from contract bargaining where
contract terms necessarily provide for the protection of private
parties in cost-effective ways. Using the power model, this Arti-
cle focuses on sources of power, power strategies, and the extent
to which relationships are embedded in an historical, cultural,
and political context. Each of these models has implications for
the evaluation of existing corporate law and corporate reform
proposals.
Because of the importance of models, this Article is devoted to
the development and analysis of the efficiency and power mod-
els. Writers who are critical of the efficiency model, which has
come to dominate corporate law thinking, have been hampered
by the lack of a clear and thorough explication of this model and
by the absence of an alternative model. This Article attempts to
correct these two failings.
Rather than developing each model completely and then com-
paring them in a final section, I have divided this Article into
21. Even if one were to accept the interest group theory of legislation, ideological and
structural factors operate in the public sector that serve to limit deviance from public-
regarding legislation. E.g., Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through
Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223, 240 (1986)
("The very presence of an independent judiciary serves as an inevitable and legitimate
obstacle to the interest group's objectives"). But see Easterbrook, The Supreme Court,
1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1984);
Landes & Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L.
& EcoN. 875, 894 (1975) (stating that the independent judiciary enforces the deals made
by interest groups).
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four parts, which address different aspects of the models. The
parts are entitled: (I) The Firm, (II) Management, (III) Firm
Objectives, and (IV) Firm Behavioral Determinants, the Share-
holder-Management Relationship, and the Board of Directors.
In each part, the efficiency-and power models are discussed sep-
arately and then compared. This order has been adopted to
highlight most effectively the differences and the similarities in
the models. However, the reader should read all parts to under-
stand the models fully, because each part covers only one aspect
of the models, and there is necessarily some judgment used in
allocating material among these parts to avoid repetition.
Part I focuses upon the general description of the firm offered
by each model. Because conceptual lenses are being created, par-
ticular attention is given to the language or terms used to de-
scribe the corporation and the connotations or associations they
suggest. Under the efficiency model, for example, the firm is a
"nexus of contracts" and, therefore, disappears as an actor, mak-
ing questions as to "corporate" responsibility meaningless. This
conceptualization is unlike that of the power model, which rep-
resents the corporation as an institution dominated by certain
power coalitions who are furthering their goals through that in-
stitution. Under this paradigm, questions concerning "corpo-
rate" responsibility or to whom the corporation should be re-
sponsible become important.
Part II discusses management from the perspectives of the
two models. The use of the word "agents" is central to the effi-
ciency model's characterization of managers as instruments im-
plementing shareholder objectives subject to the discipline of
markets. The power model, in contrast, develops a different pic-
ture of the role of managers, making use of the term "agents"
inappropriate.
Part III explores firm objectives from both a positive and a
normative perspective. Profit maximization increases the
probability of survival of firms and is desirable under the effi-
ciency model. The power model, on the other hand, suggests
that firms generally seek to increase their power and autonomy,
that firms pursue numerous, often inconsistent goals (other than
profit) that increase the adaptability of those firms to changing
conditions, and that the profit maximization goal is not neutral
but imports value premises in favor of certain groups.
Part IV develops and analyzes each model's explication of
firm behavior, the shareholder-management relationship, and
the board of directors. The efficiency model explains corporate
behavior as resulting from the operation of markets, and de-
[VOL. 22:1
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scribes governance arrangements in efficiency terms. The man-
agement-shareholder relationship is represented as a contractual
arrangement, with the board of directors performing a monitor-
ing role over managers. In contrast, under the power model, cor-
porate behavior results from a number of power considerations.
This model explains the existence of governance structures in a
number of ways other than on the basis of some notion of alloca-
tive efficiency. It defines the shareholder-management relation-
ship in political terms with the board of directors serving as a
tool of management. The table below outlines features of the
two models of corporate behavior that are described and com-































"monitoring" device "tool" of internal
coalition
Part V concludes the Article with a reexamination of basic
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I. THE FIRM
A. Efficiency Model
According to the efficiency model, the firm is a legal fiction,
serving as a "nexus for a set of contracting relationships" among
individuals, such as shareholders, employees, customers, and
suppliers."2 Under this "nexus of contract" concept, the firm is
merely a facility for exchange, not unlike a stock market.
[The firm] is a legal fiction which serves as a focus for a
complex process in which the conflicting objectives of in-
dividuals ... are brought into equilibrium within a
framework of contractual relations. In this sense the "be-
havior" of the firm is like the behavior of a market; i.e.,
the outcome of a complex equilibrium process. We sel-
dom fall into the trap of characterizing the wheat or
stock market as an individual, but we often make this er-
ror by thinking about organizations as though they were
persons with motivations and intentions.2 3
The firm is conceptualized as an extension of the market where
persons freely and voluntarily enter into contracts specifying the
terms of their relationships. The firm itself disappears as an ac-
tor and is largely reactive. It thus makes no sense to ask such
questions as "what should be the objectives of the firm?" or
"does the firm have social responsibility?" Under this model the
"firm is not an individual,"2 ' it is a market.
B. The Power Model
The power model depicts the firm as an institution with its
own internal structure that seeks to decrease its uncertainty by
increasing its own autonomy and discretion over its environ-
22. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 14, at 778; Fama, supra note 14, at 291; Fischel,
supra note 14, at 1262; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 14, at 310.
23. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 14, at 311.
24. Id.; accord Fischel, supra note 14, at 1273 ("Since it is a legal fiction, a corpora-
tion is incapable of having social or moral obligations much in the same way that inani-
mate objects are incapable of having these obligations."). Nonetheless, as discussed in
Part III, the efficiency model maintains that firms "should" maximize profits or mini-
mize costs to ensure their survival.
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ment.2 5 Unlike a wheat market, it utilizes various strategies to
decrease its dependence on its environment,26 thus muting the
effects of market constraints. According to the power model, not
"only are organizations [perceived as] constrained by the politi-
cal, legal, and economic environment, but, in fact, law, legiti-
macy, political outcomes, and economic climate [are understood
to] reflect, in part, actions taken by organizations to modify
these environmental components for their interests of survival
and growth.""7 Thus, the firm is not merely reactive with respect
to its environment, but proactive.
Firm behavior results from a contest for control among power
coalitions comprised of groups of individuals in specific relation-
ships to the firm and with each other.2 8 Power derives from nu-
merous sources; these are discussed in Part IV. The important
bargaining takes place in the context of political and social rela-
tionships among groups rather than through individual or atom-
istic exchanges. The objective is to become part of the dominant
coalition, which generally consists of management and some
other group, depending on the decision involved and the power
of various groups.29 "Internal" coalitions consist of top manage-
ment and employees of various divisions and departments. "Ex-
ternal" coalitions include shareholders, customers, and suppliers.
Under the power model, the dominant coalition emerges as
"the firm,""0 thus the corporation does not disappear as an ac-
tor. The most important question becomes not "what is the ob-
jective of the firm?" but "who is in the dominant coalition?"
C. Discussion and Comparison of Models
The "nexus of contract" concept of the firm generally ob-
scures the power and authority present in various relationships.
An example of the extent to which some efficiency writers ignore
25. See infra text accompanying notes 228-316.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 247-307.
27. J. PFEFFER & G. SALANCIK, supra note 19, at 108; accord C. PERROW, supra note
19, at 212-14.
28. E.g., R. CYERT & J. MARCH, supra note 19; H. MIN'ZBERG, supra note 19; J. PFF-
FER & G. SALANCIK, supra note 19; W. SCOTT, supra note 19. This Article adopts the term
"coalitions" in the plural sense used by Professor Scott. Id. at 264. Accord Tomlinson,
Economic and Sociological Theories of the Enterprise and Industrial Democracy, 35
BRIT. J. OF Soc. 591, 602 (1984) (conceptualizing firms as "conglomerates of arenas of
struggle").
29. E.g., W. SCOTT, supra note 19, at 264-65.
30. Id.
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power relationships is found in the description of an employer's
assignment of employees to different tasks. The reassignment is
described as a "renegotiation" of a contract, rather than as the
exercise of "authority and direction."'
In contrast, concepts of power and authority are integral to
the power model. Contracts are merely one of a number of
sources of power in the firm, and are themselves a result of
power bargaining. In addition, power struggles within the firm
are continuous. While it is true that contracts may include ex
post governance structures, whether these structures will be put
into place and how they will actually operate are largely depen-
dent on power considerations.
The concept of the corporation that is adopted is important
because it encourages certain perceptions and excludes others
that might otherwise guide actions. The "nexus of contract" for-
mulation of the firm brings to mind the image of persons volun-
tarily entering into contracts in a competitive market."2 Empha-
sis is placed on the voluntariness of exchange relationships and
the degree to which individuals can obtain safeguards to protect
their interests. Visions of reaching pareto optimal solutions
without governmental intervention arise with this description of
the firm.8"
31. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 14, at 777. This description of the employment
relationship has been criticized as obscuring the asymmetrical nature of that relation-
ship. C. PERROW, supra note 19, at 226-27; Putterman, On Some Recent Explanations of
Why Capital Hires Labor, 22 EcoN. INQUIRY 171, 175 (1984); see also C. PERROW, supra
note 19, at 230.
32. Note, however, that actual bargaining is not required by various contract models,
because the market is relied upon to produce offers in response to the demands of con-
sumers. E.g., Klein, The Modern Business Organization, supra note 14, at 1522. In pro-
posing his "series of bargains" model, Professor Klein states, "[Tihe theory developed
here does not necessarily assume that people engage in bargaining. Indeed, if one balks
at this notion, one can think in terms of a bargain (an outcome) rather than bargaining
(a process)." See also, Hetherington, Redefining the Task of Corporation Law, 19
U.S.L. REv. 229, 256 (1985) ("[T]he fact that individual investors cannot bargain over
the provisions of a specific issue is unimportant as long as the market gives issuers an
incentive to offer investment packages that investors will buy.").
33. A pareto optimal transaction is one that makes one individual better off without
making some other individual worse off, based on each individual's subjective evaluation
of his own welfare. P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 460 n.12 (9th ed. 1973). It appears that if
two individuals agree to contract, both individuals are better off than if they did not
contract. However, a pareto optimal transaction has not necessarily occurred because the
new contract may change the terms of a prior contract. These changes may make one of
the parties worse off. In addition, the contract may change other preexisting relation-
ships by, for example, excluding someone else from contracting with a party. Also, the
implementation of contractual terms may have adverse effects on third parties. Some
writers use a modified version of pareto superiority, known as the Kaldor-Hicks formula-
tion. This formulation of efficiency only requires that the transaction increase net social
welfare and is unconcerned with its distribution. R. POSNER, supra note 7, at 13-14. It is
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In contrast, once the power model introduces authority and
power into the conceptual framework, the degree to which con-
sent is fictitious in, for example, the context of a contractual re-
lationship or the structure of decision making in the firm be-
come matters for regulatory concern. The difference in the
concepts of the firm is also reflected in the vision of the firm as
it interacts with its "environment." The firm appears essentially
benign with the efficiency model, whereas with the power model
it does not. According to the efficiency model, the firm merely
reacts to market forces. According to the power model, the firm
acts to increase its power over its environment. 4 With the power
model, the firm itself is a formidable social and political institu-
tion that shapes society rather than merely being shaped by it.
II. MANAGEMENT
A. Efficiency Model
Management is an "agent" for various constituencies, 5 such
as shareholders, employees, and customers, although some writ-
ers believe that management is an agent only for shareholders.3
The perception of management as an agent is reinforced by the
efficiency model's emphasis on the constraining forces of various
markets.
sometimes referred to as wealth maximization. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis
of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980).
Wealth maximization suffers from many of the same ethical and political objections di-
rected at utilitarianism. E.g., Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563, 574-84
(1980); Kornhauser, A Guide to the Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in the Law, 8 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 591, 599-600 (1980).
34. See infra text accompanying notes 228-316.
35. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 14, at 778 (describing management as the "cen-
tral contracting agent"); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 14, at 310.
36. E.g., Fischel, supra note 14, at 1262. Not all theorists whose writings fall within
the efficiency model agree with this characterization of management. Professor Klein
criticizes the use of agency terminology and emphasizes the legitimate interests of man-
agement in control. See infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text. Professor William-
son, who adopts the transaction cost approach discussed later in this article, describes
management as a "constituency" of the company. 0. WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note
14, at 312-14.
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B. Power Model
In the power model, management is a power coalition,3 7 which,
due to its strategic position in the firm,"' is usually part of the
controlling coalition.
C. Management: Not An Agent
When the term "agent" is given its proper legal meaning,
management is not an "agent" for employees, customers, or
creditors. The source of the confusion with the efficiency model
appears to stem from a frequently cited article that broadly de-
fines agency as "a contract under which one or more persons
(the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform
some service on their behalf which involves delegating some de-
cision-making authority to the agent."3 9 According to this defini-
tion, whenever a person does not perform a service herself and
engages in a barter transaction, she has "delegated" decision-
making authority to another. Under this definition, all contrac-
tual relationships become agency relationships.
Key elements in a true agency relationship are the principal's
control over the agent and the agent's obligation to act in the
principal's interest. An employer often favors an agency rela-
tionship, not because he wants to delegate "decision-making au-
thority to another," but because he wants to retain decision-
making authority over the actions of the agent.4" "Agency,"
properly understood, is a fiduciary relationship characterized by
a promise by the agent to the principal: (1) to act on her behalf
and (2) subject to her control."1 Under this definition, managers
37. See supra note 28.
38. Management has access to external coalitions and is centrally located to obtain
information concerning the company. Moreover, it has formal authority over employees.
39. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 14, at 308.
40. The control by the principal and the fact that the agent has undertaken to act in
the principal's interest also explain other legal characteristics of this relationship, the
liability of the principal for the actions of the agent, and the fiduciary obligations of the
agent to the principal. The liability of the principal for the actions of the agent logically
flows from the control exercised by the principal and the fact that the agent is acting to
further the principal's business. Note that the fiduciary obligation does not appear to
arise from the principal's liability for the actions of the agent as has been asserted. See
Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA
L. REV. 738, 760 (1978). For example, a trustee owes a fiduciary duty to beneficiaries of a
trust, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1954), but the beneficiaries are not liable
for the actions of the trustee.
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1957).
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are not agents for employees, customers, or creditors. Managers
are not subject to the continuous and active control of employ-
ees, customers, or creditors.'2 Moreover, they do not owe these
persons a fiduciary duty to act in their best interests. Under the
efficiency model, failure to distinguish between the true agency
relationship and other kinds of contractual relationships ob-
scures the authority and control aspects of the agency
relationship.' s
As corporate law scholars are well aware, managers are also
not agents for shareholders. Although managers owe fiduciary
duties to shareholders, they are not subject to the continuous
and active control of shareholders." In fact, state corporation
statutes grant independent authority to the board of directors to
manage the corporation.' 5 The rights of shareholders over man-
agers are limited. Although shareholders can vote for directors, 6
they can nominate them only if they are willing to incur sub-
stantial expenses. Shareholders may fill vacancies on the board,
but only under certain circumstances. 7 In addition, they may
vote on board-initiated proposals only with respect to certain
42.
The agent differs from most other fiduciaries such as executors, trustees, etc., in
that he remains under the continuous control of the principal as to matters re-
lating to the object of his agency, throughout the entire period of his agency.
The agent has a duty, at all times, to obey the directions of his principal, even
though the principal may have initially indicated he would not give such addi-
tional instructions.
W. SELL, AGENCY 2 (1975).
43. This tendency on the part of the efficiency model has been noted previously. See
supra text accompanying note 31.
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14C (1957); see W. SELL, supra note 42, at
20.
45. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 300 (West 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1983);
REVISED MODEL BusINEss CORP. ACT. § 8.01(b) (1984). Under certain circumstances,
shareholders may determine corporate policy through shareholder agreements and/or by
electing special status for the corporation under state statutes primarily applicable to
close corporations. These statutes provide for the enforceability of shareholder agree-
ments under certain circumstances, and some statutes permit shareholders to dispense
with a board of directors. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 351 (1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 620 (McKinney 1986).
46. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 301 (West 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 151(a), 211(b)
(1983); REVISED MODEL BusINEss CORP. ACT § 8.03(d) (1984). In some states, debtholders
may elect directors if the company's charter so provides. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 221 (1983); CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(a)(7) (West Supp. 1987). Employees may elect di-
rectors if the charter so provides under Massachusetts corporation law. MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 156, § 23 (West 1986).
47. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 305 (West 1984 & Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
223 (1983).
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fundamental changes.48 Finally, most shareholder proposals per-
mitted under federal proxy rules must be in the form of "recom-
mendations" to the board.'9 These powers fall far short of the
control exercised by principals over agents in an agency relation-
ship. Therefore, the use of the term "agent" in the efficiency
model serves to overstate control by shareholders over the ac-
tions of management. 50
In the power model, management is a power coalition. This is
an appropriate description of management's role, because it rec-
ognizes management's independent statutory source of power.
Management has the right to make various decisions concerning
the corporation granted by state corporation statutes. As a fidu-
ciary for shareholders, it is true that these decisions must be
made in the best interests of shareholders. Management, how-
ever, has the right to decide for shareholders what is in their
best interests. These judgments are subject to control only by
courts, which grant managers considerable flexibility.51
The efficiency model incorrectly uses legal terminology to de-
scribe the role of management that emphasizes control over
management. In contrast, the power model underlines manage-
ment's uniquely controlling position in the firm.
III. FIRM OBJECTIVES
The efficiency and power models differ in their depiction of
management and result in differing perceptions of the autonomy
and power that corporate managers possess. The two models
also suggest different conclusions concerning firm objectives and
the efficiency of existing governance structures. The efficiency
48. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 903, 1001, 1103, 1201, 1903 (West 1984 & Supp. 1987);
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 151, 242, 251, 271, 275 (1983); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP.
ACT §§ 10.03, 11.03, 12.02, 14.02 (1984).
49. Auer v. Dressel, 306 N.Y. 427, 118 N.E.2d 590 (1954); Adoption of Amendments
Related to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 12,999 (LEXIS,
Fedsec library, Secrel file) (Nov. 22, 1976).
50. Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1428 (1985); Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRIN-
CIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55 (1985). Use of the term "agency" to
describe contracts by management with customers, suppliers, and creditors also serves to
understate unique aspects of the shareholder-management relationship in which share-
holders have ongoing participatory rights in the governance of the corporation. Use of a
single term to describe all such relationships obscures the privilege that state corporation
laws grant to shareholders as a power coalition to vote for representatives to an ongoing
governing body of the corporation, the board of directors.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 340-41.
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model posits that firms in the aggregate maximize profits and
should pursue that objective. For support, it draws upon the
natural selection argument that maintains that only the most
profitable firms survive. In contrast, the power model suggests
that firms seek to increase their power and autonomy, which is
not necessarily synonymous with the quest for profits. According
to the power model, profit seeking fulfills the goals of some co-
alitions, but not others. The power model challenges the conclu-
sions of the efficiency model and its foundations, such as the
natural selection argument. This Section explicates and evalu-
ates these perspectives.
Adherents of the efficiency model maintain that the profit
maximizing goal has positive and normative implications. From
a positive perspective, they argue that firms in the aggregate act
as though they were maximizing profits. Firms that maximize
profits are said to utilize resources efficiently and, therefore,
maximize their chances of survival. It presumably follows that
those firms that survive do so because they are more efficiently
structured and operated than other firms that fail or hypotheti-
cal firms structured or operated in different ways. Therefore, ex-
isting governance structures (such as boards composed of share-
holder representatives and hierarchical work organization) can
be explained on the basis of efficiency considerations. From a
normative perspective, the efficiency model indicates that firms
should maximize profits to increase both efficiency and the
probability of survival of the firm, that corporations should set
goals to benefit shareholders, whose interests are presumably
consistent with profit maximization, and that government
should not interfere with existing governance structures because
they have been selected by markets as having efficient survival
properties.
The power model, in contrast, rejects profit maximization
from both a positive and normative standpoint. From a positive
perspective, firms behave as though they were seeking to de-
crease their dependence on their environment in order to in-
crease their autonomy and discretion. The actions of firms in
pursuit of power may or may not be consistent with some notion
of allocative efficiency, because firms seek to insulate themselves
from market demands and to affect the operation of markets.
The power paradigm posits that governance structures of firms
can be explained more persuasively on the basis of a number of
factors other than efficiency. From a normative perspective,
profit maximization involves value choices favoring certain
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groups. In addition, firms pursuing numerous, often inconsis-
tent, goals adapt better to changing conditions.
A. Efficiency Model
Profit maximization and cost minimization are associated with
the efficiency model. Supposedly, profit maximization can be as-
sumed and need not be proven." The profit maximization as-
sumption is purportedly buttressed by a "natural selection" ar-
gument that asserts that only firms that maximize profits will
survive.53 According to this argument, firms need not intend to
maximize profits; only those firms that actually make profit-
maximizing decisions will survive.
Some law and economics writers rely upon a weaker version of
the natural selection argument." This version replaces the no-
tion that only firms that maximize profits survive with the posi-
tion that firms with the highest profits in the marketplace have
the highest probability of survival. 5
The efficiency model also embraces another school of thought,
referred to as the "transaction cost approach, 5 6 which focuses
on particular transactions rather than the behavior of firms in
the aggregate. The transaction cost approach maintains that,
within the limits of "bounded rationality, ' 57 firms act to mini-
52. See M. FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN PosrrrwE ECONOMICS (1953); Jensen, Organization
Theory and Methodology, 50 AccT. REV. 319 (1983). Profit maximization is used as an
assumption to predict the aggregate behavior of firms responding to market conditions.
53. Milton Friedman explains:
[U]nless the behavior of businessmen in some way or other approximated behav-
ior consistent with the maximization of returns, it seems unlikely that they
would remain in business for long. Let the apparent immediate determinant of
business behavior be anything at all. . . . Whenever this determinant happens
to lead to behavior consistent with rational and informed maximization of re-
turns, the business will prosper and acquire resources with which to expand;
whenever it does not, the business will tend to lose resources and can be kept in
existence only by the addition of resources from outside. The process of "natural
selection" thus helps to validate . . . the [profit maximization] hypothesis-or
rather, given natural selection, acceptance of the hypothesis can be based largely
on the judgment that it summarizes appropriately the conditions for survival.
M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, at 22.
54. See Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 211
(1950); Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & EcON. 301, 301
n.1 (1983).
55. As with the stronger version of the argument, profits may be made through luck
or irrational decision making.
56. 0. WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 14, at 15; see Williamson, Corporate Gov-
ernance, supra note 14. See generally supra note 14.
57. See infra note 175.
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mize transaction costs. The notion of bounded rationality means
that the firm will act so as to minimize transaction or con-
tracting costs within the limits of the cognitive abilities of its
agents. Super-rationality, often associated with the profit-max-
imization assumption (but not by the natural selection argu-
ments), is not required by this approach. Unlike the approach
found in the natural selection arguments, the transaction cost
approach assumes firms minimize costs intentionally. 8
The transaction cost approach is similar to the natural selec-
tion theory in maintaining that governance relationships that
persist over a period of time, say a decade, are presumed to be
efficient.5 9 Common to the natural selection and transaction cost
approaches is the notion that competition or natural forces will
ultimately "select" the most efficient firms and governance
structures. Those structures that are efficient are those most re-
sponsive to the demands of the environment and the multiple
goals of the constituencies with which the firm must deal.
It is desirable under the efficiency model that management or-
ganize the demands on the firm into some sort of a preference
function that protects the firm from multipeaked preferences
and inconsistent goals.6 0 Rationality is achieved. Employees are
paid wages to adopt the goals of the firms. A distinction is made
between goals such as wages (side payments) that motivate em-
ployees to accept organizational roles, and goals that employees
consider after having assumed those roles. 1
B. Power Model
According to the power model, the firm acts to decrease the
uncertainty of its environment by increasing its power over, and
58. 0. WILLIAMSON, CAPrrALISM, supra note 14, at 45-46.
59. Williamson & Ouchi, The Markets and Hierarchies, supra note 14, at 363-64.
60. Fischel, supra note 14, at 1262. The reference to peaks may be a reference to the
work of Andreas Papandreou, who maintained that multiple goals were imposed upon
the organization by various participants and that they passed through a Peak Coordina-
tor, who integrated them into a single preference function. His contribution was note-
worthy at the time for finding a way to retain the maximization assumption while aban-
doning the single profit maximization goal for the firm. Papandreou, Some Basic
Problems in the Theory of the Firm, in 2 A SURVEY OF CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIS 183
(B. Haley ed. 1952); see H. MINTZsERG, supra note 19, at 12-14.
61. Cf. H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 277 (1976) (stating that organizational
goals are associated with the employee's organizational role and are only indirectly re-
lated to the personal motives of the individual in that role).
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autonomy from, its environment.6" This may be viewed as a gen-
eral corporate goal because it consistently emerges as an objec-
tive or an intended outcome of corporate actions and decisions."
The corporation utilizes various strategies to achieve these ends,
which will be pursued at the expense of profit, although subject
to a profit constraint."
In the power model the survival of governance structures can
be explained in a number of ways other than on the basis of
their profit-maximizing or cost-minimization attributes.66 They
may be perpetuated: (1) because they are demanded by those in
positions of power;66 (2) because they have become the tradi-
tional or accepted way of doing things;67 (3) because changing
structures would require the adoption of values not reinforced
62. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27 and infra text accompanying notes 228-
316.
63. Two primary characteristics of corporate goals, according to Professor Mintzberg,
are consistency and intendedness. "[T]o the extent that there is some consistency in the
intentions behind the decisions and actions taken by [the corporation's] participants, the
organization as a system can be said to pursue a certain outcome consistently." H.
MINTZBERG, supra note 19, at 246. Professor Mintzberg identifies "systems goals" as
meeting these characteristics, which include the following: "first, survival; second, a cer-
tain level of efficiency to ensure survival; third, control of the organization's environment
to ensure an adequate degree of independence. .. and fourth... growth." Id. at 247.
Professor Mintzberg maintains that the goals of survival, profit, control, and growth re-
present a hierarchy of organizational goals; the goals relate to the organization's stages of
development. He states "most often, survival, efficiency, and control seem to be treated
as constraints, goals subordinate to growth, the most common primary goal of the system
called organization." Id. at 278. This model is analogous to Maslow's needs hierarchy for
individuals. D. HELLRIEGEL, J. SLOCUM & R WOODMAN, ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 359-62
(3d ed. 1983).
64. See infra text accompanying notes 247-307. These strategies of power mainte-
nance and acquisition introduce into the power model a degree of organizational level
rationality, although somewhat less than the transaction cost approach. The natural se-
lection arguments by themselves do not require attention to internal decision-making
processes as do the power model and transaction cost approaches.
65. It may be inefficient to correct an earlier decision which in the current environ-
ment results in an inefficient governance structure. That is, transaction costs or sunk
investments may make changes to a more efficient arrangement inefficient.
66. E.g., C. PERROW, supra note 19, at 208-18; J. PFEFFER & G. SALANCIK, supra note
19, at 23, 189-90, 234-35, 277 ("power is one important variable intervening between
environments and organizations"); W. ScoTT, supra note 19, at 155, 158, 230-32, 253-54;
Perrow, Comment on Langton's "Ecological Theory of Bureaucracy," 30 ADMIN. SCI. Q.
278, 279 (1985); see also Bowles & Gintis, The Marxian Theory of Value and Heteroge-
neous Labour: A Critique and Reformulation, 1 CAMBRIDGE J. OF EcON. 173 (1977); Reich
& Devine, The Microeconomics of Conflict and Hierarchy in Capitalist Production, 12
REV. RADICAL POL. ECON. 27 (1981) (arguing that the nature of the political-economic
system, not technology or information and transaction costs, affects governance struc-
tures). See infra text accompanying notes 312-14 on the enactment process. Cf. Put-
terman, supra note 31, at 186.
67. E.g., J. PFEFFER, supra note 19, at 190, 239-41; W. SCOTT, supra note 19, at 141,
158; Meyer & Rowan, supra note 19, at 343.
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by existing structures that tend to generate their own value sys-
tem; 8 or (4) because they are buffered from the effects of
competition. 9
In the power model, it is the intentions of the dominant coali-
tion with respect to particular decisions70 that determine specific
firm goals. The aspirations of the dominant coalition define the
goals. 71 Firm goals result from continuous bargaining among co-
68. E.g., E. FROMM, THE SANE SOCIETY (1955); J. PFEFFER, supra note 19, at 190; Da-
vis, A Critique of the Ideology of Efficiency, 12 HUMBOLDT J. Soc. REL. 73, 80-84 (1985).
69. E.g., J. PFEFFER, supra note 19, at 186-87; W. SCOTT, supra note 19, at 158.
70. Some writers express the difficulty of dealing with organizational goals without,
on the one hand, reifying the corporation or granting it anthropomorphic properties or,
on the other hand, defining those goals as the aggregation of goals of individuals com-
prising the organization. R. CYERT & J. MARCH, supra note 19, at 26; Simon, On the
Concept of Organizational Goal, 9 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1 (1964). The concept of the dominant
coalition resolves aspects of this problem. As explained by Professor Scott:
* The problem of reification is avoided: individuals and groups have interests,
and the process by which these preferences come to be imposed on the organiza-
tion is specified.
* Although individuals are allowed to specify the goals of the organization,
there is no presumption that they do so on an equal footing, nor is it assumed
that individual participants hold common objectives.
* Although individuals impose goals on the organization, in most cases no sin-
gle individual is powerful enough to determine completely the organization's
goals; hence, the organization's goals are distinct from those of any of its
participants.
* Allowance is made for the presence of differences in interests among partici-
pants; some, but not all, of these differences may be resolved by negotiation, so
at any time, conflicting goals may be present.
* It is recognized that the size and composition of the dominant coalition may
vary from one organization to another and within the same organization from
time to time.
W. SCOTT, supra note 19, at 265.
71. Goals, rather than being maximized, are in the form of aspiration levels. Aspira-
tion levels are generally a function of experience (or the achievement of the firm) and the
side payments received by other coalitions comprising the firm. R. CYERT & J. MARCH,
supra note 19, at 34. This description is consistent with the equity theory of human
motivation that maintains that individuals compare their situation with that of others
and behave accordingly. E.g., D. HELLRIEGEL, J. SLOCUM & R. WOODMAN, supra note 63,
at 379-82; Campbell & Pritchard, Motivation Theory in Industrial and Organizational
Psychology, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 63, 104-05
(M. Dunnette ed. 1983). There is often a discrepancy between aspiration levels and the
actual operations of the firm with aspirations lagging behind the firm's performance in
good times and ahead of the firm's performance in bad times. R. CYERT & J. MARCH,
supra note 19, at 34. This discrepancy is referred to as organizational slack. To Professor
Mintzberg, slack is that "surplus which is kept in the organization itself, not paid to
influencers." H. MINTZBERG, supra note 19, at 252 n.5. Professors Cyert and March as-
sume that it is distributed to various coalitions, although orgahizational slack is not nec-
essarily the subject of general hargaining because it does not involve "allocation in the
face of scarcity." R. CYERT & J. MARCH, supra note 19, at 37. Those with the best access
to information concerning the location of slack are able to obtain more of it. Id. The
stabilizing effects of organizational slack, however, can be better understood with Profes-
sor Mintzberg's definition. The mechanization of stabilization is that "(1) by absorbing
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alitions through regularized channels with respect to the various
activities of the firm.72 The firm itself may also generate goals
necessary to its survival.7 s
In the power model the firm is characterized by a fair amount
of unresolved conflict.74 Multipeaked preferences are an every-
day reality for the firm, which is comprised of diverse elements.
Like any political institution (though one that must balance its
budget), it cannot expect to resolve all differences; firm goals are
inconsistent.7 5 The firm may decide to improve the health of its
workers by providing health benefits at the same time that it
excess resources, [organizational slack) retards upward adjustment of aspirations [goals]
during relatively good times; (2) by providing a pool of emergency resources, it permits
aspirations to be maintained (and achieved) during relatively bad times." R. CYERT & J.
MARCH, supra note 19, at 38. While too much slack can be harmful, W. Scorr, supra note
19, at 216, its stabilizing effect is arguably beneficial:
Resource scarcity brings on renewed bargaining and tends to cut heavily into the
excess payments introduced during plush times. . . .More important, the cush-
ion provided by organizational slack permits firms to survive in the face of ad-
versity. Under the pressure of a failure (or impending failure) to meet some set
of demands on the coalition, the organization discovers some previously unrecog-
nized opportunities for increasing the total resources available.
R. CYERT & J. MARCH, supra note 19, at 38.
72. See R. CYERT & J. MARCH, supra note 19, at 28, 33. Stability in the system may be
explained by organizational processes, such as budgets, hierarchical or cyclical attention
to goals, H. MINTZBERG, supra note 19, at 261-62, and other factors discussed supra text
accompanying notes 66-69.
73. The emergence of new goals from the organization of the firm itself is consistent
with the dominant coalition approach. Professor Scott explains:
Although interests are certainly brought to the organization and imposed on it
by some powerful participant groups, it seems entirely plausible that interests
also are generated within the organization. Managers who stand to profit from
economies realized by increased scale or technical innovation may be expected to
coalesce around these "new" interests; and others whose power is closely associ-
ated with the condition and survival prospects of the larger enterprise may be
expected to champion the interests of the organization as a whole. Thus, we
need to allow for the possibility that new interests and new coalitions may
emerge over time in response to the opportunities and dangers created by the
existence of the organizational structure itself. The dominant coalition model
appears able to accommodate these more unified conceptions of goal setting ar-
rangements posited by the rational and natural system analysts.
W. Scorr, supra note 19, at 266.
74. R. CYERT & J. MARCH, supra note 19, at 28.
75. See id. at 28, 32. Professors Cyert and March maintain that due to limitations on'
attention focus, corporations attend to goals sequentially. Id. at 35. They explain:
The sequential attention to goals is a simple mechanism. A consequence of the
mechanism is that organizations ignore many conditions that outside observers
see as direct contradictions. They are contradictions only if we imagine a well-
established, joint preference ordering or omniscient bargaining. Neither condi-
tion exists in an organization. If we assume that attention to goals is limited, we
can explain the absence of any strong pressure to resolve apparent internal
inconsistencies.
Id. at 36.
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speeds up the assembly line. It may decide to make expensive
product improvements at the same time it institutes a policy to
cut costs. Moreover, goals are often vague and ambiguous,76 hid-
ing a considerable amount of disagreement among coalitions.
This state of affairs will not necessarily lead to the demise of
the firm. In fact, vague and inconsistent goals may contribute to
the survival of the firm because they enlist the support of di-
verse participants. Also, autonomy among units within the firms,
called "loose coupling," permits the organization to adapt suc-
cessfully to diverse segmented markets. 7 In the efficiency model:
[T]he assumption is made that the organization is pri-
marily a production system and that when conflicts occur
among subunits, they must be resolved. Conflict inter-
feres with goal attainment; and its resolution is associ-
ated with greater effectiveness or performance. A quite
different view of conflict and conflict resolution processes
is associated with the [power model], which presumes
that intradepartmental conflict is not primarily a product
of error, ambiguity, and ignorance but results from quite
fundamental divergencies in group interests; and that the
struggles are not concerned simply with means but con-
cerns the goals to be served by the organization.78
The power model rejects the notion that the firm secures the
support of employees to achieve organizational goals through pe-
cuniary side payments. The paradigm posits that side payments
need not be in the form of money, but may be in the form of
76. Id. at 28.
77. E.g., H. ALDRICH, ORGANIZATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTS 83-84 (1979); J. PFEFFER &
G. SALANCIK, supra note 19, at 273; W. Scorr, supra note 19, at 108; see Weick, Educa-
tional Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems, 21 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1, 6-7 (1976). Weick
argues that loose coupling: (1) may lead to the perpetuation of certain parts of the organ-
ization because it "lowers the probability that the organization [as a whole] will have
to-or be able to-respond to each little change in the environment"; (2) provides a
"sensitive sensing mechanism" that can locally adapt without affecting the whole system;
(3) preserves more diversity permitting adaptation to "a considerably wider range of
changes in the environment than would be true for a tightly coupled system"; (4) permits
breakdown in one part of the system to be "sealed off"; (5) makes more room available
for autonomy or self-actualization having favorable motivational consequences and at the
same time, limits the consequences of bad decisions; and (6) minimizes coordination
costs. Id. at 6-8. Cf. C. PERROW, supra note 19, at 246-47 (arguing that there are advan-
tages in terms of flexibility to non-integrated firms).
78. W. Scorr, supra note 19, at 248.
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policy commitments.7 e For example, a sales manager may bar-
gain for an additional salesperson or for a computer system,
rather than for additional monetary compensation. This ap-
proach is in contrast to the efficiency model wherein "prefer-
ences are typically [although not necessarily] thought of as relat-
ing to the distribution of consequences of events and actions
rather than anything in the nature of those actions and events
themselves."80 In the power model, the interests of participants,
on the one hand, and decision making "in roles," on the other,
are not so readily separated.
C. Discussion and Comparison of Models
The normative foundation for the profit maximization goal is
the classical theory of the firm. In that theory, given the existing
distribution of wealth and under conditions of perfect informa-
tion and competition, firms that maximize profits will cause soci-
ety's resources to be used most efficiently by virtue of Adam
Smith's invisible hand. This utilization of resources is efficient
not only for shareholders, but also for consumers and employees.
Once the underlying conditions of this theory no longer hold,
however, efficiency cannot be equated with profit maximization,
although corporate law scholars continue to assume such a rela-
tionship.81 The relationship becomes increasingly attenuated as
markets become more imperfect. This position is illustrated by
examining the behavior of a monopolist: A monopolist maxi-
mizes profits by restricting output and raising prices. Resources,
including materials and labor, that would be most efficiently uti-
lized in the production of the monopolist's products are diverted
to other less valuable uses. The monopolist captures surplus
value that would, in a competitive market, go to consumers. In
addition, there is a net social loss of value."2 As the behavior of a
79. R. CYERT & J. MARCH, supra note 19, at 30-32 ("[S]ide payments, far from being
the incidental distribution of a fixed, transferable booty, represent the central process of
goal specification.").
80. Turk, Conclusion: Power, Efficiency and Institutions: Some Implications of the
Debate for the Scope of Economics, in POWER, EFFICIENCY AND INSTITUTIONS 189, 201
(1983).
81. E.g., Eisenberg, Corporate Legitimacy, Conduct, and Governance-Two Models
of the Corporation, 17 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 1, 5-6, 17 (1983) (arguing that a share-
holder's interest in profits coincides with the social interest in efficiency). This equation
of high profits with efficiency permits economic theories to provide normative prescrip-
tions. C. PERROW, supra note 19, at 222.
82. R. POSNER, supra note 7, at 249-59 (1986).
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monopolist thus illustrates, the maximization of profits in an im-
perfect market is not necessarily consistent with efficiency. The
resources of society would be more effectively utilized if the mo-
nopolist decreased its profits by lowering its price and increasing
the quantity of goods produced. Such losses and inefficiencies
occur in all imperfect markets. Profit maximization is not a
proxy for pareto optimal efficiency in the real world; neither is
cost minimization.
88
Efficiency is supposed to be a neutral term, referring to the
most cost-effective means to an end; however, a particular end
must be selected.8 4 Although such a choice is not necessary when
the invisible hand operates, in the absence of its operation, the
choice becomes crucial. For example, as applied to the employee,
customer, and shareholder, respectively, efficiency means work-
ing for fewer hours or with less effort for a given wage, obtaining
a higher quality product for a given price, and minimizing side
payments so as to maximize profits. As previously noted, in the
classical theory of the firm, these various criteria of efficiency
will be effectively handled by classical firms maximizing profits.
Nevertheless, in imperfect markets, existing outside an econom-
ics textbook, choosing "profit" as the efficiency goal reflects
value choices favoring stockholders.8 5 The relevant questions in
an imperfect market, then, are "efficient for whom?" and "at
what cost to others?"
Profit maximization as the corporate goal is also problematic
in that the calculation of profit does not account for externalities
or third-party effects. Psychic efficiencies or atmospheric effects
of different governance structures are also generally not consid-
ered.88 Moreover, profits in the stock market do not necessarily
translate into enhancement of the value of underlying assets.
87
The value of profit maximization as a normative goal then is
questionable.
According to the efficiency model, the assumption that firms
in the aggregate maximize profits need not be proven. This as-
sertion has been extensively criticized because it obviates "a se-
rious concern with the validity of the premises, reasoning, and
83. P. SAMUELSON, supra note 33, 586-87 n.4. Professor Samuelson discusses the be-
havior of a monopsonist in a labor market.
84. H. MINTZBERG, supra note 19, at 268-70; H. SIMON, ADMINiSTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 179
(1976).
85. H. MINrrZBERG, supra note 19, at 268-69.
86. Reich & Devine, supra note 66, at 32 ("[N]umerous studies have found that dif-
ferences in working conditions are very poorly or not at all compendated by wage differ-
entials, contrary to competitive wage theory .... .
87. See supra text accompanying notes 142-43.
FALL 1988]
Journal of Law Reform
facts supporting a conclusion [that] is a hallmark that distin-
guishes a scientific or scholarly approach from a practical or
propagandistic one." 8 As one scholar warns, "[To] get the right
answer for the wrong reason may make the theoretical model
"989useless, or worse ....
The natural selection arguments that supposedly buttress this
profit-maximization assumption are likewise problematic. First,
the argument that profit-seeking behavior determines survival,
and that in the long run the most efficient governance structures
will survive, is based on competition. The natural selection
theories do not, however, specify the amount of competition or
time lengths required. To the extent that competition is imper-
fect, firms are sheltered from competitive pressures. In the
United States, for example, failures of firms are largely confined
to small businesses, which "constitute a relatively small portion
of the total economic activity."91 Selection appears to occur
mostly among small firms operating in highly competitive envi-
ronments. For the large firm in a less competitive environment,
profit-seeking behavior is less important to survival, and its gov-
ernance structure cannot be presumed to be determined by a
process of "natural selection." Governance structures in particu-
lar are unlikely to be changed in the absence of a highly compet-
itive environment because they have power implications and are
easily "traditionalized." An illustration of this may very well be
that management often turns to employee ownership and par-
ticipatory arrangements at the plant level only when their firms
are failing due to competitive pressures.92
Second, it should also be noted that the justification of ex-
isting governance structures on the basis of natural selection ar-
guments is largely outcome determinative. That is, existing
structures that have been around for awhile are presumed to be
efficient by definition. These existing structures are then com-
pared to see if cost and incentive arguments can be made to jus-
88. Winter, Optimization and Evolution in the Theory of the Firm, in ADAPTIrVE Ec-
ONOMIC MODELS 73, 93 (1974); Kornhauser, A Guide to the Perplexed Claims of Effi-
ciency in the Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 591, 621 n.69, 625 n.75 (1980); Nagel, Assumptions
in Economic Theory, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 211 (1963); Rizzio, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 641, 645 n.18 (1980). See generally Winter, Economic "Natural Selec-
tion" and the Theory of the Firm, 4 YALE ECON. ESSAYS 225, 242-45 (1964) (stating that
natural selection requires various conditions that do not exist in reality).
89. J. PFEFFER, supra note 19, at 133.
90. E.g., id. at 132; Winter, supra note 88, at 98.
91. C. PERROW, supra note 19, at 211-12; J. PFEFFER, supra note 19, at 186-87.
92. See generally J. O'TOOLE, MAKING AMERICA WORK-- PRODUCTIVITY AND RESPONSI-
BILITY (1981).
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tify their special features. The problem is that virtually any in-
stitution can be justified if enough subjective and objective cost,
benefit, and incentive factors are taken into account, because
there is no way to weigh any of these variables. Various justifica-
tions for existing governance structures are examined in Part IV.
Third, the use of natural selection arguments to justify ex-
isting governance structures is suspect because the analysis of
institutional structures is made against a static environment.
Because the environment is continually changing, there is no
way of knowing whether a governance structure is efficient for
today or tomorrow. Even if the arguments are valid, they should
not be used prescriptively to defend existing institutions as suit-
able now or in the future. Fourth, it is by "no means certain that
an organization that is optimally adjusted to its current environ-
ment will be the one which is most able to respond to changes in
that environment."9 3
Fifth, the natural selection arguments also tend to be teleolog-
ical; they assume there is some ideal towards which all things
strive.94 Even if the argument is correct in some sense, the ques-
tion remains: ideal for whom and at what cost to others? 95 Effi-
ciency, as discussed previously, is not neutral. In commenting on
an analogous population ecology model in sociology, Professor
Perrow notes:
[T]he new model of organization-environment relations
. ..tends to be a mystifying one, removing much of the
power, conflict, disruption, and social class variables from
the analysis of social processes. It neglects the fact that
our world is made in large part by particular men and
women with particular interests. Instead, it searches for
ecological laws that transcend the hubbub that sociology
should attend to. It will have a promising future, I fear,
because it is allied with the prestigious natural sciences,
is amenable to the statistical tools we have developed
and the emphasis upon large surveys, and is, in a curious
way, comforting."'
93. Turk, supra note 80, at 193. The premise of the natural selection argument (firms
that optimize profit are most likely to survive) has been refuted by a recent simulation
study. Witt, Firms' Market Behavior Under Imperfect Information and Economic Nat-
ural Selection, 7 J. EcoN. BEHAV. & ORG. 265 (1986) (rejecting strong and weak form
natural selection hypotheses in computer simulation study, assuming imperfect
information).
94. See C. PERROW, supra note 19, at 210.
95. Id. at 209-10.
96. Id. at 213-14.
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Unlike the efficiency model, the power model evidences that
reasons other than efficiency can explain the persistence of insti-
tutional structures. 97 Moreover, unlike the transaction cost ap-
proach where the motive of the corporation is cost minimization,
the power model reveals that the principal motivating forces un-
derlying firm behavior are power and autonomy. In addition, the
firm is not viewed as being merely "selected" by an environment
due to its ability to minimize costs. Rather, a firm molds its en-
vironment to suit organizational purposes. The firm is one of the
actors constituting the market to whom others must adapt."
It may be argued that the power model's description of the
firm applies only to large corporations in less competitive mar-
kets. If that is the case, the natural selection argument of the
efficiency model tends to explain the behavior of small, numer-
ous organizations in competitive markets, whereas the power
model applies to larger organizations in less competitive mar-
kets. 9e The power model then would be important for under-
standing the most important sectors of the American economy.
It may also be argued that the power model explains the be-
havior of individual firms in the short run, but that the effi-
ciency model, buttressed by the natural selection arguments,
provides accurate generalizations about corporations in the long
run.100 However, as previously discussed, the natural selection
arguments are unpersuasive.
IV. FIRM BEHAVIORAL DETERMINANTS, THE SHAREHOLDER-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONSHIP, AND THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
A. Efficiency Model
In addition to the natural selection theory, the efficiency
model offers three other theories to explain why existing govern-
ance arrangements are efficient. This Section focuses on why
shareholders have certain rights, including the right to place
representatives on the board of directors to the exclusion of
97. See supra text accompanying notes 65-69.
98. C. PERROW, supra note 19, at 212-14; Bauer & Cohen, The Invisibility of Power in
Economics: Beyond Markets and Hierarchies, in POWER,' EFFICIENCY AND INSTITUTIONS
81, 94 (1983) (stating that firms "constitute a [system of actors in a market universe]
whose functions they simultaneously define").
99. Cf. W. ScoTT, supra note 19, at 204-05.
100. Williamson & Ouchi, The Market and Hierarchies, supra note 14, at 30. Cf. J.
PFEFFEP, supra note 19, at 204; W. ScoTT, supra note 19, at 204-05.
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other constituencies. Three theories are explored: the residual
rights approach, which places special emphasis on the impor-
tance of property rights to incentives and behavior; the related
agency cost approach, which focuses upon a number of cost fac-
tors and competition in various markets to understand contrac-
tual forms; and the transaction cost approach, which emphasizes
the importance of asset specific investments made by parties to
contractual relationships. This Section will critique the internal
logic of these theories. The next section will conclude with the
power model's more plausable explanation of existing govern-
ance arrangements.
1. Residual rights approach- The residual rights approach
attaches great importance to the connection between corporate
control and the right to the residual earnings (profits) of the
firm. The explanation of this connection is related to the issue of
why firms exist in the first place. Before turning to an examina-
tion of the residual rights approach, the change in language used
by early and more recent residual rights writers must be ad-
dressed, because it has a bearing on the conceptual lens pro-
vided by the efficiency model. This change in terminology is par-
tially explained by more recent writers' adoption of a different
concept of the firm, the "nexus of contracts" concept, as op-
posed to the prior entrepreneurial concept of the firm.
Early writers described the economic landscape as "islands of
conscious power [(firms)] in this ocean of unconscious co-opera-
tion [(markets)] like lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of but-
termilk." 01 The relevant question was why do these "islands of
conscious power" exist? That is, why are organizations necessary
or why is an "entrepreneur-co-ordinator, who directs produc-
tion 1 02 needed, when coordination can be accomplished through
markets? These questions imply that early writers thought that
the distinguishing feature of the firm was the "supersession of
the price mechanism"10 3 or the replacement of the pricing mech-
anism with the firm's authority relationships.
More recent writers have rejected this characterization. They
maintain that "it is not quite correct to say that a 'firm'
101. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 EcONOMICA 386, 388 (1937) (footnote omitted).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 389. Professor Coase explained:
Outside the firm, price movements direct production, which is co-ordinated
through a series of exchange transactions on the market. Within a firm, these
market transactions are eliminated and in place of the complicated market
structure with exchange transactions is substituted the entrepreneur-co-
ordinator, who directs production.
Id. at 388.
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supercedes the 'market.' Rather, one type of contract supercedes
another type. '14 Queries regarding the necessity of organiza-
tions are no longer important, because organizations exist only
as nexuses of different kinds of contracts. The concept of firm
boundaries, whereby some activities were viewed as being "in-
side" the firm and ordered by authority and direction and where
other activities were viewed as being "outside" the firm and or-
dered by contract, thus disappears.' 6 All relationships with the
firm are explained in terms of contracts. There is no generic dis-
tinction between relationships with parties "inside the firm,"
such as shareholders and employees, and relationships with par-
ties "outside the firm," such as suppliers or customers. The firm
itself is merely a facilitator for exchanges, much like a wheat
market.0'0
This change in perspective tends to downplay the extent to
which discretionary authority inheres in certain relationships
"within" the firm,10 7 and the extent to which firms are islands of
"conscious power." This emphasis is typical of the efficiency
model. Nevertheless, to stress that all arrangements are contrac-
tual also challenges the perception of the market as an "ocean of
unconscious buttermilk,"108 which the efficiency model em-
braces. While the term "market" often gives the impression of
some automatic, unconscious mechanism; in fact, markets are
often negotiated environments, particularly for large firms, in
which social, cultural, and political factors play a large role.10 9
104. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J.L. & EcON. 1, 10 (1983) (em-
phasis in original). Professors Alchian and Demsetz explain:
It is common to see the firm characterized by the power to settle issues by fiat,
by authority, or by disciplinary action superior to that available in the conven-
tional market. This is a delusion. The firm does not own all its inputs. It has no
power of fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action any different in the slightest
degree from ordinary market contracting between any two people.
Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 14, at 777.
105. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 14, at 311. The power perspective defines a
firm's boundaries as follows:
The organization is the total set of interstructured activities in which it is en-
gaged at any one time and over which it has discretion to initiate, maintain, or
end behaviors. . . .The boundary is where the discretion of the organization to
control an activity is less than the discretion of another organization or individ-
ual to control that activity.
J. PFEFFER & G. SALANCIK, supra note 19, at 32.
106. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 14, at 777.
107. This view is not shared by the transaction cost theorists, however. See infra text
accompanying notes 173-227.
108. Coase, supra note 101, at 388.
109. See, e.g., Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of
Embeddedness, 91 AM. J Soc. 481 (1985); MacCauley, Non-Contractual Relations in
Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. Rav. 55 (1963).
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Accordingly, the change in terminology intentionally downplays
the extent to which "conscious power" is exercised by firms. On
the other hand, it also has the unintended consequence of con-
firming the extent to which markets are not characterized by
"unconscious cooperation." It therefore suggests some character-
istics of the power model.
The problematic residual rights approach is reflected in two
theories that place importance on the connection between firm
control and the right to residual earnings. These theories are re-
ferred to herein as the "modes of payment" and the "incentive-
residual rights" theories. The first theory is an early theory that
mainly deals with control of the classical capitalist firm by the
entrepreneur (owner-manager). The second more modern theory
extends its explanation to the public corporation with diffuse
ownership.
a. Modes of payment theory- According to the "modes of
payment" theory, organization of the firm is explained by the
specialization of the entrepreneurial function which is required
under conditions of uncertainty.10 The specialization of this
function requires a differentiation of rewards or "modes of pay-
ment."'' Variable profits (or the residual) go to the entrepre-
neur who controls production and fixed contractual payments to
110. F. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 267-70 (1921). According to Professor
Knight, in the absence of uncertainty, there would be no need "for anything of the na-
ture of the responsible management or control of productive activity." Id. at 267. While a
"coordinator" of the activities of individuals may be necessary, "such functionaries
would be laborers merely, performing a purely routine function, without responsibility of
any sort, on a level with men engaged in mechanical operations." Id. at 268. According to
Professor Knight, with uncertainty "the primary problem or function is deciding what to
do and how to do it." Id. at 268. The actual doing of things becomes secondary in impor-
tance. A "new economic functionary," id. at 268, the entrepreneur, is therefore created,
specializing in decision making under uncertainty. Because "men differ in their powers of
effective control over other men as well as in intellectual capacity to decide what should
be done," id. at 269, the centralization of this management function in experts through
the organization of the firm provides least cost results.
Professor Coase disagreed with Knight's belief that the organization of the firm was
due to the specialization of the entrepreneurial function. Coase states:
[T]he fact that certain people have better judgment or better knowledge does
not mean that they can only get an income from it by themselves actively taking
part in production. They can sell advice or knowledge. Every business buys the
services of a host of advisors. We can imagine a system where all advice or
knowledge was bought as required. Again, it is possible to get a reward from
better knowledge or judgment not by actively taking part in production but by
making contracts with people who are producing.
Coase, supra note 101, at 400-01; see also Cheung, supra note 102, at 5-6 ("[I1f every
activity is measured and priced, then benefits arising from specialization and coordina-
tion can be realized" by market exchanges.).
111. F. KNIGHT, supra note 110, at 271.
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factors of production. This argument is primarily based on prac-
tical considerations:
With human nature as we know it it would be impracti-
cable or very unusual for one man to guarantee to an-
other a definite result of the latter's actions without be-
ing given power to direct his work. And on the other
hand the second party would not place himself under the
direction of the first without such a guaranty.11 s
Thus, fixed payments and the relinquishment of control, or, al-
ternatively, profit sharing and control, go hand in hand.
This theory, however, cannot withstand analysis. The case of
independent contracting, for example, is contrary to the coup-
ling of profit sharing and control. 113 Independent contractors
maintain control over work performed, but are often promised
fixed payments. Assurances that the work will be performed
properly can be given without the purchaser controlling the
work. In addition, employees who relinquish control over their
labor often enter into profit sharing agreements. 1 " Although the
positive incentive effect of profit sharing may be diminished if
employees have little control over decisions affecting profits, 1 5
profit-sharing is nevertheless attractive to some employees, de-
pending on their attitudes towards risk.1 6 It has been suggested
that shareholders, who share in profits, and debtholders, who re-
ceive fixed payments, differ not in their interest in controlling
the company, but only in their attitude towards risk and their
112. Id. at 270. Professor Knight also associates with the new economic functionary
(the entrepreneur) confidence in his judgment and powers that permits him to assume
the risk and guarantee the "doubtful and timid" a specific return. Id. at 270. In addition,
at one point Professor Knight stresses the importance of bonding. Although he concedes
the possibility of an entrepreneur investing no money in the business and offering as
security his own earning power, he claims "the potential earning power of the entrepre-
neur himself. . . might not be marketable on account of a moral hazard without being
underwritten by a property-owning connection." Id. at 274 n.1, 289 n.1.
113. Coase, supra note 101, at 401.
114 Coase, supra note 101, at 392 ("[O]ne entrepreneur may sell his services to an-
other for a certain sum of money, while the payment to his employees may be mainly or
wholly a share in profits.").
115. E.g., R. KATZELL & D. YANKELOVICH, WORK, PRODUCTIVITY AND JOB SATISFACTION:
AN EVALUATION OF POLICY-RELATED RESEARCH 324 (1975). "Generally, [cognitive theories
of worker motivation] hold that an important influence on worker motivation is the ex-
tent to which the employee sees a connection between his increased output and the re-
wards he receives." Id. For further information on motivation, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 123-31.
116. Klein, supra note 14, at 1534 (categorizing employee profit sharing as a high-risk
claim). According to Professor Knight, employees, unlike the entrepreneur, are risk
averse. See supra note 112.
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degree of optimism concerning the future of the company." 7
Practical considerations as to appropriate modes of payment,
therefore, do not necessarily account for control by the entrepre-
neur of the classical capitalist firm."18
b. Incentive-residual rights approach- The second residual
rights theory, the incentive-residual rights approach, argues that
control of the corporation by the entrepreneur is the most effi-
cient arrangement because the ownership of residual rights pro-
vides an incentive to maximize the performance of the firm. Co-
ordination of activities within the firm is explained by the
difficulty of metering the outputs of various factors of produc-
tion when team production is involved (for example, the joint
lifting of cargo by two men)." 9 A central coordinator (or entre-
preneur) can efficiently estimate the marginal productivity of
each input by observing the behavior of inputs.120 In addition,
through monitoring, the central coordinator can decrease shirk-
ing, which is encouraged by the difficulty of metering where
team production is involved.' 2 ' Thus, inputs are more efficiently
utilized under the direction of a central monitor than through
market exchanges.
This analysis does not explain, however, why the entrepreneur
must also be entitled to all the profits. The connection between
control and the right to the residual is explained by the fact that
the central monitor will have an added incentive not to shirk
and to utilize the resources of the team most efficiently if he is
also entitled to the profits.'2 2 In this way, the incentive-residual
117. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 14, at 789 n.14.
118. Professor Knight does discuss the modern corporation with many shareholders.
He maintains that the neglected feature of the "responsible direction of economic life
... [is] the inseparability of these two elements, [financial] responsibility and control."
F. KNIGHT, supra note 110, at 271 (emphasis in original). That is, "[a]ny degree of effec-
tive exercise of judgment, or making decisions, is in a free society coupled with a corre-
sponding degree of uncertainty-bearing, of taking responsibility for those decisions." Id.
at 271. Despite diffuse ownership in the modern corporation, he concludes that the sepa-
ration of ownership and control is "illusory," when "control is accurately defined and
located." At this point, a fair amount of confusion enters Knight's analysis. He says that
control principally means "the selection of men to make decisions." Id. at 297. At an-
other point, he elaborates on what he means by this which demonstrates that he is pri-
marily referring to the functions of the entrepreneur in the classical firm: "The responsi-
ble decision relates to men rather than things, the ultimate manager is he who plans the
organization, lays out functions, selects men for functions and appraises their value to
the organization as a whole, in competition with all other bidders in the market." Id. at
308.
119. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 14, at 779-80.
120. Id. at 780.
121. Id.
122. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 14, at 782.
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rights theory justifies control by the entrepreneur of the classical
capitalist firm.
Proponents of this theory reject profit sharing among mem-
bers of large teams, because each team member would receive
only a small percentage of the profits. Under this arrangement,
it is said that more shirking can be expected by employees, be-
cause "only a smaller percentage of the losses occasioned by the
shirker will be borne by him."12 The incentive-residual rights
theory does not recognize that the smaller percentage loss suf-
fered by the employee may nevertheless be significant to the em-
ployee if he is aware of the personal loss that his shirking will
produce.12" That is, the employee does not have to be entitled to
the full "output" from his efforts to be motivated to obtain a
fraction. In fact, one could argue that he might even work
harder in that situation. What is significant to his motivation is
the percentage of his wealth tied up in the profits of the com-
pany and the degree to which there is a connection between his
efforts and the percentage of the company's earnings he is enti-
tled to receive.1
25
The corollary to the statement that the employee bears only a
small percentage of the costs of his shirking is that he is entitled
to a small fraction of the "output" his efforts produce. This is
true only in a very narrow sense. Unless the employee is being
exploited, other factors contribute to his output. Thus, the em-
ployee's motivation would not be adversely affected by the no-
tion of sharing implied by this reasoning.1 26
123. Id. at 786; see also infra note 126 (regarding the significance of shirking).
124. Cf. Anderson, supra note 40, at 784-86 (discussing incentive compensation plans
and stock ownership for management).
125. Indeed, the measurement issue is the problem. This measurement problem also
exists for the central monitor. His efforts will only be reflected imperfectly in the firm's
profits. This problem is reflected in the probabilities used in calculating the effort/re-
ward ratio in expectancy theory. See infra text accompanying note 129.
126. See infra note 133 and text accompanying notes 146-49 for discussion of equity
theory. Professor Perrow would not give central importance to shirking in understanding
organizations. He explains that employees' utilities are not likely to be achieved by
shirking, but rather by seeking "safe work, interesting work, opportunity to use and de-
velop skills, some autonomy, influence in decisions that affect not only working condi-
tions but the efficiency of the organization." C. PERROW, supra note 19, at 230. In addi-
tion, Professor Perrow maintains that this incentive-residual rights approach ignores the
incentive of the control monitor to act opportunistically with respect to the employees of
the firm. He points out that "[e]xploitation of employees would appear to be a problem
at least as great as, and probably far greater than, shirking by employees, given the self-
interest assumed to drive the model and the obviously superior resources of the monitor,
entrepreneur, CEO, or capitalist." Id. at 227. This analysis draws attention to the asym-
metrical nature of the relationship that is based upon authority rather than contract. Id.
at 226-28, 230.
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Proponents of the incentive-residual rights theory also make
the unsupported empirical assumption for large teams that:
the cost of team production is increased if the residual
claim is not held entirely by the central monitor. . . .[Ihf
profit-sharing had to be relied upon for all team mem-
bers, losses from the resulting increase in central monitor
shirking could exceed the output gains from the in-
creased incentives of other team members not to shirk.
127
Factors relevant to motivation, however, are not taken into ac-
count in making this assumption.
First, there is no necessary linear relationship between in-
creasing percentage rights to profits and increasing profit-seek-
ing motivation. It is more likely that there is a decreasing return
to scale as the absolute monetary rewards to the central monitor
increase. At some point, it will be more efficient for the firm to
share profits with employees than to have all profits go to the
central monitor.
12 8
Second, expectancy theory provides that motivation depends
on the value of the reward multiplied by the expected effort/
reward ratio. 29 The ratio measures the expected amount of ef-
fort required to receive a given reward. Rewards, however, are
not only in the form of money, but include such things as status
or prestige, the nature of the work itself, increased responsibil-
ity, and opportunities for personal growth. 30 Opportunities to
pursue these other values are more available to top managers
than to lower-level employees, because of the greater degree of
discretion possessed by top managers. The pursuit of these val-
127. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 14, at 786.
128. This concept is similar to the satiation concept invoked by needs theorists.
129. Unlike reinforcement and drive theories, expectancy theory recognizes that indi-
vidual thoughts and intentions influence behavior. The description in the text reflects
the Porter-Lawler model of expectancy theory. See L. PORTER & E. LAWLER, MANAGERIAL
ATTITUDES AND PERFORMANCE 10-14 (1968). Actually the expected effort/reward ratio is
composed of two components: (1) the perceived contingency relationship between effort
and performance (sometimes referred to as "expectancy"), and (2) the perceived contin-
gency relationship between performance and reward (sometimes referred to as "instru-
mentality"). See id. at 179-80; Campbell & Pritchard, supra note 71, at 78. The theory is
somewhat more complex, however, embracing three feedback loops: (1) actual reward
practices influence subsequent calculations of the effort/reward ratio; (2) the experience
of satisfaction with the outcome will affect its future value; and (3) the effort/reward
contingency will be influenced by experiences of success or failure and their impact on
the individual's general self-esteem. L. PORTER & E. LAWLER, supra, at 129; Campbell &
Pritchard, supra note 71, at 78-79; see also E. Lawler, Motivation in Work Organizations
(1973).
130. D. HELLRIEGEL, J. SLOCUM & R. WOODMAN, supra note 63, at 376-77.
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ues, such as the nature of the work itself or increased responsi-
bility, may or may not be related to profit. The chief executive,
for instance, may be interested in building new modern struc-
tures or in personally overseeing certain projects, although from
the firm's perspective, this is not profit-maximizing behavior.
Moreover, numerous opportunities for self-actualization are pro-
vided by our society to persons in senior positions.'' It is likely,
therefore, that factors other than money have a greater impact
on managerial motivation than on that of lower-level employees.
Some profit sharing with employees may have a greater effect on
profit-maximizing behavior within the firm than if all profits
were to go to the top manager.
Third, greater incentives or rewards in terms of profits to
managers can have an impact on the incentives of others in the
organization. The equity theory of motivation-unlike the ex-
pectancy theory, which has an individual orienta-
tion ' 2 -indicates that motivational decisions are made by com-
paring the relationship of one's input/output ratio to the input/
output ratio of others.133 Increased management monitoring of
131. In addition, researchers have found that top managers are better able to satisfy
self-actualization needs, because of the nature of their jobs, which are more challenging
than those of lower-level employees. Id. at 364.
132. Id. at 383.
133. Adams, Toward An Understanding of Inequity, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSY-
CHOLOGY 422, 424 (1963) [hereinafter Adams, Toward an Understanding]. See generally
Adams, Inequity in Social Exchange, 2 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 267
(1965); Campbell & Pritchard, supra note 71; Vecchio, An Individual-Differences Inter-
pretation of the Conflicting Predictions Generated by Equity Theory and Expectancy
Theory, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 470 (1981). Equity theory is based on cognitive disso-
nance and social comparison processes. Under this theory, differences between the input/
output ratios of a person and a comparison "other" result in tension that the person is
motivated to reduce. The amount of tension is proportional to the amount of inequity, or
the magnitude of the differences between the input/output ratios. Tension reduction is
accomplished by restoring equity, which may be accomplished by (a) altering the inputs
or outputs, (b) distorting reality and convincing oneself that the situation is fair, or (c)
leaving the firm or withdrawing.
For example, imagine a secretary who feels her boss underpays her. She could
reestablish actual equity in various ways: She could neglect her work (thus low-
ering her own inputs), demand a raise (thus raising her own outcomes), make
mistakes so that the boss will have to work harder undoing what she has done
(thus raising the boss' inputs), or sabotaging company equipment (thus blower-
ing her boss' outcomes).
Hatfield & Sprecher, Equity Theory and Behavior in Organizations in 3 RES. SOCIOLOGY
ORGANIZATIONS 95, 98 (1984). Or, alternatively, she could conclude that she really does
not deserve to be paid more or that her boss really works much harder than she does. Of
course, the boss may or may not serve as her "other" or reference group. See Ronen,
Equity Perception in Multiple Comparisons: A Field Study, 39 HuM. REL. 333 (1986)
(suggesting that reference groups outside the firm are more important than inside refer-
ence groups in explaining job attitudes and behavioral propensities of employees in man-
ufacturing firms). In addition, inequity may be less likely to occur in an impersonal ex-
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employees for the purpose of causing them to increase their ef-
forts can cause the employees to believe that others are profiting
at their expense. Moreover, profits often change in ways unre-
lated to managerial input, which can accentuate the disparity in
the output/input ratios of managers and employees, and create
further adverse motivational consequences within the firm.
There is also substantial evidence that employee ownership,
1 34
profit sharing, and gain sharing"3 5 can have positive effects on
the productive ability of the firm. Because the motivational rela-
tionship between an employee's individual effort and the result-
ing profits of the firm is attenuated, I propose that the increase
in productivity associated with such arrangements can be attrib-
uted to the social comparison rationale of the equity theory
(rather than to expectancy theory). 136 For all of the above rea-
change relationship. Campbell & Pritchard, supra note 71, at 110. Professor Adams
explains:
Evidence suggests that equity is not merely a matter of getting "a fair day's pay
for a fair day's work," nor is equity simply a matter of being underpaid. The
fairness of an exchange between employee and employer is not usually perceived
by the former purely and simply as an economic matter. There is an element of
relative justice involved that supervenes economic and underlies perceptions of
equity or inequity.
Adams, Towards an Understanding, supra, at 422.
134. See generally I. WAGNER, REPORT TO THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE: PER-
FORMANCE OF PUBLICLY-TRADED EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP COMPANIES 3-4 (1984); Conte &
Tannenbaum, Employee-Owned Companies: Is the Difference Measurable?, 101
MONTHLY LABOR REV. 97 (1978); Jones & Svejnar, Participation, Profit Sharing, Worker
Ownership and Efficiency in Italian Producer Cooperatives, 52 ECONOMICA 449 (1985).
135. More case study documentation of gain-sharing plans is needed. Bullock &
Lawler, Gainsharing: A Few Questions, and Fewer Answers, 23 HUMAN RESOURCE MGMT.
23, 38 (1984). Bullock and Lawler found only 83 such studies in the literature. They
summarize the literature as follows:
About three quarters of the gain-sharing plans reported some improvements in
productivity, quality, cost reduction, or customer service. About two-thirds re-
ported improvements in individual attitudes, morale, or quality of worklife. Over
three-quarters reported more ideas, more suggestions, more innovations. Over
one-half reported improvements in labor-management relations, working with
the union, or better communication and cooperation between supervisor and
worker. All but three cases reported at least some bonuses and pay increases
based on performance improvements.
Id. at 31. There are a number of different kinds of gain-sharing plans, including the
Scanlon, Improshare, and Ruckers Plans. Implementation of these plans generally in-
volves some participation by employees and a formula for determining bonuses. Id. at 24.
See generally R. KATZELL & D. YANKELOVICH, supra note 115, at 355; NEW YORK STOCK
EXCHANGE, INC., PEOPLE AND PRODUcTIvrrY: A CHALLENGE TO CORPORATE AMERICA 32-39
(1982); Fein, Gain-sharing Is Antidote to Problems Between Workers and Managers,
INDUS. ENGINEERING 50, 60-62 (1983) (describing study of 72 companies that established
Improshare Plans showed 22.2% increase in productivity in first year).
136. A variety of explanations have been offered for this increased productivity other
than the one offered in this article. Some argue that the increased productivity primarily
results from economic motivation. E.g., Geare, Productivity From Scanlon-type Plans, 1
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sons, the efficient organization of the classical capitalist firm
cannot be explained by reference to the right to the residual be-
longing to the entrepreneur.
Of course, in the modern corporation, residual rights are not
held entirely by the central monitor. Stock ownership is shared
among shareholders, managers, and employees. Nevertheless,
the incentive-residual rights theory is not abandoned by residual
rights theorists in this context to explain the efficient organiza-
tion of the firm. Residual rights, according to this theory, remain
the central motivating force ensuring the efficiency of the firm.
Although shareholders have only limited voting rights, it is said
that shareholders control management by "exiting" the firm,
thereby causing the price of the company's stock to fall. The de-
crease in stock price affects management's ability to acquire fi-
nancing for the firm and sets in motion the "market for corpo-
rate control" in which large residual owners displace presumably
inefficient management.13 Moreover, capital market pressures
cause firms to adopt compensation arrangements for manage-
ment that align the interests of shareholders and manage-
ment.138 Accordingly, the theory maintains that residual owners
are in control of the modern corporation, although indirectly
through the operation of markets.
There are several problems with this explanation of suppos-
edly efficient shareholder control of corporations. First, effi-
ciency theorists argue against the expansion of existing share-
holder voting rights on the basis of the individual shareholder's
small "percentage" interest in the firm. 39 According to this ar-
gument, individual shareholders do not have the economic in-
AcAD. MGMT. REV. 99 (1976). Others argue that it is due to the increased involvement and
participation of employees in the workplace. E.g., Rosenberg & Rosenstein, Participation
and Productivity: An Empirical Study, 33 INDUS. & LAHOR REL. REV. 355 (1980). A re-
cent argument stated that gain-sharing changes the culture of the organization:
Gain-sharing plans appear to transform individuals, working on their own tasks
and largely unaware of how their jobs interface with the whole of the organiza-
tion, into groups of employees which suddenly have a much broader understand-
ing of and commitment to the total enterprise and its success. This can en-
courage employees to work smarter and perhaps harder because they feel they
are part of an ongoing team which needs their energy, ideas and allegiance if it is
to win.
Bullock & Lawler, supra note 135, at 37.
137. E.g., Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 14, at 788; Manne, supra note 13, at 265-66.
138. Jensen & Zimmerman, Management Compensation and the Managerial Labor
Market, 7 J. ACcT. & EcON. 3 (1985).
139. Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 395, 402, 424-
25 (1983); see supra text accompanying notes 15-18 and infra note 259. But see M. Ei-
SENBERG, supra note 7, at 64-65 ("Most of the stock in any given publicly held corpora-
tion is in the hands of a relatively small number of sophisticated holders .... ").
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centive to monitor the corporation effectively. These same small
shareholders nevertheless are perceived as efficiently controlling
the firm by selling their shares and thus causing the stock price
to fall. Exiting is considered a positive force in corporate govern-
ance because it activates the market for corporate control. Yet
monitoring by exiting is done by shareholders whose individual
incentive to monitor effectively is rejected by the efficiency theo-
rist.140 The efficiency theorist fails to explain how this individual
disincentive to monitor effectively results in effective monitoring
when the behavior of shareholders is viewed in the aggregate.
Second, operation of the "market for corporate control" may not
result in a more efficient utilization of resources."' Takeovers
140. If reliance is placed on market professionals and institutional investors to moni-
tor effectively, e.g., Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control, 11 J. FIN.
EcoN. 5 (1983) then the incentives of these individuals need to be examined, rather than
those of the residual rights owners. For example, institutional investors may be more
interested in short-term rather than long-term profitability of companies. Conard, The
Supervision of Corporate Management: A Comparison of Developments in European
Community and United States Law, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1459, 1476 (1984); Lipton, Corpo-
rate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1,7 (1987); Low-
enstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation, 83 COLUM.
L. REV. 249, 280 n.127, 292-93, 300, 301 n.209, 302 n.214 (1983). Moreover, with the
teachings of the efficient market hypothesis, the incentives of institutional traders should
be examined very closely, particularly in light of the enormous amount of trading occur-
ring on the stock exchanges. Impact of Corporate Takeovers: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 115 (1985) [hereinafter Impact of Corporate Takeovers] (statement
of Professor Lowenstein); Lowenstein, supra, at 300. Note that the Securities and Ex-
change Commission relies upon the incentive of shareholders. It appears to agree with
the statement that, "Since the shareholders are betting their own money, they can be
relied on to protect not only their own interests but society's as well . Impact of
Corporate Takeovers, supra, at 292.
141. The issues as to (1) whether takeovers are beneficial to the economy, and (2)
whether they are related to managerial performance or excessive managerial compensa-
tion have not been resolved. First, the purported beneficial effects of tender offers and
mergers are demonstrated by reference to stock price changes rather than actual im-
provements in operating performance. See generally Jensen & Ruback, supra note 140.
Whether a beneficial effect is found depends upon the dates chosen for measuring stock
price changes. Studies on mergers, for example, show positive abnormal returns from the
announcement date through the outcome date. Significant negative abnormal returns
have been found in the year following the mergers. As Professor Jensen and Ruback
explain, "Explanation of these post-event negative abnormal returns is currently an un-
settled issue." Id. at 22. They are also "unsettling," according to these authors, because
"they are inconsistent with market efficiency and suggest that changes in stock price
during takeovers overestimate the future efficiency gains from mergers." Id. at 20. In
addition, studies of actual operating results raise considerable doubt as to the inferences
drawn from the stock market studies. Johnson, supra note 18, at 205. Second, the in-
creasing debt/equity ratio of businesses taken over also has to be taken into account in
assessing the beneficial effects of takeovers. Regulating Hostile Corporate Takeovers:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th
Cong. 1st Sess. 227-28 (1987). Third, takeovers may not be due to poor managerial per-
formance or excessive managerial compensation. See Coffee, Regulating the Market for
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may very well result from persons merely arbitraging two mar-
kets: the stock market and the market for underlying corporate
assets.142 The argument concerning the beneficial effects of the
operation of the market for corporate control rests upon the as-
sumption that the stock market is efficient in valuing underlying
assets. This assumption is being increasingly challenged. ""
Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Gov-
ernance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1206-07 (1984); Lowenstein, supra note 140, at 292-93,
294 n.186, 295-96 (stating that a growing number of leveraged buyouts is keeping man-
agement in control), 306. But see, Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1165 (1981) (stat-
ing that the stock price of target companies prior to takeover demonstrates an un-
derperformance of market). However, the SEC's Advisory Committee on Tender Offers
concluded that "while in certain cases takeovers have served as a discipline on inefficient
management, in other cases there is little to suggest that inefficiency of target company
management is a factor." SEC ADVISORY COMM. ON TENDER OFFERS REPORT ON REcoM-
MENDATIONs 8-9 (1983). Moreover, evidence that stock prices of rivals in the industry also
increase at the time of the tender offer indicates gains are more general, yet "removal of
inefficient target management is unlikely to be an industry-wide phenomenon." Jensen &
Ruback, supra note 140, at 25. Professor Lowenstein found that all industrial companies
that were targets of hostile takeovers in 1981 had a return on equity of 16%, hardly
consistent with inefficient management. Impact of Corporate Takeovers, supra note 140
(statement of Professor Lowenstein), at 117. Moreover, he found that the premiums were
largely attributable to tax gains. Id. at 118. See Lowenstein, supra note 140, at 289 n.165
for summary of results of 1981 takeover bid study. See also C. PERROW, supra note 19, at
251 n.35. But see Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of "Dis-
counted" Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891, 895-97 (1988).
"[T]ax effects seldom appear to have been primary motives for acquisitions." Id. at 896.
142. Professor Lowenstein suggests that two markets are involved, the day-to-day
trading market and the market for entire companies:
When one looks at oil companies as a whole, one finds prices that would be in
the range of $6 to $8 a barrel. . . . [Alt the moment if you buy a share of Exxon
you're buying oil at $3 a barrel. There are 17 barrels of oil per share of Exxon
and Exxon sells for less than $50 a share. Is the market pricing shares in Exxon
efficiently? Perhaps in the day-to-day trading market. Is that relevant to the
whole company price of Exxon? I submit to you that it's not. . . . The same
would be true of property and casualty insurance companies which almost inva-
riably sell for ratios to book value of about 175 percent and yet one can buy
property and casualty insurance companies in the day-to-day market at figures
not much above and sometimes below book value rather than at the large pre-
mium. . . . In effect, what Mr. Pickens, Mr. Steinberg, and Mr. Icahn and the
like are doing is simply arbitraging two markets. We have the day-to-day trading
market with its set of pricing criteria, too often focused on a high turnover per-
formance game played by institutional investors, and we have a quite different
market for corporate control and whole companies.
Impact of Corporate Takeovers, supra note 140 (statement of Professor Lowenstein), at
109-10; see also Lowenstein, supra note 140, at 274 (concluding that "whatever the mar-
ket's long-run tendencies toward efficiency may be, they are only that-tendencies").
143. A number of studies indicate that the stock market is not efficient from a "fun-
damental-valuation," as opposed to "information-arbitrage," point of view. See gener-
ally, Lowenstein, supra note 140, at 283-87; Wang, Some Arguments That the Stock
Market is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 341, 344 (1986) for summaries of various
studies. Keynes long ago argued that stock markets do not reflect intrinsic value at all,
but reflect the outcome of individuals trying to predict how the crowd will act in the
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Third, even if the market for corporate control operates to dis-
place inefficient management, the substantial premiums offered
to shareholders in takeovers indicate substantial inefficiency in
the governance structure of the firm.""
Lastly, it is inconsistent to argue that management will be ap-
propriately motivated by compensation linked to stock price
performance while maintaining that employees will not be simi-
larly motivated with profit-sharing arrangements. Even if this
inconsistency is put aside (as will also be explored in the next
Section), studies of the relationship between stock performance
and executive compensation do not necessarily bear out the
managerial incentive argument. These studies can be interpreted
in different ways. For example, studies showing that an eleven-
percent rise in stock market prices followed an announcement of
a short-term incentive-compensation plan do not necessarily
demonstrate that the market expects this plan to motivate man-
agers to achieve higher operating results (the incentive hypothe-
sis). It may instead mean that the market is being informed by
executives that they believe that their company's operating re-
sults will be higher and, therefore, are arranging to have their
compensation dependent on those results (information
hypothesis).145
future (thus investors "play the market"). J. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOY-
MENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 153-57 (1936). His analogy of the stock market to a beauty
contest has been found accurate by recent writers, one of whom has argued that social
dynamics (fashions or fads) heavily influence stock prices. Ackley, Commodities and
Capital: Prices and Quantities, 73 Am. EcON. REV. 1, 12-14 (1983). See generally, Kraak-
man, supra note 141, at 898-901 (discussing market hypothesis). This could explain why
prices of other firms in the industry go up when one firm in the industry is the subject of
a tender offer.
144. If takeovers are indeed due to managerial inefficiencies, see supra note 141, and
stock prices are a reflection of that inefficiency, the large premiums (30% average abnor-
mal returns) reflect that a substantial degree of inefficiency is required before the market
for corporate control will operate. Brudney, supra note 50, at 1425-26; see also Lowen-
stein, Hostile Takeovers: A Remedy of First Resort or Last Resort, 15TH ANN. SEC. REG.
INST. 9 (1988) ("average premium over market for large number of transactions in the
late 1970's and early 1980's was 80 percent"). The costs of such tender offers cannot be
overlooked. These costs include share acquisition costs, legal and other professional
costs, and costs of solicitation and advertisements. One article estimates that the costs of
such takeovers range from $6 million to $17 million. Metz, Outside Professionals Play an
Increasing Role in Corporate Takeovers, Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 1980, at 1, col. 6; see Lowen-
stein, supra note 140, at 31 ("At an average of four percent of transaction values, the
fees [for takeovers] have been aggregating about $6-7 billion a year.")
145. Correlational studies do not demonstrate the direction of causality. See Jensen
& Zimmerman, supra note 138, at 6 (arguing that the market price reaction could also be
due to the tax effect of such compensation plans); Raviv, Management Compensation
and the Managerial Labor Market, - An Overview, 7 J. AccT. & ECON. 239 (1985). Al-
though the correlations between executive compensation and current year stock prices
are statistically significant, they are "low" and much of "the variance in executive com-
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In summary, the residual rights approach does not demon-
strate that control rights in the modern corporation are organ-
ized to ensure 'the efficient utilization of resources. The modes of
payment theory does not describe reality. The incentive-residual
rights theory is also not particularly persuasive in arguing for
the superior efficiency of existing control structures.
The equity theory, discussed above,1 46 also suggests that the
residual rights approach, with its emphasis on individual max-
imization assumptions, does not provide an adequate paradigm
for the efficient control of the modern corporation. The equity
theory suggests that in exchange relationships, particularly the
long-term or more intimate ones,'14 7 equity is important to moti-
vation and should be considered. For example, one study dem-
onstrates that, contrary to the utility maximization assumption
(utilized in expectancy theory), persons will withdraw from an
inequitable situation to one less profitable, but more
equitable.141
pensation remains unexplained." Jensen & Zimmerman, supra note 138, at 4. For excel-
lent criticism of the significance of these studies, see Brudney, supra note 50, at 1422-43.
See also infra text accompanying notes 268-71 on shareholders' attempts to determine
executive compensation.
146. See supra text accompanying note 133.
147. Equity theory has been applied to various relationships. See Berkowitz & Wal-
ster, Equity Theory: Toward a General Theory of Social Interaction, 9 ADVANCES Ex-
PERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 1 (1976). It has not yet been applied to the shareholder-
management relationship.
148. Schmitt & Marwell, Withdrawal and Reward Reallocation as Responses to In-
equity, 8 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 207 (1972). In this study, pairs of subjects
had the choice between working individually or cooperatively. Each subject would make
more if they cooperated than if they worked individually. When one subject received
either two, three, or five times as much as the other subject, the amount of cooperation
decreased, with the lower-paid subject opting to forego the rewards of cooperation to
avoid the inequitable condition. Some withdrawal occurred in 40% of the pairs under
large inequity, in 25% of the pairs under moderate inequity, and in 15% under small
inequity. When persons were permitted to make transfer payments though, cooperation
increased and partial or full equity was restored. Accord Hoffman & Spitzer, Entitle-
ments, Rights, and Fairness: An Experimental Examination of Subjects' Concept of
Distributive Justice, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 259 (1985). There is some evidence that the eq-
uity effect is short-lived. E.g., Lawler, Koplin, Young & Fadem, Inequity Reduction over
Time in an Induced Overpayment Situation, 3 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PER-
FORMANCE 253 (1968). In addition, some overpayment studies, which have induced per-
sons to feel overpriced by manipulating the subjects' perceived qualifications, have been
criticized because subjects may have been responding not to inequity, but to threatened
self-esteem and/or job security. E.g., Wiener, The Effects of "Task-and "Ego-Oriented"
Performance on Two Kinds of Over compensation Inequity, 5 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HUM. PERFORMANCE 191 (1970). See generally Campbell & Pritchard, supra note 71, at
106-07. The Schmitt and Marwell study, however, noted that "the data for moderate and
large nonrectifiable inequity conditions indicate that there is more interruption [non-
cooperation] the longer the time spent under the [inequitable] condition, and the length
of each interruption tends to become longer." Schmitt & Marwell, supra, at 219. A re-
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The equity theory is at odds with the law and economics liter-
ature. While equity may be worked into the utility maximization
framework of the efficiency model by observing that inequity
can decrease the value or utility of a reward,1 9 it requires the
consideration of social, cultural,150 and distributional conse-
quences. An analysis of "efficient" governance structures would
take into account not only metering and monitoring concerns,
but social, cultural, and distributional consequences as well.
2. An addendum on incentives: the stakeholder's argu-
ment- Rather than rationalizing existing governance structures
that grant substantial discretion to managers by relying on the
incentive of residual rights owners to monitor managerial per-
formance, the recent tendency among law and economics writers
is to reach that same result by arguing that managers have a
"legitimate interest in control," 151 because of their "stake" in the
enterprise.
Managers' compensation and reputation may depend on
the success of the business; as a result, they must be con-
cerned with control to protect and enhance that bar-
gained-for element of their compensation. In fact, man-
cent study by Vecchio did not threaten self-esteem. The equity effect of the overpay-
ment situation was confirmed. Vecchio suggested in that study that the permanence of
the equity effect may be a function of individual differences in moral maturity among
subjects. Vecchio, supra note 133, at 479. Note that the self-interest assumption of law
and economics is virtually identical to Kohlberg's lowest state of moral development.
Harrison, Egoism, Altruism and Market Illusion: The Limits of Law and Economics, 33
UCLA L. REV. 1309, 1322-24, 1337-38 (1986). Persons may cooperate in a situation where
the most rational course of action would be otherwise, perhaps due to a sense of identity
with a group or community values. Higgs, Identity and Cooperation: A Comment on
Sen's Alternative Program, 3 J.L., ECON. & ORGANIZATION 140 (1987); Sen, Goals, Com-
mitment, and Identity, 1 J.L., EcoN. & ORGANIZATION 341 (1985).
149. Some theorists view the equity theory as a corollary to the expectancy theory in
much this same way, where inequity can effect the "valence of rewards." Lawler, Equity
Theory as a Predictor of Productivity and Work Quality, PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 596, 609
(1968). Equity theory and expectancy theory come from two different traditions, how-
ever. Expectancy theory posits that people seek to maximize their positive outcomes.
Human nature is hedonistic or selfish. In contrast, equity theory holds that individuals
seek to balance inputs and outputs. The behavior described is of individuals seeking
equity or justice in a social setting. See Vecchio, supra note 133. The cognitive and be-
havioral effects of inequity will be felt by an overpaid person only if that person feels he
is treating someone else unfairly. In the large impersonal organization, overpayment may
not have the equity effect. Campbell & Pritchard, supra note 133, at 108. More research
needs to be done before any firm conclusions can be drawn about the operation of the
equity effect in the modern corporation. Hatfield & Sprecher, supra note 133, at 116. In
addition, it may be that the force generated to reduce inequity is more likely to be found
in persons who feel they have been underpaid.
150. Adams, Toward an Understanding, supra note 133, at 424-25.
151. Klein, The Modern Business Organization, supra note 14, at 1543.
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agers are understandably and legitimately concerned
about control even when only salary is at stake; it can be
costly for a manager, even a very good one, to move from
one job to another. Thus, managers are likely to have
strong financial incentives to perform well, to be free
from interference by investors (who are, after all, less
skilled in management), and to monitor and control the
performance of other members of the management
team.
152
Reliance is placed on labor markets, which will be discussed in
the next Section, to assure efficient management of the firm.
This new incentive argument in favor of managerial control is
referred to herein as the stakeholders' argument. The stakehold-
ers' argument looks at the degree to which persons or groups
have a vested interest in the company to ensure the company's
survival and/or its profitability. By comparison, under the incen-
tive-residual rights theory, when shareholders who invest $5,000
in a company are juxtaposed with debtholders who invest
$100,000, the shareholders are presumed to have the greater in-
centive to monitor the company. Under the stakeholders' argu-
ment, the debtholders have the greater incentive to work for the
survival of the firm. Although shareholders would have the
greatest interest in profits, they would, nevertheless, not expend
as much energy as debtholders to ensure the survival of the
firm. 1 5 Thus, the definition of "stake" takes into account,
among other things, not only the probability of a party's loss
when compared with others, but also the amount of the poten-
tial loss.
Under the stakeholders' analysis, management does not neces-
sarily have a greater stake (and, therefore, incentive to see that
the enterprise is operated efficiently) than employees or share-
holders. This is also true when comparing individual top manag-
ers to individual shareholders, debtholders, or employees. For
example, an employee may be less n'arktable and have less sav-
ings to tide him over to search for another job or to finance a
needed career change. 164 Therefore, once the stakeholders' anal-
152. Id. (footnotes omitted).
153. That is, while residual owners are concerned with the "operational efficiency" of
the firm, where efficiency is equated with profitability, id. at 1540, this does not mean
that they have more incentive than others to insure the survival of the firm.
154. A risk of loss analysis has been used as a basis for arguing for employee partici-
pation in corporate governance. E.g., Jonsson, Labour as Risk-Bearer, 2 CAMBRIDGE J.
ECON. 373 (1978); Note, An Economic and Legal Analysis of Union Representation on
Corporate Boards of Directors, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 919, 928-30 (1982).
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ysis is adopted as legitimate, the analysis predicts participation
in the governance of the firm by various constituencies in differ-
ent degrees, changing from time to time.
While the stakeholders' analysis can arguably provide the ba-
sis for a normative model for firm governance, the stake of a
shareholder, creditor, or employee is not in fact the measure of
her control of the firm. As the power model emphasizes in the
next section, actual control is shaped by the firm's dependence
on the factor of production, not the factor's dependence on the
firm.
3. Agency cost approach- The second theory relied upon by
efficiency model theorists is the agency cost approach, which re-
lies upon labor markets and the natural selection argument, to
explaih existing governance structures. Like the residual rights
approach, the agency cost approach maintains that the govern-
ance structure of the modern corporation is efficient. It states
that the separation of "ownership" and control naturally "leads
to"'155 efficient decision-making systems within the firm (such as
the board of directors) that separate the management function
("decision management") from the monitoring function ("deci-
sion control"). 156 The theory posits that shareholders retain cer-
tain decision management and control functions, such as voting
on mergers, and "delegat[e]" other functions to the board of di-
rectors. 5 1 The board in turn retains and delegates various func-
tions to internal agents.
155. Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, supra note 14, at 311,
322.
156. "Decision management" includes the "initiation" of decisions (i.e., the "genera-
tion of proposals") and the implementation of decisions. "Decision control" includes
"ratification," defined not only as "monitoring," but also as the "choice of the decision
initiatives to be implemented." Id. at 303-04. The agency cost approach maintains that
"[wihen residual claimants have no role in decision control, we expect to observe separa-
tion of the management and control of important decisions at all levels of the organiza-
tion." Id. at 309. Moreover, in complex organizations, "efficient decision control, like effi-
cient decision management, involves delegation and diffusion of decision control as well
as separation of decision management and control at different levels of the organization."
Id. at 308.
157. Id. at 309, 313. Efficiency advantages for having some separation of ownership
and control include utilizing the expertise of individuals who do not have capital to in-
vest in the firm, amassing large amounts of capital to bond fixed payment obligations
and to invest in risky assets, decreasing the cost of capital to the firm because investors
decrease their risk by diversifying and investing only small amounts in the firm, and
decreasing the difficulty and cost associated with obtaining the views of many residual
loss bearers on matters affecting the corporation. Id. at 305-11. Moreover, according to
Professor Klein, residual claims "avoid excessive contractual rigidity and inconsistent
promises." Klein, supra note 14, at 368 n.3.
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Because of the discipline of labor markets, the agency cost ap-
proach maintains that managers choose those arrangements of
retention and delegation of functions that maximize shareholder
wealth. Unlike the incentive-residual rights approach, which fo-
cuses on trading by residual rights holders, the agency cost ap-
proach relies on the outside and inside labor markets and the
board of directors to discipline managers in making these impor-
tant decisions.1 58 The market for corporate control offers "little
comfort" to the agency cost theorist.15 9 It serves as a court "of
last resort,"1 60 due primarily to the high costs of takeovers noted
earlier in this Article.
According to the agency cost approach, the internal labor mar-
ket operates through the board of directors, which has naturally
"evolve[d] to stimulate the ongoing efficiency of the corporate
form."'' In this market, top executives in the company compete
with one another to improve the efficiency of the firm. They
bring competing initiatives and information concerning the per-
formance of their superiors and corporate governance matters to
the attention of outside board members.'62 The board (or at
least its outside members) then serves as an arbiter among top
managers'" or, in cases where the chief executive officer of the
company should be dismissed, as a "market-induced mechanism
for low-cost transfer of control."'" 4
This description of an internal labor market creates a number
of problems. The theory ignores the process by which outside
directors are selected. Outside directors are generally selected
and their tenure determined by the chief executive officer, who
is supposed to be responsible to them."6 5 Outside board mem-
bers are often not truly independent, but are economically and
psychologically dependent on the chief executive officer.' They
158. Fama, supra note 14, at 288, 293-95. The labor markets are also dependent on
information provided by the capital markets regarding the abilities of managers.
159. Id. at 295.
160. Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, supra note 14, at 313.
161. Fama, supra note 14, at 295.
162. Id. at 293-94; Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, supra
note 14, at 313-14.
163. Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, supra note 14, at 315.
164. Fama, supra note 14, at 293.
165. In essence, the monitored are expected to select their own monitors. M. EISEN-
BERG, supra note 7, at 164. This apparently does not bother the agency cost theorists.
The nomination process is perceived to be properly in the hands of insiders, because of
their knowledge and expertise. Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control,
supra note 14, at 314.
166. Id. When there is added to this the psychological tendencies of persons in
groups to conform, the likelihood of the board of directors serving the functions indi-
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are selected because they are able to get along with and serve
the chief executive officer's needs. 67 Generally, it is in their best
interest not to rock the boat. In addition, the executives, who
are expected to bring to the outside board members' attention
information concerning the performance of their superiors, and
competing initiatives, are also for the most part dependent on
their superiors for their jobs and job references.
16 8
According to the agency cost approach, subordinates'have the
incentive to bring problems with their superiors or problems
with the governance structure of the firm to the attention of the
board because subordinate's future opportunities and wages in
the outside labor market are tied to the company's perform-
ance."6 9 Presumably, the outside labor market evaluates all
members of top management by reference to the company's
stock price, which supposedly reflects the performance of the
top managers and the various initiatives adopted by the board.
Even assuming that stock prices are accurate, they do not give
subordinates these incentives. The future opportunities and
wages of subordinates are more directly affected by their superi-
ors than by stock prices; stock prices cannot be taken to reflect
the merits of a particular subordinate. How, for example, does
the outside labor market determine from the company's stock
price the marginal production of each manager who has engaged
in team production or whose responsibility extends only to par-
ticular aspects of the corporation's business?1
7 0
cated by the agency cost approach is further diminished. See Cox & Munsinger, Biases
in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Co-
hesion, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 83, 91-95.
167. M. EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 147 n.36; M. MACE, DIREcTORS: MYTH AND REAL-
ITY 99 (1971).
168. M. EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 145-46; M. MACE, supra note 167, at 99; ("The
vice president inside-director is in a precarious position at a board meeting. He just can't
say anything in disagreement with his boss, so what he usually does is sit quietly and
wait until he is called upon to speak."). Mace, in his extensive study of boards of direc-
tors, observed that "CEO's generally did not want to be challenged at board meetings,
especially if subordinates of the CEO were on the board or in attendance at the meet-
ing." Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality-Ten Years Later, 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 293, 296
(1979). He also observed that board meetings were often "ritualistic performance[s]" and
that "[iun many companies, it would have been possible to write the minutes of a board
meeting in advance." Id. at 296.
169. Fama, supra note 14, at 293-94; Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership and
Control, supra note 14, at 313-14.
170. For a detailed critique of the wage revision process, see Vagts, Challenges to
Executive Compensation: For the Markets or the Courts?, 8 J. CORP. L. 231, 241-43
(1983). Even if such a wage revision process were efficient, it would not create appropri-
ate incentives for all executives, particularly those near retirement or who receive large
severance benefits (such as golden parachutes). Fama, supra note 14, at 306.
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The outside labor market also cannot effectively provide com-
petition for the existing chief executive officer because substan-
tial information costs are involved in finding companies that will
be receptive to a new CEO.171 In addition, to the extent that
managers actually control their own retention and compensa-
tion, this aspect of the outside labor market operates fitfully at
best. Even if such competition exists, changing a governance
structure that grants considerable power to managers is unlikely
to be a top priority for new managers.
Unlike the incentive-residual rights approach, the agency cost
approach does not maintain that exclusive shareholder represen-
tation on the board of directors will always be the most efficient
arrangement. According to this approach, "[iun the team or
nexus of contracts view of the firm, one cannot rule out the
evolution of boards of directors that contain many different fac-
tors of production (or their hired representatives), whose com-
mon trait is that their marginal products are affected by those of
the top decision-makers.""1 2 According to the agency cost ap-
proach, an alternative arrangement would be tried and naturally
selected if it were efficient, but it is not today.
In this regard, the agency cost approach ignores that such an
"evolutionary" tendency towards constituency representation
may be reflected in the presence on existing boards of banks,
investment bankers, and others who provide resources to corpo-
rations. Moreover, it ignores legal rules that restrain such evolu-
tion: in general, directors may be elected only by shareholders,
and they must act in the best interest of shareholders. 173 The
agency cost approach then is unsuccessful in providing an "evo-
lutionary" justification for the election of directors only by
shareholders and in explaining the efficient governance of the
firm.
171. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 14, at 781.
172. Fama, supra note 14, at 294. Unlike the incentive-residual rights approach, the
agency cost approach maintains that a focus upon joint or team production is too nar-
row, because "joint production can explain only a small fraction of the behavior of indi-
viduals associated with the firm." Jensen & Meckling, supra note 14, at 310. Also of
interest to the agency cost theorist are relationships with other constituencies, such as
suppliers, customers, and creditors.
173. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. A discussion of the application of
market analysis to lawmaking is beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Romano, The
State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDozo L. REV. 709 (1987); Winter,
State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 251 (1977). Such an analysis has been criticized previously. See Coffee, The Future
of Corporate Federalism: State Competition and the New Trend Towards De Facto
Federal Minimum Standards, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 759 (1987).
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4. Transaction cost approach- The third theory offered by
efficiency-model theorists to explain existing governance struc-
tures is the transaction cost approach. According to this ap-
proach, the "main problems of economic organization. . . would
vanish" 7 " without bounded rationality 7 5 or opportunism.
76
However, because these factors are present, governance struc-
tures are needed and can be explained by reference to three
dimensions: uncertainty, frequency, and asset specificity.1 7 The
first dimension, uncertainty,17 8 makes it difficult for parties to
foresee and contract adequately with respect to future contin-
gencies. As uncertainty increases, the cognitive limits of individ-
uals are quickly approached, and a greater need arises to provide
contractually for governance structures to guard against oppor-
tunism. The second dimension, frequency of transactions be-
tween parties, 79 justifies the cost of more elaborate governance
arrangements among the parties. Asset specificity, 80 the third
dimension, measures the degree to which investments made in
the context of a relationship cannot be effectively redeployed
without a substantial loss in value. As asset specificity increases,
the importance of governance arrangements increases to guard
174. Id. at 50. Accord Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, At-
tributes, 19 J. EcON. LITERATURE 1537, 1546 (1981). The main problem of defining prop-
erty rights under conditions of scarcity, however, would remain.
175. "Bounded" rationality refers to the cognitive limits of individual decision-mak-
ers. Within the limits of their cognitive abilities, individuals are perceived to be "in-
tendedly rational". 0. WILLIAMSON, CAPrrALISM supra note 14, at 11 (citing H. SIMON,
ADMINISTRATVE BEHAVIOR xxiv (2d ed. 1961)). See generally W. Sco'rr, supra note 19, at
75, 145.
176. "Opportunism" means "self-interest seeking with guile. This includes but is
scarcely limited to more blatant forms, such as lying, stealing, and cheating. Opportu-
nism more often involves subtle forms of deceit. Both active and passive forms and both
ex ante and ex post types are included." 0. WILLIASON, CAPITALISM supra note 14, at
47.
177. 0. WILLIAMSON, CAPrrALISM supra note 14, at 52-61.
178. Id. at 56-60.
179. Id. at 60-61.
180. Id. at 52-56. Asset specificity measures the value of the use of an asset in a
particular transaction against its lower value in its next best use (the difference being
referred to as quasi-rent). The greater the loss of value, the greater the asset specificity.
Four types of asset specificity are defined:
Site specificity-e.g., successive stations that are located in a cheek-by-jowl rela-
tion to each other so as to economize on inventory and transportation expenses;
Physical asset specificity-e.g., specialized dies that are required to produce a
component; Human asset specificity that arises in a learning-by-doing fashion;
and Dedicated assets, which represent a discrete investment in generalized (as
contrasted with special purpose) production capacity that would not be made
but for the prospect of selling a significant amount of product to a specific
customer.
Id. at 95.
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against the hazards of opportunism by the other party or parties
to the relationship.
The absence of asset-specific investments is reflected in "spot
market" trading, where transactions are discrete, and no prior or
future relationship exists among the parties.1 81 A relationship
which began in a competitive or large number context (ex ante)
can change to a small numbers condition during the contract,
though, because of asset-specific investments made by one or
both parties to the relationship during the course of the contract
(ex post). In that situation, a bilateral governance arrangement
may be set up ex ante to protect asset-specific investments. Bi-
lateral governance arrangements, also called relational con-
tracting, may involve either bilateral structures that maintain
the autonomy of the parties, such as arbitration provisions, or
unified structures, such as boards of directors or vertical integra-
tion.182 The latter arrangements result in the transaction being
brought "within" the firm to become part of an authority
relationship.
Under the transaction cost approach, the board of directors is
primarily a bilateral governance structure to protect sharehold-
ers.' 8 In this respect, the transaction cost approach is like the
residual rights and agency cost approaches, which describe the
board of directors' function as monitoring managers for the ben-
efit of shareholders. The transaction cost approach explains this
conclusion, however, by reference to the dimensions of uncer-
tainty, frequency, and asset specificity.
The shareholders' relationship with the corporation is particu-
larly uncertain. The investment by shareholders is made for the
life of the firm, making comprehensive ex ante contracting im-
possible. As for frequency, the shareholder's relationship with
the firm is not subject to periodic renewal. 8" Thus, like frequent
transactions, the use of an elaborate governance mechanism,
such as the board of directors, is cost justified. Shareholders
make asset-specific investments, because their investments pur-
portedly are not readily redeployableI s5
The transaction cost approach also supports board member-
ship for managers. Such membership is designed to protect man-
181. Id. at 73-74.
182. Id. at 75-78. See also MacNeil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic
Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REv.
854 (1978).
183. 0. WLLIAMSON, CAPITALISM supra note 14, at 298, 317.
184. Id. at 304.
185. Id. at 304-07.
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agers' asset-specific investments in the firm. According to the
transaction cost approach, the board of directors serves "secon-
darily" to safeguard managers' investments. 186 It is not intended
to protect other constituencies. Any other constituency repre-
sentation would have to be nonvoting and may be efficient only
"for the limited purpose of sharing information in a timely and
credible manner.
1 87
The transaction cost approach is a kind of risk of loss, or
stakeholders', theory. This conclusion is suggested by references
throughout this literature to "stakes" and "risk of loss" to ex-
plain board membership.18 This approach, though, should not
be confused with the stakeholders' argument previously dis-
cussed, because the transaction cost approach uses a special def-
inition of stake or risk: A "risk" or "stake" is an asset-specific
investment. Accordingly, the transaction cost approach should
be judged by its definition of asset-specific investments.
For purposes of reaching various judgments and conclusions in
the corporate governance area, the transaction cost approach ex-
cludes two important kinds of investments from its definition of
asset specificity. First, investments of a personal nature that re-
late to direct investments by employees in the firm are excluded.
The cost of moving, searching for alternate employment, train-
ing to be eligible for new employment, and the emotional costs
of leaving a community, home, or friends appear not to matter
in determining an employee's stake in a job. According to the
transaction cost approach, human asset specificity exists only to
the extent that an employee has learned skills for his job that he
cannot use elsewhere without a substantial loss in wages. 89
Therefore, governance arrangements are efficient only to safe-
guard this narrow kind of investment.
Second, investments made prior to the transaction in ques-
tion, or prior to the time the relationship with the firm was es-
tablished, are excluded from the definition of asset specificity.
For example, it is said that suppliers may obtain membership on
the board for informational purposes only "where a large volume
186. Id. at 298.
187. Id. at 298.
188. For example, board membership for debt holders may be efficient, according to
this approach, when their "exposure to risk increases," i.e., when the firm has a high
debt/equity ratio or is experiencing adversity. Id. at 307. Board membership by suppliers
would be called for only "where a large volume of business is at stake and a common
information base is needed to coordinate investment planning." Id. at 308; see also Note,
Union Representation on Corporate Boards of Directors, supra note 154.
189. 0. WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM supra note 14, at 95, 302 n.5.
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of business is at stake." 190 Nevertheless, if the firm has alterna-
tive sources of supply, the fact that the supplier has a large vol-
ume of business at stake does not make board membership any
more likely for the supplier under transaction cost reasoning.
Only when the firm has induced investments by the supplier in
connection with a particular transaction can the supplier expect
to participate on the board. Therefore, it is the dependence of
the firm on the supplier, or the firm's need for the supplier to
provide special products or larger quantities of goods generally
unavailable in the market, that makes the investments by the
supplier asset-specific. The fact that the supplier has made in-
vestments in assets that are useful mainly in providing supplies
to the firm is irrelevant if the firm has market power as a buyer.
The efficiency attributes of a theory that ignores personal in-
vestments and prior investments must be seriously questioned.
Transaction costs of individuals seeking new jobs are no less real
than other transaction costs and should be integrated fully into
any transaction cost theory. Also, individuals or firms rarely con-
tract without having already made sizable investments and with-
out taking into account those prior investments in making new
investments. An efficiency theory that does not concern itself
with the proper utilization of these resources or the external
costs of firm decision making can have only limited value.
As the power model will demonstrate, what is important to
corporate governance is not the supplier's stake in the company,
but the company's stake in the supplier.' 91 The transaction cost
approach, however, artificially creates a symmetrical situation
for bargaining purposes, by relying on the assumptions that all
investments are entered into for the first time at the time of the
transaction or at the time the relationship with the firm is estab-
lished. The resulting analysis suggests that persons can .privately
bargain for their own protection. These assumptions are false,
however. The majority of transactions with firms are by individ-
uals and firms that have already made extensive investments in
machinery, education, resources, or material, or have few
alternatives.
The problem with asset specificity is not only that it excludes
consideration of certain kinds of investments, but also that it is
a nebulous and variable concept that permits virtually any ex-
isting or hypothetical governance arrangement to be justified on
190. Id. at 308.
191. See supra text accompanying note 154 and infra text accompanying notes 234-
42.
[VOL. 22:1
Beyond Berle and Means
some basis. For example, in reaching a desired conclusion, the
leading transaction cost theorist at one point suggests that the
human asset specificity label may attach to the simple task of
pinmaking.19 2 At another point, the fact that machinery is not
on wheels is used to justify that label.'9s In addition, the amount
of investment or the degree to which the asset must be
nonredeployable to result in a certain type of governance struc-
ture is not specified. 194 Also, no explanation is offered as to why
one governance structure is better than another based on the
dimensions of asset specificity, frequency, or uncertainty. Why,
for example, are customers and the community better served by
arrangements other than board membership? 9" No answer is
forthcoming that relies upon the central dimensions of the the-
ory. The transaction cost analysis often degenerates into a mun-
dane cost-benefit analysis in which it is presumed that existing
governance arrangements are cost-justified or efficient. Under
this approach, as well as under the agency cost approach, the
natural selection or evolutionary argument ultimately provides
the questionable answers.
In order to explain shareholder representation on the board of
directors, the transaction cost theory maintains that sharehold-
ers make asset-specific investments. The nonredeployability as-
pect of the asset specificity definition poses difficulty for this
analysis. Transaction cost theorists argue that stock investments
are nonredeployable because stockholders cannot readily obtain
possession of the assets their shares represent,'96 and because
the assets represented by shares tend to be nonredeploy-
able-more valuable when used by the firm than by other firms
in a next-best use.19 7 The latter argument has not yet been
proved.
Stock investments, however, are characterized by free trans-
ferability. Liquidity is an advantage of stock ownership. More-
over, stockholders do not own shares as an alternative to owning
the underlying assets themselves. 98 The transaction cost theo-
192. 0. WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM supra note 14, at 211 & n.5.
193. Id. at 211.
194. Williamson has himself noted the "excessive degrees of freedom enjoyed by
transaction cost economics." Id. at 391. See I. PFEFFER, ORGANIZATIONS AND ORGANIZATION
THEORY, supra note 19, at 146-47.
195. 0. WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM supra note 14, at 308-11.
196. Id. at 304.
197. See id. at 305 n.10, 307 (noting that the Modigliani-Miler theorem is at variance
with the asset specificity/governance approach).
198. Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legisla-
tion, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 249, 259-62 (1983).
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rist responds that stockholders should be treated as a group or
class and that, as a class, their investments are not readily
redeployable.'99 Nevertheless, the firm itself can be sold. While
there are transaction costs associated with selling the firm, these
costs are comparable to or possibly less than the termination
costs of other constituencies interacting with the firm if these
constituencies are also treated as classes or groups. Thus, while I
do not assert that shareholders do not have reasons for being
represented on the board, including shareholders to the exclu-
sion of other groups as voting members is not supported by this
analysis.
The transaction cost approach may have biases. It discounts
human investments when compared with capital. As previously
noted, personal investments are excluded from the definition of
human asset specificity.200 In addition, a leading transaction cost
theorist has expressly stated that human asset specificity can
never reach the magnitude or importance of capital asset speci-
ficity.201 The apparent bias against labor is further demonstrated
by another statement of the same theorist that one efficiency ad-
vantage of agreements with employees over other commercial
contracts is that employees can be forced to do things in certain
circumstances that they have not agreed to do and that do not
fall within their zone of acceptance.202 Efficient for whom, one
wonders. This theorist also stresses that labor membership on
the board, for information purposes only, is important for the
efficiency of the firm, particularly in periods of adversity when
firms are asking employees for givebacks. 203 But there is no men-
tion of the particular importance of board membership during
periods of prosperity. To labor, participation in profits during
good times is of greater significance. The transaction cost ap-
proach thus appears to have a bias against labor,20' although this
bias does not extend to top managers.
Voting membership on the board of directors is perceived as
an efficient means for managers to safeguard their asset-specific
investments.20 No reason is given, however, for why top manag-
199. 0. WILLIAMSON, CAPrrALISM supra note 14, at 304.
200. See supra text accompanying note 189.
201. 0. WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM supra note 14, 248-49.
202. Id. at 249. Professor Granovetter also points out that Williamson refers to
Chester Barnard's zone of indifference as a zone of acceptance, "thus undercutting Bar-
nard's emphasis on the problematic nature of obedience." Granovetter, supra note 109,
at 495.
203. 0. WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM supra note 14, at 303.
204. See also Putterman, supra note 31, at 176.
205. See supra text accompanying note 186.
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ers are more likely than lower level employees to make asset-
specific investments. Possibly because of this weakness, the
transaction cost approach offers reasons as to why this represen-
tation is efficient not only for managers, but also for sharehold-
ers.20 6 When managers participate in decision making at the
board level, outside board members, it is asserted, can observe
managers engaging in the process of decision making, which en-
ables the members to better evaluate these managers. In addi-
tion, it is argued that outside board members will gain more in-
formation by discussing matters at the board level with top
managers than by listening to their formal presentations before
the board. Both of these objectives, however, can be achieved
through non-voting participation by managers at board
meetings.
Employee participation on the board can also be efficient from
the shareholders' point of view. Labor representatives may be
preferable to outside directors, for example, because they can
provide an effective counterweight to the power of managers."0 7
Labor representatives are not drawn from the same socioeco-
nomic class as outside directors 2 0 can spend more of their time
on company matters, 20 1 have a greater "stake" in the company,
and have independent access to information concerning the
company. As far as shareholders are concerned, labor represent-
atives may, therefore, be more effective watchdogs.210 In addi-
tion, labor representatives can provide outside directors with a
new channel of information concerning the company, or a "win-
dow out" on the plant. 11 Moreover, any conflict of interest that
206. 0. WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM supra note 14, at 317.
207. Note, Employee Codetermination: Origins in Germany, Present Practices in
Europe, and Applicability to the United States, 14 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 947, 993-95 (1977)
[hereinafter, Note, Employer Codetermination]; Note, supra note 154, at 941.
208. Note, supra note 154, at 939 (describing an employee director as not part of the
old-boy management network).
209. Id. at 941.
210. E.g., Comment, Broadening the Board: Labor Participation in Corporate Gov-
ernance, 34 Sw. L.J. 963, 979-80 (1980); Note, Employee Codetermination, supra note
207, at 993-95; Note, Union Representation on Corporate Boards of Directors, supra
note 154, at 940-41.
211. Markham, Restrictions on Shared Decision-Making Authority in American
Business, 11 CAL. W.L. REv. 217, 251 (1975); Summers, Codeterminism in the U.S.: A
Projection of Problems and Potentials, 4 J. COMP. L. & SEC. REG. 155, 175 (1982); Com-
ment, supra note 210, at 979-80. On the other hand, concern has been expressed that the
disclosure of confidential information at the board level to employee directors may be
harmful to the company. Union officials may have the incentive to disclose information
to the rank and file which will justify their position on certain issues. Also, union mem-
bership on the boards of competing companies may lead to the disclosure of information
that may be competitively disadvantageous to one or more companies. Id. at 968; Hopt,
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labor may have with respect to matters discussed by the board
can be handled in much the same way as managerial conflicts of
interest.21
This Article offers two other reasons that strongly suggest the
efficiency of labor representation on the board from the stand-
point of shareholders. One reason relates to the efficiency of
lower level participatory arrangements, such as quality circles
and teams.21 These arrangements tend to have longer lives
when associated with labor participation at higher levels in the
organization s.21  The second reason is that labor participation in
corporate governance can increase the corporation's ability to
make technological changes. While examples can be found of
businesses delaying technological changes due to employee resis-
tance, a strong case can be made that labor participation is ef-
fective in facilitating technological change. It lessens conflict
with labor by encouraging long-term planning.2 15 Three re-
New Ways in Corporate Governance: European Experiments With Labor Representa-
tion on Corporate Boards, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1338, 1358 (1984); Summers, supra, at 181;
Note, Employee Representative on the Corporate Board of Directors: Implications
Under Labor, Antitrust, and Corporate Law, 27 WAYNE L. REV. 367, 386 (1980) [herein-
after Note, Employee Representative]. Problems associated with interlocking director-
ates exist with respect to other representatives on current boards, and are not limited to
employee directors. Such problems can be largely handled by having employees, not un-
ions, select representatives to the board. Conard, The Supervision of Corporate Manage-
ment: A Comparison of Developments in European Community and United States
Law, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1459, 1478 (1984). The concern with the confidentiality of infor-
mation at the board level has been adequately dealt with by other legal systems and is,
therefore, resolvable. Hopt, supra, at 1359-62 (Collective bargaining in Sweden extends
to determining what information will be kept secret. In Germany, the board decides
what information will remain confidential). Moreover, access by employee directors to
information may contribute to making collective bargaining more rational. Summers,
supra, at 184.
212. Conard, supra note 211, at 1478. An alternative, to minimize any potential legal
problems, is for the labor representatives not to participate in decision making at the
board level on issues directly involving labor negotiations and disputes. Summers, supra
note 211, at 169; Note, Employee Representative, supra note 211, at 390. Similar rules
apply in foreign systems where employees abstain from voting at the board level on labor
issues. Hopt, supra note 211, at 1349-50 (discussing Ireland and Denmark), Note, Em-
ployee Codetermination, supra note 207, at 979 (discussing Sweden). One writer pro-
poses more liberal standards for union directors when deciding upon employee-related
matters. Note, supra note 154, at 950.
213. Stone, Public Interest Representatives: Economic and Social Policy Inside the
Enterprise, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND DIRECTORS' LIABILrTms (K. Hopt & G.
Teubner eds. 1984); Summers, supra note 211, at 185.
214. Note, Employee Codetermination, supra note 207, at 992-93; cf. R. KATZELL &
D. YANKELOVICH, supra note 115, at 36-37 (stating that system-wide changes can have
more positive effects on productivity).
215. See E. JACOBS, S. ORWELL, P. PATERSON & F. WELTZ, THE APPROACH TO INDUS-
TRIAL CHANGE IN BRITAIN AND GERMANY (1978). This is a study of large corporations in
Britain and Germany concerning how managers and employees respond to major changes
such as large reductions in workforce, reorganization of plants, or movements of produc-
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searchers who compared the ability of companies in Great Brit-
ain and Germany to make technological changes concluded:
The execution of technical and organisational change is
facilitated by cooperative conflict resolution, which si-
multaneously ensures the adoption of manpower policies
that reduce the element of controversy from industrial
change, and so help to expedite it.""8
In responding to the argument that labor participation on the
board is efficient for shareholders, a transaction cost theorist has
written:
If true, the question arises of why some perceptive share-
holders have not recognized the benefits and made provi-
sion for union participation. Is it ignorance of the gains?
Are incumbent managements so well entrenched that
they can defeat any such effort? Or are the gains offset
by unacknowledged costs?2"7
The legal framework is very important."' In the United States,
under most state laws, shareholders may not provide in charters
or bylaws for the election by employees of employee board mem-
bers.219 Moreover, they do not have the right to nominate em-
ployee directors to be included in the company's proxy state-
ment.220 This means that they must engage in a costly proxy
contest to nominate employee directors.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has also declined to
require companies to adopt procedures for considering director
nominees suggested by shareholders.21 In addition, shareholders
tion from one site to another. In Britain, where a rights approach has been adopted,
reduction in the size of the workforce by a company was associated with firings, so there
was acute worker anxiety about technological change. In Germany, where the emphasis is
on building cooperative institutions at the enterprise level with, among other things, em-
ployee directors, long-term personal planning was undertaken. Reductions in workforce
were accomplished through such techniques as early retirement, halt in recruitment, and
redeployment of employees within the enterprise. Dismissals were avoided, which re-
sulted in less anxiety among workers about technological change. See Note, Employee
Codetermination, supra note 207, at 960.
216. E. JACOBS, S. ORWELL, P. PATERSON & F. WELTz, supra note 215, at 102.
217. 0. WILLIAMSON, CAPIrrALSM supra note 14, at 304 n.7. Note that employee partic-
ipation does not necessarily entail union participation.
218. E. JAcos, S. ORWELL, P. PATERSON & F. WELTZ, supra note 215, at 109.
219. See supra note 46.
220. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(8) (1988).
221. In 1980, the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission issued a report
recommending that, "If there is not a substantial increase in the percentage of compa-
nies with independent nominating committees who consider shareholder nominations,
FALL 1988]
Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 22:1
may not include a proposal in a company's proxy statement rec-
ommending that the board nominate a certain number of em-
ployee directors. 2 ' The SEC only requires a company to include
proposals in its proxy statement that relate to general qualifica-
tions for directors and general procedures to be followed in con-
nection with the selection of nominees. 223 The qualifications
must apply to all directors equally, and the procedures may not
involve consideration of nominees from different groups. The
only proposal that would arguably be acceptable, then, would be
one that recommended that all directors be employee direc-
tors.224 In addition, legal uncertainty concerning potential viola-
the Commission should authorize the staff to develop a rule requiring companies to
adopt a procedure for considering shareholder nominations." SEC ACCOUNTABILITY Ra-
PORT, supra note 9, at 131. After monitoring the number of companies with nominating
committees in connection with its three-year (1979-81) Proxy Disclosure Monitoring Pro-
gram, the staff decided not to recommend such a rule. By 1981, however, fewer than a
third of the companies in its sample had nominating committees (an increase from
19.4% in 1979), and only 78% of these committees considered shareholder nominees, a
decrease from the percentage that did so in 1979. Analysis of Results of 1981 Proxy
Statement Disclosure Monitoring Program, Exchange Act Release No. 18,532, 3 Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) V 24,120 (Mar. 3, 1982). But see note 224.
222. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (May 9, 1985)
(WESTLAW, Securities library, FSED-NAL file) (shareholder recommendation that the
board of directors nominate at least one active employee, selected by participants in the
company's profit-sharing or employee stock plan, excludable under Rule 14a-8(c)(8));
CNA Financial Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 5, 1984) (WESTLAW, Securities li-
brary, FSEC-NAL file); Allied Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 5, 1984) (WESTLAW,
Securities library, FSEC-NAL file) (proposal that one member of the board be a non-
management salaried employee excludable under Rule 14a-8(c)(8)); Braniff International
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 5, 1982) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL
file) (proposed amendment of bylaws that board of directors nominate at least four ac-
tive employee shareholders, selected by designated employee groups, excludable under
Rule 14a-8(c)(8), because the proposal would require that "employees from certain speci-
fied employee groups be included in management's slate of nominees"); Pacific Gas &
Electric Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 12, 1979) (WESTLAW, Securities library,
FSEC-NAL file). But see American Telephone & Telegraph Co., SEC No-Action Letter
(Jan. 14, 1977) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file). See also infra note 257.
223. E.g., General Motors Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 31, 1988) (WESTLAW,
Securities library, FSEC-NAL file) (proposal recommending that all directors and nomi-
nees for directors own at least $25,000 of Company common stock not excludable under
Rule 14a-8(c)(8)); Unicare Services, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (May 13, 1980)
(WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file) (proposal that no director be an officer,
director, or principal stockholder of any supplier or customer doing more than $20,000
business with the company not excludable under 14a-8(c)(8)). But see Quaker State
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 17, 1988) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-
NAL file) (proposal that only company outside directors own.common shares for a cer-
tain amount not excludable). See also note 257.
224. The SEC has also recently permitted a shareholder to include a proposal in the
company's proxy statement recommending that the board of directors institute a mecha-
nism for the nomination of opposition directors. Chittenden Corp., SEC No-Action Let-
ter (Mar. 10, 1987) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file). Such a proposal, if
approved by shareholders and adopted by the board of directors, could result in the cost-
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tions of labor and antitrust laws provides further barriers to la-
bor membership on boards.225
Under the transaction cost approach, a number of efficiency
arguments against constituency representation (including em-
ployee representation on boards) are made. This approach
points to the deflection of decision-makers at the board level
from their main purpose to discussing operating-level com-
plaints; the dissipation of firm assets on "worthy" causes; and
"opportunism," or the leverage provided constituencies through
board membership to obtain favorable terms in their contractual
relationships with the firm.22 These consequences are neither
unavoidable nor necessarily disadvantages of constituency repre-
sentation on the board. While these arguments will be addressed
in this section, additional matters relevant to constituency rep-
resentation on boards will be deferred to Part V B of this
Article.
Concern by the board for what is happening at the operating
level may lead to better monitoring of managerial behavior. The
board is not in a very good position to determine broad policies
for the corporation without considering the operational conse-
quences. Moreover, a disadvantage of the present system is that
management largely determines the agenda for board meet-
ings.227 If constituency board members were to bring operating
problems to the attention of the board, the board would be able
to determine its own agenda.
The transaction cost theorist assumes that the assets of the
firm are used efficiently only when their use benefits sharehold-
ers. Therefore, the use of funds for "worthy causes," such as
abating pollution caused by the firm's plant or improving work-
ing conditions, would be a dissipation of the firm's assets, unless
this use of funds was required by law or dictated by contract
terms (regardless of bargaining positions or market conditions).
To the extent that worthy causes involve the internalization of
effective nomination of employee directors by shareholders. This letter may very well
signal a liberalization of the SEC's views on matters relating to shareholder use of the
company's proxy statement. Compare Mobil Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 19,
1988) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file) (proposal recommending that
certain shareholders have right to make opposition statements to management proposals
in company's proxy statement not excludable) with Detroit Edison Co., SEC No-Action
Letter (Feb. 12, 1980) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file) (proposal for fair
and equal debate on proposals in proxy statement excludable).
225. See Comment, supra note 210; Markham, supra note 211; Note, Employee Rep-
resentative, supra note 211.
226. 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 58, at 311.
227. Coffee, supra note 141, at 1190 n.128.
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external costs of the business, however, the firm's assets are be-
ing used efficiently. Such decisions by the constituency board
would increase the efficient utilization of the firm's resources.
Only when the firm's assets are used for purposes having no con-
nection with the firm's business can it be said that a dissipation
of assets (from the efficiency point of view) occurs. Employees,
however, would have no greater incentive than managers or
shareholders to use the firm's assets in this way.
From the standpoint of opportunistic behavior, it is better to
have a number of constituencies present on the board rather
than one, namely management. Each constituency can then keep
the others in check. As previously discussed, an employee direc-
tor can serve as a counterweight to managerial power.
In conclusion, the transaction cost approach fails to make a
persuasive case for the efficiency of existing governance struc-
tures when it engages both in an asset-specificity analysis and in
a mundane cost-benefit analysis.
B. Power Model
This section is devoted to understanding firm behavior with a
focus on power as opposed to efficiency. Resource dependence
and institutional factors are important to understanding power
and the relationship between the firm and various constituen-
cies. This section begins with a discussion of resource depen-
dency and institutional factors. A power analysis of the share-
holder-management relationship is then attempted. First,
shareholder rights, particularly voting rights, are explored in the
context of strategies for avoiding dependencies. Second, the effi-
ciency model's treatment of the board as a device permitting
shareholders to monitor managers and thereby enhance the effi-
ciency of the firm is replaced with an understanding of the
board as a tool of management, which serves to legitimate the
substantial amount of power in the hands of management. Fol-
lowing this section, the efficiency and power models are
compared.
1. Introduction- The power model adopts the power coali-
tion view of decision making within the firm.2 8 Changes in the
corporate governance of a firm, whether intradepartmental or at
the board level, can be seen as the outcome of a contest for con-
trol. The important questions to ask in connection with such
228. See supra text accompanying notes 25-30.
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changes are who gains and who loses. These changes determine
firm objectives or the criteria the firm will seek to satisfy.22 As
previously noted:
A quite different view of conflict and conflict resolution
processes is associated with the [power model], which
presumes that intradepartmental conflict is not primarily
a product of error, ambiguity, and ignorance but results
from quite fundamental divergences in group interests;
and that the struggles are not concerned simply with
means but concern the goals to be served by the
organization.230
To understand the determinants of firm behavior, a closer
look at power is necessary. In comparing power and efficiency,
one writer observes:
[E]fficiency is more likely to be a special case of power
than power a special case of, or dominated by, efficiency.
Power is wider in its scope; the sources of power are
much broader than the sources of efficiency. Efficiency it-
self needs interpretation in the light of its 'power con-
tent,' and this may be less neutral, and more deeply bur-
ied in the rules for measuring efficiency, than it seems to
be at first sight.231
As previously developed in the section on firm goals,232 the use
of efficiency in the efficiency model has a power content, due to
imperfections in the market or the existence of market power.
Power is also inherent in the efficiency model because the model
229. Professor Pfeffer explains:
If we take seriously the conceptualization of organizations as coalitions, then a
critical issue is not just what the consequences of various structural arrange-
ments are, but who gains and who loses from such consequences. Structure, it
would appear, is not just the outcome of a managerial process in which designs
are selected to ensure higher profits. Structure, rather, is itself the outcome of a
process in which conflicting interests are mediated so that decisions emerge as to
what criteria the organization will seek to satisfy. Organizational structures can
be viewed as the outcome of a contest for control and influence occurring within
organizations.
J. Pfeffer, The Micropolitics of Organizations, in ENVIRONMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS 25,
36 (1978).
230. W. SCOTT, supra note 19, at 248.
231. Turk, supra note 80, at 196.
232. See supra Part III; McGuiness, Markets and Hierarchies: A Suitable Frame-
work for an Evaluation of Organizational Change?, in POWER, EFFICIENCY AND INSTITu-
TIONS 180, 183 (1983); Turk, supra note 80, at 196.
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is not concerned with the distribution of wealth or the sources of
buying power. In fact, as previously noted, the efficiency model's
failure to consider wealth distribution may also make it a less
complete model of efficiency.
238
One way of looking at power in the corporate governance con-
text is to draw upon an expanded version of the resource depen-
dency perspective. From this perspective, power is the obverse
of dependency. 23' The "dependence of one party provides the
basis for the power of the other .... "235 According to this per-
spective, the amount of external influence obtainable by various
coalitions, such as shareholders, suppliers, or employees, will
roughly depend on the corporation's perceived dependence on
the resources provided by these constituencies. These resources
may be physical goods, capital, labor, or social legitimacy.23
In the power model, the corporation behaves so as to increase
its area of discretion or to decrease the influence of external or-
ganizations and constituencies.237 Unlike a wheat market, the
corporation may utilize various strategies to avoid dependence
or to manage its interdependence with its environment.238 The
corporation will tend to focus on areas of critical resource depen-
dencies, because that is where the possibility of external influ-
ence over the corporation is the greatest.
The extent of the corporation's dependence on other constitu-
encies depends to a large degree on its ability to alter its con-
duct in order either to modify its environment or to avoid such
dependencies. It can, for example, make different arrangements
233. See supra text accompanying notes 149-50.
234. W. ScoTT, supra note 19, at 116.
235. Emerson, Power-Dependence Relations, 27 AM. Soc. REv. 31, 32 (1962). Building
on Emerson's framework, Thompson concluded that: "[An organization is dependent on
some element of its task environment (1) in proportion to the organization's need for
resources or performances which that element can provide and (2) in inverse proportion
to the ability of other elements to provide the same resource or performance." J. THOMP-
SON, supra note 19, at 30. A similar formulation has been used to understand power
within the organization itself. Hickson, Astley, Butler & Wilson, supra note 19, at 159-
60. Under this view of power, the exchange relationship need not be zero-sum, with one
party losing and the other gaining power. E.g., J. THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 31.
Through the coordination of their activities, both parties may increase their dependence
on the other party. The power need not be symmetrical, however, since one party may be
more dependent on the exchange than the other: "[A] symmetry exists in the relation-
ship when the exchange is not equally important to both organizations. This may occur
because the organizations differ greatly in size, so that what is a large proportion of one's
operations is a small proportion of the other's."
J. PFEFFER & G. SALANCIK, supra note 19, at 53.
236. J. PFEFFER & G. SALANCIK, supra note 19, at 43.
237. E.g., ; J. PFEFFER, supra note 19, at 192-93, 261; W. Scorr, supra note 19, at 116;
see J. GALBRAITH, supra note 7 (suggesting that organizations seek to avoid competition).
238. See infra text accompanying notes 247-307.
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with these constituencies or absorb them. These strategies may
have the effect of decreasing the uncertainty facing the corpora-
tion. Certainly, obtaining a market position so that its suppliers
become dependent on it rather than the other way around is one
such strategy. Going private to avoid tender offers by sharehold-
ers or subcontracting work outside the firm, thereby decreasing
dependence on the internal labor force, are other strategies.
Power as defined by the power model is the ability to organize
and structure the activities of other social actors for one's own
interests.2 39 Rather than describing the firm as largely reactive
to various market forces, and its behavior as a result of a com-
plex equilibrium process, the power model suggests that the cor-
poration is proactive. The corporation seeks to affect its social,
economic, and legal environment to better meet its needs.240
This resource dependency perspective is an expanded version
of such perspective for two reasons. The resources that are the
focus of corporate efforts are not only capital or physical prod-
ucts, but are also social products, such as social legitimacy. In
addition, dependence is not only measured by reference to the
concentration of resourc6 control and resource importance, but
also by discretion over resource allocation and use.24'
Discretion over resource allocation and use may provide the
sole source of power. This discretion over resources may result
from possession of the resource, the actual use of the resource,
access to the resource, or the ability to control its use.242 The
ability to control resource use is provided in contract terms and
in the recognition of certain property rights by the legal system.
239. See Bauer & Cohen, supra note 98, at 93.
240. J. PFEFFER & G. SALANCIK, supra note 19, at 107-08.
241. Professors Pfeffer and Salancik, further refined the concepts developed by
Emerson and Thompson, discussed supra note 235. They identified three factors as rele-
vant in determining degrees of dependence: concentration of resource control, resource
importance, and discretion over resource allocation and use. J. PFEFFER & G. SALANCIK,
supra note 19, at 46-51. The first factor, concentration of resource control, refers to the
availability of substitutes or alternative sources, including the ability of sources to organ-
ize or coordinate their activities vis-a-vis the corporation. Id. at 50-51; see also, Jacobs,
supra note 19, at 56. The second factor, resource importance, is defined as having two
dimensions: (i) the relative magnitude of the exchange or the "proportion of total inputs
or proportion of total outputs accounted for by the exchange," J. PFEFFER & G. SALANCIK,
supra note 19, at 46; and (ii) the criticality of the resource or the "ability of the organiza-
tion to continue functioning in the absence of the resource or in the absence of the mar-
ket for the output," id. at 46. A resource may be critical, although it does not represent a
large portion of the corporation's budget (its magnitude is not great), and its importance
may vary from time to time. The third factor is discussed in the text of this article. See
text accompanying note 242.
242. J. PFEFFER & G. SALANCIK, supra note 19, at 47-50.
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However, "not everything in organizations is [resource] depen-
dence."' " Institutional factors, such as hierarchy, routine orga-
nizational process, control over information flow, and custom
may also be sources of power. 44
A corporation's dependencies produce uncertainties for those
in power within the organization because the actions of third
parties become important to their survival. The internal mana-
gerial coalition can decrease these uncertainties either (1) by di-
minishing the effect of other coalitions on corporate decision
making (i.e., by "avoiding dependencies"),4 5 or (2) by altering
the corporate environment through various "bridging
strategies."'24
2. Shareholder rights understood in the context of strate-
gies for avoiding dependencies- Management may "avoid" cer-
tain dependencies by the following: (a) controlling the genera-
tion of demands made upon the corporation by coalitions, (b)
limiting access by coalitions to communication channels, (c) in-
creasing the cost of communications by coalitions, (d) creating
the illusion of satisfying the demands of coalitions, and (e) fail-
ing to disclose information to coalitions concerning corporate be-
havior.24 7 Shareholder legal rights can be understood in the con-
text of strategies for avoiding dependencies.
Management has been successful in controlling the generation
of demands by shareholders and limiting their access to commu-
nication channels. Favorable legal rules restrict the ability of
shareholders to bring derivative actions,48 grant broad discre-
tion to the decisions of directors,"19 and limit the kinds of pro-
posals that shareholders may include in the corporation's proxy
statement.25 In addition, as revealed in the Securities and Ex-
change Commission's Staff Report on Corporate Accountability,
access to management is limited by some companies that do not
require directors to attend annual shareholder meetings, limit
243. Hickson, Astley, Butler & Wilson, supra note 19, at 160.
244. See, e.g., J. PFEFFER, supra note 19, at 239-46; W. ScoTT, supra note 19, at 141-
43; Hickson, Astley, Butler & Wilson, supra note 19, at 160-61.
245. See, e.g., J. PFEFFER & G. SALANCIK, supra note 19, at 95-110.
246. See, e.g., J. PFEFFER, supra note 19, at 106-09; W. ScoTT, supra note 19, at 193-
203.
247. J. PFEFFER & G. SALANCIK, supra note 19, at 97-106.
248. E.g., In re Kaufman Mutual Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 857 (1973) (demand requirement); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984)
(demand requirement); FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (contemporaneous ownership requirement);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 327 (1983) (contemporaneous ownership requirement); see also
infra text accompanying notes 253-56.
249. See infra text accompanying notes 340-41.
250. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1988).
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the time directors will be present at such meetings to respond to
questions, hold such meetings at inconvenient places, unduly re-
strict the time devoted to the presentation and discussion of
shareholders' proposals, and schedule few regional meetings, al-
though shareholders are dispersed geographically. 51 These strat-
egies all serve to control the generation of demands by share-
holders, mainly by limiting their access to communication
channels such as the courts, the company's proxy statement, and
the annual shareholders' meetings.
The internal managerial coalition's dependence on sharehold-
ers is also decreased when the shareholders' cost of communicat-
ing demands is increased. Again, favorable legal rules increase
the expense of shareholder action. Shareholders may not use the
company's proxy statement to nominate directors, but must en-
gage in an expensive proxy contest.2 52 Shareholders' expenses in
a proxy contest often include the cost of litigating to obtain a
shareholders' list2 53 and the cost of hiring a proxy soliciting firm.
While management may use the company's funds, the share-
holder does not have the right to obtain reimbursement for such
211expenses. 2 Derivative actions also are made more expensive by
those states that require plaintiffs to post security 255 and by the
ability of firms to terminate derivative actions on the basis of
decisions of independent litigation committees made during the
pendency of such actions.256
While the federal proxy rules decrease the cost of some share-
holder communications, costly legal counsel is often required to
deal with the considerable technical requirements of these
rules.2 57 Moreover, certain kinds of communications are not per-
251. SEC AccourrAiLITY REPORT, supra note 9, at 138-88.
252. M. EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 109 n.48, 112 (Moreover, "incumbents gain an
important psychological advantage in soliciting under the name of 'the corporation'
rather than under their own names, as insurgents must do.").
253. See State ex rel Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 291 Minn. 322, 191 N.W.2d 406
(1971)' M. EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 112; Comment, Protecting the Shareholders'
Right to Inspect the Share Register in Corporate Proxy Contests for the Election of
Directors, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 1273 (1973).
254. M. EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 122 n.88.
255. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-6(3) (West 1969 & Supp. 1988); see Gimbel v. Sig-
nal Companies, Inc., 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch.), aff'd 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974) (dismissing
plaintiff's action for inability to post $25 million bond); Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival
of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM.
L. REV. 261, 314 (1981) (The "security for expenses statute fails adequately to distinguish
between meritorious and nonmeritorious actions and thereby chills both.").
256. See, e.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); Auerbach v.
Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 393 N.E.2d 994 (1979).
257. See Exchange Act Release No. 20,091, 1983-84 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,417
(Aug. 16, 1983) (Commissioner Longstreth's dissent). The technical requirements of
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mitted, which have the effect of increasing the cost of share-
holder communication. For example, a shareholder may not in-
clude in the company's proxy statement a recommendation that
the company assist shareholders in forming a shareholders' asso-
ciation that can more effectively voice shareholder concerns even
if no special funding is requested from the company to support
the association.2 5  The efficiency model would increase these
these rules can be demonstrated by the following. Assume that a shareholder submits a
proposal that "a nonmanagement shareholder be elected to the board of directors at the
upcoming meeting." This proposal would be excludable under 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(8)
[hereinafter Rule 14a-8(c)(8)], which permits the omission of proposals "relating to the
election to office," since the proposal applies to the upcoming meeting. Allied Corp., SEC
No-Action Letter (Jan. 5, 1984) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file); Bran-
iff Int'l Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 5, 1982) (WESTLAW, Securities library,
FSEC-NAL file). If revised to apply only to subsequent meetings, it would nevertheless
be excludable under Rule 14a-8(c)(6), because the proposal is worded such that it is
beyond the power of the corporation to effectuate. Management cannot "elect" a non-
management shareholder to the board; it can only "nominate" candidates, who in turn
must be elected by shareholders. American Information Technologies Corp., SEC No-
Action Letter (Dec. 13, 1985) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file) (proposal
that at least one elected member of the board of directors be a worker-shareholder or
retired employee omitted); GTE Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 10, 1984)
(WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file) (proposal that a number of women
should be elected to the board of directors excluded). Then, if the shareholder amends
the proposal to provide that "a nonmanagement shareholder be nominated to the
board," the proposal may be excludable under Rule 14a-8(c)(1), as the proposal is not
phrased as a recommendation or request. Northwest Airlines, SEC No-Action Letter
(Mar. 2, 1978) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file). The SEC, however,
would probably point out this error to the shareholder and permit her to amend the
proposal. Even so reworded, the proposal may be excludable under Rule 14a-8(c)(8), as it
is deemed to relate to the nomination of persons from a "specific group." See supra note
222. That is, it does not involve establishing a general qualification for all of the direc-
tors. The shareholder can escape this result only by proposing that all nominees be non-
management shareholders, supra note 223, or possibly by proposing that the board of
directors consider nominees selected by a committee composed of nonmanagement
shareholders. See Bank America Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 7, 1980)
(WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file) (proposal that the company facilitate
organization of institutional investor committees and consider a list of nominees from
such group not excludable under Rule 14a-8(c)(8)). But see infra note 258.
258. The Southern Company, SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 5, 1986) (WESTLAW, Se-
curities library, FSEC-NAL file) (recommendation that poll be taken through company's
quarterly report of shareholders interested in organizing a shareholders' association, to
be organized at no cost to the company); Northeast Utilities Services Co., SEC No-Ac-
tion Letter (Mar. 5, 1985) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file) (recommen-
dation that board investigate means by which company shareholders can form sharehold-
ers' association); Boston Edison Company, SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 6, 1984)
(WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file) (recommendation that company assist
in establishing shareholders' association); Middle South Utilities, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter (Mar. 4, 1983) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file) (recommendation
that company assist in organizing and funding a shareholders' association); Pennsylvania
Power & Light Co., SEC No-Action Letter (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL
file) (Jan 25, 1982) (recommendation that membership solicitation brochure of share-
holders' association be included in company's regular mailing to shareholders).
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costs even further by doing away with the federal proxy rules
altogether, leaving the decision as to whether shareholders
should have access to communication channels to market forces
acting upon company managers." 9
Another way to avoid dependencies is to create the illusion
that demands are being satisfied. The legal system is helpful in
this regard. While shareholders have the right to elect direc-
tors, 60 which presumably they want to do, no provision is made
under state law for nominations. The election amounts to a vote
on one set of nominees selected by management.2 6' The illusion
is created that shareholders elect directors, which is far from re-
ality. Another example of such an illusion occurs in the area of
259. Professors Easterbrook and Fischel explain:
Because it is so easy to sell one's shares, and because managers must set at-
tractive terms for new securities (including terms for voting) if they are to maxi-
mize their returns, there is no good reason for believing that the voting rules
designed by firms themselves will be inferior to those the SEC can think up.
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 139, at 421.
According to Professors Easterbrook and Fischel, the federal proxy rules displace pri-
vate arrangements reflected in state corporation laws. Id. at 398. They maintain that
there is a "presumption that federal regulation is welfare decreasing." Id. at 419. This is
not true for state rules that presumably result from efficiency-producing competition
among states. Id. See generally Dodd & Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters:
"Unhealthy Competition" versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259 (1980), Romano,
supra note 173; Winter, supra note 173.
Professors Easterbrook and Fischel argue in favor of shareholder voting rights with
respect to the election of directors and on certain major corporate transactions (e.g.,
mergers) provided under state corporation laws and against proposed nomination rights
and existing Rule 14a-8 rights under federal law. The efficiency arguments that they use
to support these positions are manipulable and outcome determinative. First, the share-
holder's right to elect directors is defended on the basis of the incentive-residual rights
theory. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 139, at 403-06. That theory could also be used
in an equally forceful manner to support the right to nominate directors. But since such
a right is not provided for by state law, the authors assert that individual shareholders
do not have "the appropriate incentive at the margin to study the firm's affairs and vote
intelligently," id. at 402, and, therefore, choose to delegate this function to management,
an "information-generating agency," id. at 402-03. This same argument, however, could
be used to argue against the individual shareholders' right to elect directors. Second, the
absence of a Rule 14a-8 mechanism under state law is explained on the basis that indi-
vidual shareholders do not have the necessary incentive or expertise. Id. at 419-21. These
same arguments, however, can be used to support the position that shareholders should
not have the right to vote on major corporate transactions such as mergers. In fact, due
to the importance and complexity of these transactions, it would appear that the exper-
tise of managers would be even more important for these transactions. But Professors
Easterbrook and Fischel, recognizing the difficulty with these arguments, conclude that
the fact that these rights have endured creates "a presumption of efficiency that has not
been overcome by any contrary evidence." Id. at 416. Ultimately, an outcome determina-
tive or natural selection solution is embraced. See id. at 397-98.
260. See supra note 46.
261. J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BusINEss CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1780-1970, at 96-97 (1970); SEC AccoUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 9,
at 131.
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auditor selection. Shareholders may vote on the company's audi-
tors.2" 2 However, shareholders may not use the company's proxy
statement to propose different auditorss or even to suggest
guidelines for the selection of accounting firms by the board.
26 4
Even an innocuous proposal that there be "yearly consider[ation
of] the practice of rotating the outside auditors with the fre-
quency of rotation to be determined solely by the Audit Com-
mittee of the Board" can be excluded from the company's proxy
statement.265 Thus, although shareholders appear to have a say
over the selection of the company's auditors, in reality they do
not.
The illusion of satisfying demands can also be accomplished
through another strategy: control over the definition of what is
demanded. Directors, because of their election by shareholders
and the fiduciary obligations that they owe to all shareholders,
are presumed to be in the best position to know what sharehold-
ers want. Proposals relating to matters involving the ordinary
business operations of the company, for example, may be ex-
cluded from the company's proxy statements. 6 However, sub-
sumed within the ordinary business operations are demands re-
lating to such social issues as abortion, plant closings, smoking,
use of watershed lands, and use of Indian land.6 7 Other issues
262. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 23, 1987) (WESTLAW,
Securities library, FSEC-NAL file).
263. S.S. Kresge Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 17, 1976) (WESTLAW, Securities
library, FSEC-NAL file); Kellogg Company, SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 23, 1976)
(WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file); Payless Drug Store, SEC No-Action
Letter (Apr. 11, 1975) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file).
264. For example, during 1985-86, proposals were submitted to a number of public
utilities to amend their bylaws to provide for the periodic rotation of accounting firms,
generally every five or more years, and for the board of directors to give primary consid-
eration to competitive bids (from at least three accounting firms) in selecting the re-
placement firm. Bank America Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 27, 1986)
(WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file); Long Island Lighting Co., SEC No-
Action Letter (Feb. 20, 1986) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file); Pacific
Lighting Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 6, 1986) (WESTLAW, Securities library,
FSEC-NAL file); Consumers Power Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 1, 1986)
(WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file); Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., SEC
No-Action Letter (Dec. 30, 1985) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file); Pa-
cific Gas & Electric Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 30, 1985) (WESTLAW, Securities
library, FSEC-NAL file).
265. Firestone Fire & Rubber Company, SEC No-Action Letter (Nov. 25, 1980)
(WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file).
266. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(7) (1988).
267. E.g., Kimberly-Clark Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 26, 1987) (WESTLAW,
Securities library, FSEC-NAL file) (proposal for termination of manufacture of tobacco
industry paper and products); Weyerhauser Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 19, 1986)
(WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file) (proposal to give community advance
notice of plant closings); Hospital Corporation of America, SEC No-Action Letter (Feb.
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which are said to relate to ordinary business operations and
which must be left to the board are whether the company should
limit executive compensation, 68 enter into golden parachute
contracts,6 9 tie executive compensation to company earnings
70
12, 1986) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file) (abortion proposal excludable
as dealing with ordinary business operations, i.e., determination of medical procedures to
be performed at company facilities); American Standard, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter
(Jan. 22, 1986) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file) (proposal for report
describing rationale and effect of two plant closings); Pennsylvania Enterprise, Inc., SEC
No-Action Letter (Apr. 12, 1985) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file) (pro-
posal prohibiting the sale, lease or other conveyance or development of the company's
watershed land); Boeing Company, SEC No-Action Letter (Aug. 12, 1983) (WESTLAW,
Securities library, FSEC-NAL file); Gulf Oil Corp., SEC No-Action Proposal (Feb. 4,
1980) (proposal to refrain from uranium mining on Indian burial site). But cf. The Boe-
ing Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 22, 1988) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-
NAL file) (proposal relating to establishment of committee to develop plans for alterna-
tive uses of military production facilities not excludable as ordinary business matters);
Archer Daniels Midland Company, SEC No-Action Letter (Aug. 14, 1987) (WESTLAW,
Securities library, FSEC-NAL file) (proposal prohibiting charitable contribution to orga-
nizations promoting abortions not excludable as ordinary business).
268. E.g., GTE Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 10, 1986) (WESTLAW, Securities
library, FSEC-NAL file) (imposing fixed dollar ceiling on amounts payable to executives
in excess of the limitations provided for under the Employment Retirement Income Se-
curity Act of 1974); Commonwealth Edison Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Aug. 28, 1985)
(WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file) (compensation limited to no more than
$200,000 salary paid to the president of the United States); Gulf Oil Corp., SEC No-
Action Letter (Feb. 14, 1983) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file); Ameri-
can Telephone and Telegraph Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 28, 1983) (WESTLAW,
Securities library, FSEC-NAL file); International Business Machines, SEC No-Action
Letter (Jan. 25, 1982) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file).
In one such letter, a shareholder sought to limit executive compensation under an Ex-
ecutive Stock Incentive Plan. According to the shareholder, the company's pperating
earnings before income taxes had declined from $753 million in 1981 to $481.5 million in
1982, to $244.5 million in 1983, and to minus $425 million in 1984. Nevertheless, the
Chairman in the dismal year 1984 received $490,000 salary, $200,000 bonus, $58,000
profit sharing, and $23,900 matched savings. In addition, under the Plan, he received
$241,000, a total of $1,096,000 in cash or stock, plus stock options for 6,100 shares. He
also received 8,000 performance units with a maximum value of $150 per unit, payable in
the future. The Chairman's cash compensation received in 1984 exceeded by more than
$100,000 his 1983 cash compensation. Likewise, the other four principal officers listed in
the 1985 proxy all received more in 1984 than in 1983. The proposal was excludable as
involving the ordinary business operations of the company. CIGNA Corp., SEC No-Ac-
tion Letter (Dec. 19, 1985) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file); see Nynex
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 29, 1988) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-
NAL file) (proposal to limit compensation of non-employee directors); Ohio Edison Co.,
SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 9, 1987) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file)
(proposal for shareholder approval of all future increases in executive salaries and bene-
fits); Southwestern Bell Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 7, 1987) (WESTLAW, Secur-
ities library, FSEC-NAL file) (proposal to limit annual retainer of non-employee
directors).
269. E.g., Georgia-Pacific Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 22, 1988) (WESTLAW,
Securities library, FSEC-NAL file); Occidental Petroleum Corp., SEC No-Action Letter
(Apr. 5, 1985) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file); see also, Crown
Zellerbach Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 20, 1986) (WESTLAW, Securities library,
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or dividend payments, 71 make loans to officers," 2 or adopt an
employee stock ownership plan.2" The board, it is maintained, is
in the best position to speak on behalf of shareholders on these
"ordinary business" issues.
Finally, the corporation can withhold information. With dis-
closure, the corporation becomes subject to the demands of vari-
ous coalitions and thus is often required to take their perspec-
tives into account when it ordinarily would not do so.2 " An
efficiency-model writer who opposes mandatory disclosure ex-
plains this effect:
Requiring firms to disclose their policy with respect to
compliance with the environmental laws, violations of
regulatory statutes [for the protection of employees or
FSEC-NAL file) (proposal excluded would also have the effect, if enforced, of causing
the company to breach an existing agreement).
270. E.g., Emerson Radio Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 29, 1988) (WESTLAW,
Securities library, FSEC-NAL file); Chrysler Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 28,
1985) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file); Pacific Gas & Electric Co., SEC
No-Action Letter (Feb. 5, 1985) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file); Ben-
dix Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 17, 1983) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-
NAL file); see Maytag Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 3, 1988) (WESTLAW, Securi-
ties library, FSEC-NAL file)(proposal to tie compensation of directors to company
earnings).
271. E.g., Middle South Utilities, SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 25, 1988)
(WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file); Detroit Edison Co., SEC No-Action
Letter (Feb. 26, 1987) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file); Ramada Inc.,
SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 9, 1987) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file);
Long Island Lighting Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 28, 1985) (WESTLAW, Securi-
ties library, FSEC-NAL file); Bangor Hydro Electric Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Mar.
18, 1985) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file); Justin Industries, Inc., SEC
No-Action Letter (Feb. 5, 1985) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file); Itek
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 8, 1980) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL
file). Even shareholder proposals that recommend amendments to compensation plans
originally submitted by managers to shareholders for approval may be omitted. E.I. Du-
pont De Nemours & Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 19, 1985) (WESTLAW, Se-
curities library, FSEC-NAL file); CIGNA Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 13, 1985)
(WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file); Alexander & Alexander Services, Inc.,
SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 7, 1984) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file).
272. Major Realty Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 19, 1987) (WESTLAW, Secur-
ities library, FSEC-NAL file) (proposal not to make loans to officers and directors
excludable).
273. Santa Fe Southern Pacific Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 11, 1988)
(WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file) (proposal relating to institution of
ESOP); Western Airlines, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 22, 1982) (WESTLAW, Se-
curities library, FSEC-NAL file) (proposal concerning establishment and funding of
ESOP); Hercules, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 7, 1981) (WESTLAW, Securities
library, FSEC-NAL file); see also Pan American Airways, SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 8,
1984) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file) (proposal for additional contri-
butions to the ESOP).
274. See, e.g., J. PFEFFER & G. SALANCIK, supra note 19, at 104-05.
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consumers], or questionable foreign or domestic pay-
ments all may affect the willingness of the firm to under-
take the conduct at issue. Due to a fear of litigation, ad-
verse publicity, or regulatory intervention, managers may
simply decide that the costs of disclosure may exceed the
expected benefits from the activity." 5
The proxy proposal rules permit the utilization of this strategy
of withholding information. Proposals recommending prepara-
tion and dissemination of reports to shareholders or the forma-
tion of special committees to examine particular areas of con-
cern involving the ordinary business operations of the
corporation may be excluded from the company's proxy state-
ment.2 76 Because shareholders invest in corporations on the ba-
sis of the ordinary business of the corporation, this severely lim-
its their ability to discover information that they consider
important. Moreover, proposals that recommend that additional
financial information be disclosed to shareholders may also be
omitted.2 77 If the information is not legally required, it need not
be disclosed.
3. Shareholder representation on the board understood as a
bridging strategy- When dependencies cannot be completely
avoided through the above-described strategies, the corporation
may utilize a number of "bridging strategies" to create a negoti-
275. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 139, at 424.
276. E.g., Santa Fe Southern Pacific Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 30, 1986)
(WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file); American Standard, Inc., SEC No-Ac-
tion Letter (Jan. 22, 1986) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file) (request for
report describing rationale for and effects of closing of two plants); General Electric Co.,
SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 20, 1985) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file)
(request for information on company's contributions to U.S. Committee for Energy
Awareness); Newport Pharmaceuticals International, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Aug.
10, 1984) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file) (formation of committee to
investigate compensation of management); see also American Home Products Corp.,
SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 9, 1987) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file)
(proposal relating to making available transcripts of annual shareholders' meetings).
277. E.g., Santa Fe Southern Pacific Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 30, 1986)
(WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file) (request for current cost financial
statements to determine fair market value of shares); Arizona Public Service Co., SEC
No-Action Letter (Feb. 22, 1985) (WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file);
Pittsburgh & West Virginia Railroad, SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 19, 1984)
(WESTLAW, Securities library, FSEC-NAL file) (request for appraisal or reevaluation
of company properties for purposes of establishing current fair market value of shares);
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 12, 1979) (WESTLAW, Se-
curities library, FSEC-NAL file) (proposal that financial statements reflect effects of
inflation).
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ated or changed environment. These strategies include con-
tracting, coopting, and coalescing.278
Contracting represents "attempts by organizations to reduce
uncertainty by coordinating their future behavior in limited and
specific ways, with other units. 2 79 This strategy involves the
"negotiation of an agreement for the exchange of performances
in the future,"280 and includes sequential spot contracts, contin-
gent claims contracts, and incomplete long-term contracts in
which various matters are left to arbitration.
Cooptation is "the process of absorbing new elements into the
leadership or policy-determining structure of an organization
[such as the board of directors] as a means of averting threats to
its stability or existence."28 Cooptation is intended to decrease
the uncertainty facing the organization by gaining the commit-
ment and support of the coopted coalition or some other audi-
ence, such as the public. 282 "[C]oopting is a more constraining
form of cooperation than contracting, for to the extent that co-
optation is effective it places an element of the environment in a
position to raise questions and perhaps exert influence on other
aspects of the organization.
2 8 3
Two kinds of cooptation have been identified-formal and in-
formal.28 4 "Formal" cooptation involves "the establishment of
openly avowed and formally ordered relationships. 28 5 This form
of cooptation is generally utilized to establish legitimacy or to
lend respectability to the authority of a governing group and as
a means of providing a mechanism for reaching a relevant pub-
278. E.g., W. SCOTT, supra note 19, at 193-98; J. THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 34-36.
279. W. SCOTT, supra note 19, at 194.
280. J. THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 35.
281. P. SELZNICK, TVA AND THE GRASSROOTS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF FORMAL
ORGANIZATION 13 (1949); J. THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 35.
282. M. LACY, COOPTATION: ANALYSIS OF A NEGLECTED SOCIAL PROCESS 73 (1977) (the
audience coopted need not be the affected group); Lacy, A Model of Cooptation Applied
to the Political Relations of the United States and American Indians, Soc. Sci. J., July
1982, at 23, 24-25.
283. J. THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 35. Professor Lacy disagrees with Thompson's
view of cooptation as being a form of cooperation, because that view assumes a "relation-
ship between two actors of more or less equal power." M. LACY, supra note 282, at 20. He
constructs a threat model in which cooptation involves yielding by the powerholder in
order to soften the impact of a threat to his power. See also W. GAMSON, POWER AND
DISCONTENT (1968); H. MINTZBERG, supra note 19, at 87-88. The threat is defused with a
legitimacy payoff and by providing a filter between the powerholder and the threatening
group. See infra text accompanying notes 291-95, 306.
284. P. SELZNICK, supra note 281, at 13.
285. Id.
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lic. 28 6 "Informal" cooptation, rather than being public, occurs
often in the "shadowland of informal interaction," '287 so as not to
undermine the legitimacy of the governance structure. It is a re-
sponse to specific individuals or interest groups brought into the
policy-determining organ of the company because of the firm's
dependence on them for physical resources or funds.2"'
Coalescing involves the combination of organizations by
merger or joint venture where the corporation acts as one with a
coalition with respect to certain operational goals through joint
decision making.289
The shareholder-management relationship may be one of coa-
lescing, informal cooptation, or formal cooptation, depending on
the nature of the corporation's dependence on its stockholders.
As the size and complexity of a company increase, the nature of
the corporation's dependence on its shareholders changes.
In the small close corporation, the firm is often dependent on
its shareholders for both managerial services and capital. There
is coalescing, whereby the shareholders and those who control
the corporation share a common identity. Passive shareholders
286. Id. at 259-60. Professor Selznick found an example of formal cooptation in the
use of voluntary county associations by the county agents or agricultural extension work-
ers of the land grant colleges. Id. at 231-37, 163-64. Avowedly formed to involve local
citizens at the grassroots in the TVA's fertilizer test demonstration program, the associa-
tions actually served as tools for the agents. For instance, they served as a "front" for the
selection of farmers to participate in the program, thus buffering the agents from com-
plaints of "playing favorites," and provided administrative functions involving funds
supposedly not within the educational role of the agents. Professor Selznick found that,
in many cases, de facto power remained in the agents--the selection of farmers to partici-
pate in the program represented simply the formal confirmation of choices of the agents,
and, in many cases, the county agents were in complete control of the functions of the
associations. Moreover, the associations were not parties to the agreement between the
TVA and the extension services establishing the policy governing the fertilizer test dem-
onstration program within the state. Although the agents' control was partially explained
by their responsibility for the success of the program, the desire to maintain power was a
factor. Some officials at TVA had hoped for the development of a strong cooperative
movement based on the network of associations, but it was perceived that "the extension
service remained hesitant about organizing unlimited membership organizations for fear
that such organizations would 'get out of their hands'." Id. at 235.
The associations then served various administrative functions for the agents. However,
they were not successful in legitimizing the TVA's program in the area, because the
farmers did not view the organization as theirs. Cooptation is not always successful.
However, it has been noted by Professor Lacy that legitimacy payoffs may come from an
audience outside the system where cooptation occurs. M. LACY, supra note 282, at 73. In
the case of the TVA, the grassroots association served to legitimize the intrusion of the
TVA into the region by those voters supporting the program through their representa-
tives in Congress.
287. Id. at 261.
288. Id. at 15.
289. W. Scorr, supra note 19, at 196-98; J. THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 35-36.
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who are brought into the small close corporation to provide a
source of present and future capital for the firm add an element
of informal cooptation. These shareholders are often a powerful
group who pose a substantial threat to management, because
smaller firms and, particularly, firms in their formative years
have fewer sources of funding available at affordable prices.
Moreover, the new corporation lacks a track record and relevant
information upon which to judge its operations and its manage-
ment team, which makes obtaining sufficient financing from
other sources, such as bank loans and debt offerings, difficult
and expensive. 90
The large public corporation is less dependent on its share-
holders for capital. It has many sources of financing.29' Thus, the
power of shareholders in this context stems less from physical
resource dependence than from the social legitimation of mana-
gerial power that the inclusion of shareholders in the official de-
cision-making process provides. The one resource that manage-
ment expects shareholders will provide in the public corporation
is social legitimacy. Formal cooptation is involved.
This legitimation29 2 derives from three sources. The first
source resides in the American respect for private property.
Shareholders are generally perceived by the public to be "own-
ers" of the corporation and, therefore, ultimately in control of its
activities. Managers thus can argue persuasively against govern-
mental interference by relying for legitimacy on arguments relat-
ing to the private control of property. The second source of le-
gitimacy rests on the efficiency argument-made by the residual
rights theorists-that owners have the greatest incentive to util-
ize corporate resources efficiently, which redounds to the benefit
of society.293 A mechanism for owner participation in decision
making thus provides a social reason for combating interference
290. See generally W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE
(1986).
291. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S., 547, table 924
(1984); see G. DONALDSON, MANAGING CORPORATE WEALTH 42-57 (1984).
292. Legitimation is a means of rationalizing or justifying an organizational structure
as being consistent with social values. E.g., J. PFEFFER & G. SALANCIK, supra note 19, at
193-202. Legitimacy is not necessarily synonymous with legality or with economic viabil-
ity, although it bears some relationship to both. Id. at 93. That is, legitimacy does not
arise merely from economic viability, although if an activity is legitimate to a large
enough segment of the population, it will probably be economically viable as well. Id.
But, although a cocaine operation is able to find persons to support its operations
through the exchange of scarce resources, it is not consistent with social values. An orga-
nizational structure may likewise be economically viable but lack legitimacy. This may
be because it is inconsistent with social norms or values.
293. See supra text accompanying notes 117-45; J. HURST, supra note 261, at 85.
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by government in managerial decision making. The third source
of legitimacy is the comfort obtained from a system of "checks
and balances"-fundamental to the American understanding of
justice-whereby managers are perceived to be checked by
shareholder participation."9 4 It is generally considered beneficial
for those holding positions of power to be held accountable to
some group or groups other than themselves. That management
is purportedly held accountable to shareholders serves to legiti-
mate its exercise of power. Shareholder participation has thus
provided the ideological justification for managerial power.9 5
Such a justification is particularly important for the large corpo-
ration because of the scope of its control over decisions affecting
the community at large.
The relationship between shareholders and management in a
large public corporation is then one of formal cooptation. The
purpose of formal cooptation is to provide a "front" or "aura of
respectability" for the powerholder.2 96 This objective is obtained
by providing participation by the coopted group in a governance
structure, while limiting the ability of that group to exercise true
power: the "point of formal cooptation is to share the public
symbols or administrative burdens of authority and, conse-
quently, public policy, without the substantive power being
transferred. '2 9 7 That substantive power is not transferred to the
public shareholders is amply demonstrated in the section that
294. E.g., J. HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES 242, 244 (1977);
SEC ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 9, at 86 (transcript of Professor Carey's testi-
mony); The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly
Owned Corporation, 33 Bus. LAW. 2083, 2090 (1978)(statement of The Business Round-
table)("It is appropriate, however, that the public and its elected representatives should
be concerned that private business organizations like government itself be subject to
checks and balances, to constraints on excessive power").
295. See R. DAHL, APTER THE REVOLUTION: AUTHORITY IN A GOOD SOCIETY 125 (1970);
J. HURST, supra note 294, at 93 (it was by the shareholder's vote that he would formally
confer legitimacy on the power wielded by those immediately controlling the firm); SEC
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 9, at A-4,A-5 (issue raised as to "whether the pre-
sent corporate governance system [would] retain its legitimacy in the absence of share-
holder participation"). The SEC report also stated:
In this time of increasing competition between business and government over
the direction of the economic system, it is important that the legitimacy of the
corporate form as a principal means of doing business be supported by the pub-
lic and that internal corporate practices not be mandated by law or regulating
fiat. Confidence in the corporate institution can be increased by better publiciz-
ing the role and function of the board of directors. The annual meeting, annual
report to shareholders, and proxy statement can be the focal point of this impor-
tant educational effort.
Id. at 211-12 (quoting AMERICAN SOC'Y CORP. SECRETARIES, ANNUAL MEETING GUIDE 7.
296. P. SELZNICK, supra note 281, at 260.
297. Id. at 261.
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relates to the avoidance of dependencies.298 One of the most sig-
nificant obstacles to shareholder control is the right of manage-
ment to include only its nominees in the company's proxy state-
ments.2 "9 This method of selecting powerholders is consistent
with the traditional model of cooptation, in which members of a
governing group are elected by existing members of that
group.
3 00
Cooptation, however, is not always successful. Nevertheless,
when the legitimacy payoff is with a broader audience than the
coopted group, the audience is "less likely to critically examine
the meaningfulness of expanded participation." 30' This is espe-
cially true in the case of shareholder participation in which the
public at large is the relevant audience.
Formal cooptation can result in actual sharing of power, such
as when a coalition becomes organized and is able to exert real
power. This power could be exerted, for example, by the organi-
zation of shareholders' associations or the acquisition of large
blocks of stock by individual shareholders. In this respect, coop-
tation is a "two-edged sword." 0 2 It provides legitimacy for man-
agerial power, but it also has the potential to displace that
power.
That managers intended shareholder participation to provide
legitimacy for the exercise of their power and not to confer real
power is evidenced by the response of managers to tender offers.
When large shareholders sought to exercise power through
tender offers, managers responded with a vast array of defensive
maneuvers. 0 3 The use of these maneuvers has publicly exposed
the enormous amount of power residing in corporate managers.
They have tarnished the "aura of respectability" in which mana-
gerial power has been cloaked. This unveiling, in turn, has fu-
eled efforts to find other bases of legitimacy for the exercise of
managerial power. One response is to legitimize the exercise of
power by managers on behalf of constituencies other than share-
298. See supra text accompanying notes 247-77.
299. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(8) (1988).
300. M. LACY, supra note 282, at 10-14 (traditional elite recruitment model of coopta-
tion); H. READING, A Dictionary of the Social Sciences 50 (1977) (first definition).
301. M. LACY, supra note 282, at 72. "There are several possible targets for legitimacy
payoffs: the threat group itself [here shareholders], the audience within the system, and
the audience outside the system [the public]." Id.
302. E.g., W. Scorr, supra note 19, at 195-96 ("Cooptation as a bridging mechanism
provides a two-way street with both influence and support flowing sometimes in one di-
rection, sometimes in the other, and more often, in both"); P. SELZNICK, supra note 281,
at 12; J. THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 35.
303. L. RmSTmIN, BusiNtss ASSOCIATIONS 12-39 (1985).
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holders." 4 Another is to defend as legitimate and efficient the
issuance of nonvoting common stock.0 5
In the power model, shareholder representation on the board
of directors of public corporations is an effective cooptative de-
vice.308 This participatory mechanism legitimizes the power of
managers. The board also serves to channel and blunt the exer-
cise of shareholder power.307 Thus, there is a filtering payoff as
well.
4. Concluding comments- In the power model, the compo-
sition and functions of the board of directors cannot be consid-
ered apart from a social, cultural and political context. Although
the scarcity of resources is a reality, how these resources will be
used and how activities utilizing them will be organized and di-
rected is a matter of social organization. Even the identification
of resources as critical for the corporation emerges, in part,
through a process of social influence and social definition of the
organization. It is culture that devalues women's work over that
of men and that of the black over the white man. The organiza-
tion of the firm as a top to bottom hierarchy is a reflection of
304. See supra notes 17-18; cf. J. HURST, supra note 261, at 104 (shareholders' own
legitimacy at issue).
305. See Dent, Dual Class Capitalization: A Reply to Professor Seligman, 54 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 725 (1986); Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual
Class Common Stock, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 119 (1987).
306. To my knowledge, the board of directors has not previously been conceptualized
as a cooptative device with respect to shareholders. The participation of other constitu-
encies on the board, however, has been viewed in this way. Some researchers have found
that directorate ties follow patterns of the corporation's critical dependencies. See, e.g.,
R. BURT, CORPORATE PROFITS AND COOPTrATION (1983); Burt, Cooptive Corporate Actor
Networks: A Reconsideration of Interlocking Directorates Involving American Manu-
facturing, 25 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 557 (1980); Pfeffer, Cooptation and the Composition of
Electric Utility Boards of Directors, 17 PAC. Soc. REV. 333 (1974); Pfeffer, Size, Compo-
sition, and Function of Hospital Boards of Directors: A Study of Organization-Environ-
ment Linkage, 18 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 349 (1973); Pfeffer, Size and Composition of Corporate
Boards of Directors: The Organization and its Environment, 17 ADMIN. Scl. Q. 218
(1972). But see, e.g., Palmer, Broken Ties: Interlocking Directorates and Intercorporate
Coordination, 28 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 40 (1983). The number of such members on boards has
decreased since the SEC has required that the relationships between directors and other
coalitions be disclosed. See Analysis of Results of 1981 Proxy Statement Disclosure Mon-
itoring Program, supra note 221. This decrease lends support to the position that these
ties are a form of informal cooptation. With informal cooptation, the ties must be kept
nonpublic, because their disclosure tends to undermine the legitimacy of the governance
structure. See supra text accompanying note 287. Social legitimacy depends on board
members representing shareholders, not the other coalitions.
307. M. LACY, supra note 282, at 74-77. Participation within a bureaucratic structure
provides a filtering function, consisting of blunting and channelling. Blunting refers to
the "low impact on the powerholder allowed by the structure of participation." Id. Chan-
nelling is the confining of resistance "to that possible through the structure of participa-
tion." Id.
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social, cultural, and political values, 08 just as equally efficient
work teams are a reflection of changing social values. Likewise,
the composition of the board of directors is a reflection of politi-
cal and social values.
The power model rejects the evolutionary or natural selection
perspective of the efficiency model. The corporation is part of
and, in part, creates a socially constructed reality. 09 For the so-
cial constructionist:
The idea that meaning and reality are socially con-
structed implies that there is no necessary or natural or-
der to social arrangements. Such arrangements, as well as
their meaning, are products of human action and cogni-
tion. This means that institutionalization and legitima-
tion are themselves processes open to study, debate, and
contest. Consequently, all social arrangements are prob-
lematic rather than inevitable .... 310
It should be noted that the social constructionist viewpoint is
to some extent at odds with the resource dependency perspec-
tive, from which one is more inclined to see "some material con-
crete reality in the pattern of transactions or in the pattern of
operations of the organization. ' 31 ' Nevertheless, even the re-
source dependency perspective recognizes that the corporation's
behavior is limited by its perceptions. The corporation's behav-
ior in relation to a given coalition depends on its attention pro-
cess or its re-creation of its environment.32 These processes in
turn are dependent on the corporation's structure, its division
into departments or divisions, and the nature of its activities.
Bias is present throughout the system. For instance, it is present
in the perceptions of administrators. Because persons typically
perceive their expertise as more critical to the resolution of the
firm's problems than the expertise of others,1 3 administrators
308. Cf. Francis, Markets and Hierarchies: Efficiency or Domination, in POWER, EF-
FICIENCY AND INSTITUTIONS 105 (1983) ("I try to argue that where hierarchy is chosen in
preference to market as a means of conducting transactions, this is not always because it
is in some sense technically a more efficient means of transacting, but because it allows
one party to dominate the other and act against their interests.").
309. E.g., Bauer & Cohen, supra note 98, at 94; J. PFEFFER & G. SALANCIK, supra note
19, at 259-60.
310. J. PFEFFER, supra note 19, at 210.
311. Id. at 220.
312. J. PFEFFER & G. SALANCIK, supra note 19, at 71-83, 260; see also J. PFEFFER,
supra note 19, at 219-20.
313. J. PFEFFER & G. SALANCIK, supra note 19, at 234-35; W. ScoTT, T. MITCHELL & P.
BIRNBAUM, supra note 19, at 219-20.
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are likely to perceive their contribution to problems to be more
valuable even though input from others is often needed to re-
solve the problems. In addition, administrators tend to perceive
the functions they perform as more complex, and to see those
below them as less complex and therefore subject to review and
routinization 14 The reward structure and organization of work
will then reflect these perceptions.
The various strategies by which the corporation can decrease
its dependencies do not alter the amount of interdependence in
the system:
The only changes which alter the amount of interdepen-
dence are those which (1) increase the amount of availa-
ble resources and (2) decrease the number of contenders
for those resources. If there is a scarcity of some resource,
the fact that one organization stabilizes its acquisition of
the resource through some form of social coordination
does not alter the fact of the scarcity. It solves one organ-
ization's problem by transferring the problem to
others. 15
That is, the corporation's pursuit of uncertainty reduction is not
necessarily positive to the system as a whole, due to third party
effects. As one writing notes:
Strategies to manage interdependence require interlock-
ing activities with others, and such interlocking produces
concentrated power. Those organizations not involved in
the resultant structure are less powerful and less able to
cope with their problems of interdependence. 1
Thus, rather than finding interlocking behavior to be efficient by
reference to the possible reduction of transaction costs, the
power model recognizes the problematic nature of many such
arrangements.
314. W. Scorr, supra note 19, at 228-32.
315. J. PFEFFER & G. SALANCIK, supra note 19, at 284.
316. Id. As Professors Pfeffer and Salancik note:
The problem is that the negotiated environment established is not one that in-
cludes the interests of all parties. . . The problem with collusion, or coordina-
tion to establish negotiated environments, is that everyone is not freely and
openly participating in the process. Only a few members of a market may be
participating, and it is frequently the least powerful and the least organized
whose interests are not served in the resultant interorganizational structure.
Id. at 183-84.
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C. Comparison of Efficiency and Power Models Regarding
Firm Behavioral Determinants, The Shareholder-management
Relationship, and The Board of Directors
Comparisons of the two models with respect to the topics cov-
ered in this part have probably already been made by the
reader. For this reason, the models will be only very briefly com-
pared in this section. More importantly, this section focuses on
arguments concerning the relative merits of the concepts of effi-
ciency and power in understanding organizational structures.
In the efficiency and power models, firm behavioral determi-
nants differ. In the efficiency model, markets determine firm be-
havior. In the transaction cost approach, individuals and firms
are motivated to minimize transaction costs. 17 Based on a natu-
ral selection argument, organizational structures are understood
in efficiency terms. By contrast, in the power model, firm behav-
ior is the outcome of a power contest. Power derives from a
number of sources, including resource dependency, position in
hierarchy, culture, and distribution of wealth. To the extent that
the firm has a single motivation, it is to increase power, which is
defined as discretion and autonomy. 1 8 Organizational structures
can be explained in a number of different ways under this
model. 9
The efficiency model suggests that the terms of the share-
holder-management relationship result from individual con-
tracting. The board of directors emerges under this model as pri-
marily performing a monitoring function on behalf of
shareholders. The power model also understands the relation-
ship as an exchange, but as one among groups operating in a
317. See supra text accompanying note 58; Williamson & Ouchi, supra note 100.
318. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64. Professor Pfeffer, in commenting on
the resource dependency perspective, states:
The resource dependence perspective . . . argues that the principle concern mo-
tivating integration is the attempt to reduce uncertainty and that this uncer-
tainty reduction will be pursued even at the expense of profits, albeit subject at
some level to a profit constraint when mergers among business firms are consid-
ered. Concerned more with issues of power and politics both within the firm and
between firms, resource dependence essentially argues . . . from the perspective
of power maintenance and power acquisition. Structural autonomy, or freedom
from external constraint, and the ability to constrain or affect other firms moti-
vate the various cooptive strategies used by firms. Power may have profit out-
comes . . . but profit or efficiency is not the sole or perhaps even the dominant
motivating force.
J. PFEFFER, supra note 19, at 206.
319. See supra text accompanying notes 65-69.
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social and political context. The board of directors is, in power
terms, a cooptative device with respect to shareholders.2 0
It has been argued that the resource dependency perspective
explains outcomes in terms of power when they are more appro-
priately understood in efficiency terms. 21 Some argue, for exam-
ple, that a response by an organization to a critical dependency
is efficient. Indeed, the resource-dependency theorist often ex-
plains such a response as adaptive. 22
At least a few observations are in order. First, the power
model identifies resource dependence as only one source of
power, and thus it only partially explains firm behavior. Also, an
expanded view of "resources" is utilized. Second, the author of
the power model is more sensitive to the social constructionist
perspective than some resource dependency theorists. Among
other things, the model recognizes room for the exercise of dis-
cretion in the identification of dependencies, degrees of critical-
ity, and strategies for avoidance.323 Also, note that the identity
of the firm's dependencies is related to the "choice" of firm
goals. Third, the notion of "efficient" adaption to an environ-
ment tends to obscure the fact that such adaption can change
the environment to which others then must adapt. A change in
the environment that benefits one organization may adversely
affect another, and such change may not be "efficient" for the
system as a whole." 4
It also has been argued that the power phenomenon is tran-
sient and in the long-run will give way to efficiency.325 Thus, effi-
ciency, rather than power, is more important to an understand-
ing of organizational structures. This, of course, is the natural
selection argument, which has been previously criticized.U6 That
discussion will not be repeated here, except to reiterate that the
argument is highly dependent on competition reaching the up-
permost levels of power in an organization. Moreover, concep-
tually, the long-run must build upon what happens in the short-
run, which results in a particular distribution of wealth, organi-
zational structure, and negotiated arrangements. These results
will necessarily affect what is considered efficient in the long-
320. See supra text accompanying notes 278-307.
321. Williamson & Ouchi, supra note 100, at 29-30.
322. J. PFEFFER & G. SALANCIK, supra note 19, at 106-07.
323. See supra text accompanying notes 312-14.
324. See supra text accompanying notes 315-16; Bauer & Cohen, supra note 98, at
88.
325. Williamson & Ouchi, supra note 100, at 29-30.
326. See supra text accompanying notes 90-96.
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run. It is, therefore, no surprise that the efficiency model is uti-
lized today, in most cases, to justify power in a few. Note that
this is a departure from the competitive market ideal, upon
which, ironically, the validity of the model ultimately depends.
It is also argued that efficiency is a more readily defined con-
cept than power, and therefore it is a better concept to use to
understand organizational structure. 27 Only by reifying the cor-
poration 28 or viewing it as an instrument for a single interest
group, however, can efficiency be defined. It is clear that reifica-
tion is what is involved when an efficiency.theorist argues that
"power explains results when the organization sacrifices effi-
ciency to serve special interests. 3 29 Whose interests does the
"organization" serve? As the power model reflects, the ambigu-
ity of goals makes the efficiency analysis problematic.
V. AN EXAMINATION OF SOME BASIC CORPORATE LAW
PRINCIPLES FROM THE PERSPECTIVES OF THE EFFICIENCY AND
POWER MODELS
In this section, some basic principles of corporate law are ex-
amined from the perspectives of the efficiency and power mod-
els. The principles examined are: (1) that the objective of the
corporation is to enhance corporate profits and shareholder gain
and (2) that the board of directors shall be elected by
shareholders.
A. Enhancing Corporate Profits and Shareholder Gain as
the Objective of the Corporation
The American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Gov-
ernance § 2.01 provides that the principle objective of the cor-
poration is to enhance corporate profits and shareholder gain.
330
327. Williamson & Ouchi, supra note 100, at 30.
328. See Davis, A Critique of the Ideology of Efficiency, 12 HUMBOLDT J. oP Soc. REL.
73 (1985).
329. Williamson & Ouchi, supra note 100, at 30.
330. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1984) [hereinafter T.D. 2]; see Dodge v.
Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919). The court in Dodge v.
Ford Motor Co. stated:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profits of
the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end.
The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain
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This legal principle rests on the acceptance of the efficiency
model. The efficiency model maintains that the most efficient
governance structure of a corporation is one in which share-
holder benefit (or profit) serves as the controlling factor in cor-
porate decision making.
Various reasons have been examined for the adoption of this
principle. Briefly, shareholders, according to the incentive-
residual rights theory,8 have the incentive to utilize the re-
sources of the corporation most efficiently, because they are the
"owners" of those resources and receive only the profits that
those resources can produce. Therefore, a corporation managed
in a way that shareholders would approve emerges as the stan-
dard of efficiency. Under the agency cost approach, s' share-
holder representation on the board is the most efficient govern-
ance arrangement for the firm. If it were not, market forces
would cause a different arrangement to be utilized. Thus, effi-
ciency is enhanced by having the interests of shareholders ulti-
mately control decision making. Finally, according to the trans-
action cost approach, s  shareholders make asset-specific
investments in the firm, which presumably can be obtained by
the firm only by promising to shareholders that corporations be
operated to maximize profits for shareholders. This contractual
term then contributes to the viability of the firm and would not
exist unless it were efficient.
In contrast, the power model maintains that corporations pur-
sue numerous objectives, sometimes inconsistently. Indeed, this
manner of operation is not necessarily "inefficient," but may
contribute to the adaptability of the firm to its environment.3 3"
Implicit in the power model is the notion that the struggles
within the firm, and between internal and external coalitions, do
not mainly revolve around whether efficient or inefficient meth-
ods of operating decisions, or arrangements should be adopted,
but on the goals or values to be pursued by the organization. A
political model of the corporation is involved in that what re-
that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of
profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to
devote them to other purposes.
Id.
The decision in this case must be understood, of course, with the following in mind: it
was decided prior to the social responsibility debates, did not involve an action for dam-
ages from directors, and involved a potential freeze-out of the Dodge brothers.
331. See supra text accompanying notes 119-45.
332. See supra text accompanying notes 155-73.
333. See supra text accompanying notes 174-227.
334. See supra text accompanying notes 74-78.
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suits from the political struggle may be rationalized on efficiency
grounds, but more accurately reflects power considerations. If
profit is adopted as the objective of the corporation, this conclu-
sion is the result of a power struggle in which certain power co-
alitions have prevailed.
As noted above, profit maximization may not be synonymous
with the best interests of society. 85 In the real world, efficiency
is not a neutral concept, as some efficiency theorists would have
it, but is value-laden. This is particularly the case when third-
party effects are not taken into account. As previously discussed,
firms that maximize profits are not necessarily those most likely
to survive."36 Even if those firms were most likely to survive, the
utility of "survival" is itself value-laden, depending on one's
judgment of the value of the corporation's products, services,
and methods of operation. In addition, the maximization of
profits for shareholders does not necessarily translate into the
enhancement of the value of underlying assets.3 "
A principal justification for the adoption of the profit objec-
tive by corporate law scholars is that it supposedly provides "a
single, objective, easily monitored [residual] goal."338 Nothing
could be further from the truth. First, the pursuit of profit is not
the pursuit of a single goal, but involves decisions and actions in
furtherance of numerous goals. Second, it is not objective. What
costs and benefits, for example, are to be included in the calcula-
tion of profits? If social costs are to be included, how are various
social costs and benefits to be valued? How are potential future
economic benefits and costs to be quantified given the uncer-
tainty of future markets? Third, it is not an easily monitored
goal. How can decision-makers be made accountable on the basis
of profit when their decisions involve making predictions of fu-
ture returns from uncertain markets? How are decisions to be
monitored when various business alternatives may be chosen in-
volving different degrees of profit potential, some long-term and
others short-term? Finally, how are decisions to be judged when
alternatives are available with equal profit prospects? I submit
that the only way these decisions can be assessed is on the basis
of values other than profit. Fourth, if profit is deemed to be a
"single, objective, easily monitored goal," why wouldn't other
335. See supra text accompanying notes 81-87.
336. See supra text accompanying note 93.
337. See supra text accompanying note 142.
338. R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAw 692 (1986).
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goals, such as the maximization of employee wages, consumer
prices, and survival, do equally as well?
The profit objective is to a large extent a fiction, which hides
under the guise of objectivity the substantial amount of discre-
tion managers have to make value choices. This is reflected in
the commentaries to the American Law Institute's Draft, which
recognize how the selection of time horizons can justify a sub-
stantial range of choices by managers:
Activity that entails a short-run cost to achieve an appro-
priately greater long-run profit is therefore not a depar-
ture from the economic [profit] objective, and an orienta-
tion toward lawful, ethical, and public-spirited activity
will normally fall within this description . . . .Although
the corporate decisionmaker . ..needs to meet a stan-
dard of care in making his decisions, that standard can
be satisfied even when, as is often the case, a prospective
profit cannot be particularized. Recurring cases of this
sort include those in which the object of a corporate ac-
tion is to maintain the confidence of business organiza-
tions with which the corporation deals, to foster the mo-
rale of employees, or to encourage favorable or forestall
unfavorable government regulation-as by abstaining
from conduct that would engender unfavorable public re-
action against the corporation, providing lawful assis-
tance in connection with lobbying or referenda activities,
or voluntarily adopting a course of conduct so as to fore-
stall legislation that would instead mandate such
conduct. 39
Case law also reflects the substantial amount of discretion
that the profit objective provides managers. Judgments rarely,
for example, disturb a decision for which some plausible profit-
oriented justification is given.340 Even charitable contributions
have been permitted. 41 The profit objective does not serve as a
single, objective, easily monitored goal, but as a justification for
managers to do essentially what they please. The "hidden
339. T.D. 2 § 2.01, supra note 330, at 28-29.
340. E.g., Kelly v. Bell, 266 A.2d 878 (Del. 1970); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d
173, 237 N.E.2d 776 (1968); Union Pac. R.R. v. Trustees, Inc., 8 Utah 2d 101, 329 P.2d
398 (1958).
341. E.g. Union Pac. R.R. v. Trustees, Inc., 8 Utah 2d 101, 329 P.2d 398 (1958); Sor-
ensen v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 112 Neb. 248, 199 N.W. 534 (1924).
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agenda" 4 ' of those defending the profit objective is perhaps to
maintain this state of affairs.
Supporters of the profit objective have criticized the corporate
social responsibility proponents for the "insuperable problem of
defining what the public interest is, and when the pursuit of
profit maximization should be sacrificed for these ends."3 3 Im-
plicit in this position is the notion that it is known what the
profit maximizing course of action is which must then be sacri-
ficed. As previously explained, profit maximization does not pro-
duce a readily identifiable goal or course of action. Efficiency
theorists also assume that a corporation can operate only on the
basis of a single replacement goal. Indeed, some of those who
have adopted the efficiency model have gone so far as to suggest
that a corporation will self-destruct if it pursues inconsistent
goals. " Of course, that is not the case when the power model's
conceptual lens is used. The corporation pursues numerous and
often inconsistent goals which enable the corporation to adapt to
its social, political, and economic environment. The social re-
sponsibility debate loses contact with reality when it becomes
involved with the abstraction of a single end or objective for the
corporation. The important focus must be instead on the proce-
dures for making decisions on behalf of the corporation34 and
on the identity of decision-makers.
The importance of the identity of those making decisions
(which in turn affects the goals that the public corporation will
pursue) becomes apparent when the breadth of the corporate
decision-maker's discretion is made explicit. The Delaware Su-
preme Court in a recent decision, for example, stated that the
"board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging
its responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits
accruing to the stockholders. ' '3 6 This is not a restatement of the
law, but it makes explicit that which has been, to a large extent,
implicit in the law and obscured somewhat by the fiction of the
profit objective. Even the recently enacted Pennsylvania statu-
tory provision (that directors may consider the effects of their
decisions "upon employees, upon suppliers and customers of the
342. Note the play on the words used by Professor Fischel in The Corporate Govern-
ance Movement, supra note 14, at 1284.
343. Id. at 1268-69.
344. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 139, at 405.
345. The corporate law has recently become more serious about reviewing procedures
for decision making. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
346. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986) (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985)).
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corporation and upon communities in which offices or other es-
tablishments of the corporation are located" 47 ) is not a large de-
parture from what is currently permitted, given the substantial
deference granted by courts to the substantive decisions of cor-
porate decision-makers.48 These developments, however, bring
to the fore basic issues of whether directors are appropriately
selected and qualified to make such decisions. These issues have
been obscured by the fiction of the profit goal, which is held out
as the single objective and easily monitored goal with respect to
which managers have special expertise.
B. Election of the Board of Directors by Shareholders
A primary principle of corporate law is that shareholders shall
select and thereby determine the qualifications of directors.3 '
Various reform proposals have been made over the years to
modify this principle by specifying certain qualifications for di-
rectors such as independence and/or by providing for the selec-
tion of directors by other constituencies or a governmental
agency. 60 To some extent, these proposals are motivated by rec-
ognition of the substantial discretion managers have in making
corporate decisions and the desire to make the corporation more
accountable, responsive, or sensitive to a wide variety of constit-
uencies and concerns. Among these proposals are ones that ad-
vocate that the board of directors should consist of outside di-
rectors, "public interest" directors, "professional" directors, or
constituency directors, including employee directors.3"'
347. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8363b (Purdon Supp. 1988); see also OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 1701.59(E) (Anderson Supp. 1987)
A director, in determining what he reasonably believes to be in the best interests
of the corporation, shall consider the interests of the corporation's shareholders
and, in his discretion, may consider any of the following: (1) The interests of the
corporation's employees, suppliers, creditors, and customers; (2) The economy of
the state and nation; (3) Community and societal considerations; (4) The long-
term as well as short-term interests of the corporation and its shareholders, in-
cluding the possibility that these interests may be best served by the continued
independence of the corporation.
Id.
348. See supra notes 340-41 and accompanying text. cf Conard, supra note 211, at
1476-83.
349. See supra note 46.
350. See infra note 351.
351. E.g., R. DAHL, supra note 295, at 121-29 (favoring election of employee direc-
tors); R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 124-28 (1976)
(proposing a shareholder-elected board to be comprised wholly of full-time, outside
board members, each of whom will be given separate oversight responsibilities); C.
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Reform proposals of this kind are criticized on a number of
grounds. First, the proposals contain "arbitrary" features. How
should the percentage of outside or constituency directors be de-
termined? What constituencies should be represented, and how
should they be selected? 352 Second, public interest and constitu-
ency directors would "politicize" the board 53 and, therefore, in-
terfere with efficient decision making. Third, the stakes of these
directors in the company are inadequate to ensure efficient deci-
sion making,' 54 particularly the stakes of outside and public in-
terest directors. Fourth, the expertise of outside, public interest,
and constituency directors is insufficient for membership on the
board.35 5 Fifth, market processes will be distorted if constituency
representatives become board members. 35 Sixth, constituency
directors will have conflicts of interest.357 This is particularly se-
rious because the directors have interests that are inconsistent
with general corporate welfare.3 58 Seventh, there are more effi-
cient means for other constituencies to interface with the com-
pany. For example, employees can engage in' collective bargain-
ing. 159 Eighth, minority representation on the board by outside
or constituency directors is unhelpful, because they may be "fro-
zen out" of decision making or be ineffective for other reasons.3 60
These criticisms, to a large extent, come from the utilization
of the efficiency model. According to this model, compositions
STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 152-83 (1975) (proposing that, for each $1 billion of assets
or sales, whichever is higher, ten percent of a company's directors be public interest
directors, appointed by a Federal Corporations Commission or the SEC and approved by
a majority of the other board members); Moscow, The Independent Director, 28 Bus.
LAW. 9, 12-15 (1972) (advocating that an "independent" director be assigned by govern-
mental agency to corporations whose securities are registered under § 12 of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934).
352. E.g., E. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER 283 (1981); 0. WIL-
LIAMSON, supra note 58, at 309.
353. E.g., E. HERMAN, supra note 352, at 284; 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 58, at 310-
11.
354. E.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 139, at 403-06; Fischel, The Corporate
Governance Movement, supra note 14, at 1282-83. Reference is also made to the discus-
sion of asset specificity, see supra text accompanying notes 174-227.
355. E.g., M. EISENBERO, supra note 7, at 22-23; Fischel, The Corporate Governance
Movement, supra note 14, at 1282-83.
356. See e.g., Goldschmid, The Greening of the Board Room: Reflections in Corpo-
rate Responsibility, 10 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROB. 17, 26 (1973); see 0. WILLIAMSON, supra
note 58, at 311-12.
357. E.g., M. EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 22-23; see supra note 212 and accompany-
ing text.
358. E.g., M. EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 22-23.
359. E.g., M. EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 20-21, 23-24, 161. See generally 0. WILLIAM-
SON, supra note 58, at 298-325.
360. E.g., E. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER, supra note 352 at
290-91.
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and functions of boards should be left to the marketplace, which
has opted for the present system. All other means of determin-
ing compositions and functions are "arbitrary" and thus not
valid. Due to the operation of market forces, board membership
will be determined on the basis of efficiency considerations. The
evolution of board composition will assure that board members
will have the necessary expertise, stake in the enterprise, similar
or different qualifications or interests to ensure efficient decision
making. Other interested constituencies will naturally interface
with the corporation in ways which economize on transaction
costs. Artificial arrangements imposed on the corporation will ei-
ther be circumvented, be ineffective, or decrease the efficiency of
the corporation. Although the corporate law which provides that
shareholders shall elect directors can be viewed as governmental
intrusion into the operation of the marketplace, this principle is
defended as that which would be contracted for by the parties in
the absence of transaction costs to protect shareholders' residual
rights or asset-specific investments.
The power model provides a different conceptual lens for as-
sessing these proposals. First, the power model demonstrates
that the situation which now exists, with the board composed of
shareholder representatives, is as "arbitrary" as the structures
proposed, because it is not the result of inexorable market forces
or explained adequately on the basis of efficiency considerations.
It results from a mixture of social, cultural, and power factors.
The selection of "monitoring" directors by chief executive of-
ficers is, in fact, considerably more "arbitrary" than would be
selections based on legislative criteria or selections by third
parties.
Second, the power coalition model shows that the corporation
is already highly "politicized." While diversity would increase at
the board level with public interest or constituency representa-
tion, this diversity does not necessarily interfere with efficient
decision making. Of course, the question "efficient for whom?" is
particularly relevant here. Such representation would make it
more difficult for the internal coalitions to utilize various strate-
gies to insulate themselves from the demands of various constit-
uencies.61 This representation would increase the corporation's
sensitivity to other interests. If the ability of the company to
respond rapidly to changing conditions is claimed to be the
problem with diversity on the board, it is important to empha-
size: (1) that the board serves primarily a monitoring, rather
361. See supra text accompanying notes 247-77.
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than a decision-making, function; (2) the German experience
with codetermination regarding responsiveness of German in-
dustry to technological change; 62 (3) that generally complex de-
cisions involving the assessment of ambiguous or uncertain situ-
ations are best made by groups rather than by individuals;"'3
and (4) that quick decisions do not necessarily translate into op-
erating successes because acceptance of those decisions by others
is important. The Japanese system of consensus decision-mak-
ing, though slow, has been heralded as superior to the relatively
fast CEO decision-making process in American enterprises. 6
More importantly, through broader representation it is likely
that the resulting decisions will be acceptable to more groups.
Third, the power model indicates that one should be skeptical
of the claim that outside and constituency directors do not have
the necessary stake in the company, whereas inside directors
and shareholders do. The power model demonstrates that mem-
bership on the board results not from the stake one has in the
enterprise, but from power considerations. Even representation
on the board resulting from resource dependence (informal co-
optation) occurs as a result of the company's dependence on the
resource and not as a result of the stake the constituency has in
the firm.3 65 Indeed, the problem with existing governance ar-
rangements is that they do not give sufficient attention to the
needs of those who depend on or have a stake in the company.
Certainly, constituency representation on the board accom-
plishes this purpose. As for "public interest" directors, their
stakes can be made to approximate those of current inside and
outside directors by monetary and reputational benefits and
sanctions.
Fourth, the power model demonstrates that one should be
more suspicious of the merits of the expertise argument. The
claim of expertise is a common means for attaining and main-
taining power.3 66 The validity of this argument depends upon
the functions of the board. Because the board is not intended to
manage the corporation,6 7 but to monitor and sensitize the cor-
362. See supra text accompanying notes 215-16.
363. D. HELLRIEGEL, J. SLOCUM, & R. WOODMAN, supra note 63, at 228-29.
364. Cf. W. LONG & K. SEO, MANAGEMENT IN JAPAN AND INDIA 64-65 (1977); Sours,
The Influence of Japanese Culture on the Japanese Management System, in JAPANESE
MANAGEMENT: CULTURAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS 31 (S. Lee & G.
Schwendiman eds. 1982).
365. See supra text accompanying notes 228-316.
366. See supra text accompanying ,iotes 313-14.
367. E.g., M. EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 139-41.
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poration to important issues, these functions are best served by
outside and constituency directors. 8 8
Fifth, market processes will not be "distorted" with constitu-
ency representation on the board. This can be demonstrated
even by using the efficiency model's own concept of the firm.
Under that model, the firm is a nexus of contracts or market-
place in which all constituencies, in essence, negotiate with one
another through their agent, the managers. Constituency repre-
sentation on the board permits more direct negotiations without
the fiction of an agent. Market processes are not distorted, but
are facilitated. A distortion results when the accurate sharing of
information is hampered by the managers' monopoly over this
information. The power model also questions what is meant by
the "distortion" of the market because it is socially constructed.
Sixth, the claim that in certain circumstances the interests of
constituencies may diverge from that of the corporation, ignores
the fact that the corporation should exist only by virtue of the
values that constituencies derive from its existence. The corpo-
ration should not be reified. The viability of a firm itself is not a
virtue apart from an assessment of its various functions and ef-
fects. With respect to the competing interests of different
groups, the law has devised ways to deal with conflict of interest
situations involving corporate managers. This same law can be
used with respect to constituency directors.369
Seventh, while there are other ways in which various constitu-
encies interface with the board, such as collective bargaining for
employees, the power model emphasizes the power implications
of hierarchy. The board is situated ideally at the top of the cor-
poration's hierarchy to assure that the corporation consider vari-
ous interests.7 ° Some union officials, however, oppose employee
membership on the board for fear of being coopted. 37 1 Neverthe-
less, board membership could serve as an additional entree for
labor rather than replacing collective bargaining.3 7 2 For an in-
368. E.g., R. DAHL, supra note 295, at 133. The benefits of constituency representa-
tion may also justify educational costs.
369. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
370. The author does not intend to overemphasize, however, the importance of
boards or board membership in determining corporate behavior. See M. EISENBERG,
supra note 7, at 141-48; H. MINTZBERG, supra note 19, at 76-81. Nevertheless, with differ-
ent methods of selection and qualifications for board members, the board's effectiveness
in determining corporate policies and sensitivities can be enhanced. See Summers, supra
note 211, at 183-85; see also text accompanying infra notes 376-78.
371. This article makes the same claim for shareholders under existing legal rules.
E.g., Lipton, supra note 140, at 45 n. 199; Summers, Industrial Democracy: America's
Unfulfilled Promise, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 29, 47 (1979).
372. Summers, supra note 211, at 164-67.
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creasing number of employees, board membership will provide
the most significant means of access because collective bargain-
ing is on the decline in the United States.873 Also, as previously
noted, participation at the board level can have the beneficial
effect of increasing the life of participatory arrangements at
lower levels in the organization.""'
Eighth, minority board representatives can be "frozen out" by
management from participation in decision making through such
strategies as the formation of committees which do not include
minority members and by decision making prior to board meet-
ings. While the power model demonstrates that organizational
process rules can enhance the power of certain individuals or
groups, various procedures have been suggested which can lessen
the probability that these strategies will work. 75 Moreover, it is
important to note that while the control of the firm does not
change with minority representatives on the board, the amount
of total firm conflict and the "character of decisions" can
change.76 This situation has been found to be the case in coun-
tries that have codetermination or require employee member-
ship on the board (often in a minority position). One writer ob-
serves "[a] system of consensus has emerged under which
'management . . .can risk conflict with the workers . . . only if
these conflicts are factually and socially justified.' "1s Professor
Vagts notes the advantage of employee participation because it
takes into account the human implications of decision making.
He observes:
An outsider is favorably impressed by the humanity and
care with which new jobs have been found, or even cre-
ated by bringing in new industries, and workers retained
or pensioned . . . . [O]ne feels that through
codetermination a process for handling such problems
had been set up which made it possible for each side to
373. Id. at 37, 42, 158.
374. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
375. E.g., Summers, supra note 211, at 176-77 (For example, minority representatives
can be assured participation on committees and matters that may be delegated to com-
mittees and management currently can be limited.).
376. Id. at 183-84; Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 160.
377. Comment, supra note 210, at 985 (citing H. KATER, DAS MrrESTIMMUNGSGES-
PRACH Nos. 5-7 (1976)).
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see the other's point of view and to cooperate in reducing
pain to its minimum. 8 '
It is not the purpose of this Article to advocate a particular
governance structure.3 8 9 The objective has been to demonstrate
that the power model permits a different response from the effi-
ciency model to these reform proposals concerning the composi-
tion and functions of the boards of directors.
A recent study of board compositions by Baysinger and Butler
purports to show that board composition should be left to volun-
tary, evolutionary changes. 80 The subject of board composition
and functions then should not be left without analyzing this
study. Baysinger and Butler compared the board composition of
266 firms in 1970 and 1980. They found that the number of
outside directors increased during this period, 81 despite the ab-
sence of a mandatory rule at the federal level. It is unlikely,
however, that the addition of outside directors during the 1970s
was natural or evolutionary in the sense used by Baysinger and
Butler. During this period, there were substantial social and po-
litical pressures on companies to add outside directors.382 In
fact, the choice of 1980 as the comparison year was disingenu-
ous, because that was the middle year of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission's Proxy Disclosure Monitoring Program
(1979-81). ss8 The SEC statistically monitored board composi-
tions during this period, with the view of making regulatory
changes if voluntary changes were not made.
Baysinger and Butler also concluded that the implementation
of a proposal to place a majority of independent directors on the
board may adversely affect shareholder welfare, because firms
that achieved above-average financial performance did not have
a majority of independent directors.3 84 But neither did the be-
378. Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Corporation: Perspectives From the German,
80 HARV. L. REV. 23, 71-72 (1966); see also, E. JACOBS, S. ORWELL, P. PATERSON & F.
WELTZ, supra note 215.
379. The Fifth Company Land Directive, for example, offers alternative systems of
employee participation. See Murphy, The Amended Proposal for a Fifth Company Di-
rective-Nihil Novum, 7 Hous. J. INT'L L. 215 (1985); Welch, The Fifth Draft Direc-
tive-A False Dawn?, 8 EuR. L. REV. 83 (1983).
380. Baysinger & Butler, Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Per-
formance Effects of Changes in Board Composition, 1 J. oF LAW, ECON. & ORGANIZATION
101 (1985).
381. Id. at 113-14.
382. Kripke, The SEC, Corporate Governance, and the Real Issues, 36 Bus. LAW.
173, 189-92 (1981).
383. See supra note 221.
384. Baysinger & Butler, supra note 380, at 119, 121.
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low-average performers." 5 In fact, Baysinger and Butler found
that firms with an above average percentage of independent di-
rectors in the early 1970's (although below a majority) enjoyed
better records of relative financial performance in the latter part
of the decade than firms with average or below average percent-
ages.3"' This evidence can be used as easily to support the claims
of the proponents of mandatory changes in board composition.
CONCLUSION
The efficiency and power models provide different perceptions
of corporate behavior. The efficiency model views the corpora-
tion as mainly reactive with governance structures that are
designed to deal efficiently with various constituencies. The cor-
poration responds to concrete realities such as the residual
rights held by shareholders or the asset-specific nature of share-
holders' investments. Persons bargaining for their own protec-
tion and competition in various markets cause managers to effi-
ciently deal with the demands of others. Using this model, basic
principles of corporate law can be supported as they were by the
traditional ownership/entrepreneurial models of the firm. Share-
holders are properly represented on the board of directors, and
managers should operate the corporation to benefit the share-
holders alone.
In contrast, under the power model, the corporation actively
seeks to structure its environment to serve its needs of auton-
omy and discretion. While certain concrete realities exist, such
as the scarcity of resources, how these resources are used and
distributed is a matter of social organization, dependent on cul-
tural, historical, social, and power factors. The tools of the effi-
ciency model, such as residual rights and asset-specificity, are
shown to be rationalizations for existing power relationships. As
previously demonstrated, arguments utilizing these features can
likewise be used to support other governance structures such as
employee membership on the board. Under the power model,
shareholder membership on the board is understood as a coopta-
tive device designed to legitimate the substantial amount of dis-
cretion held by managers to make value judgments. Under this
model, principles of corporate law are highly suspect.
385. Id. at 119.
386 Id. at 117.
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The power model provides a more "open textured" response
to corporate behavior and structure than the efficiency model,
which seeks to justify existing power structures on the basis of
pseudo-scientific principles of natural selection. Structures need
to be examined with'an understanding of power sources, power
strategies, and the importance of social and cultural values. Be-
ware, for "efficiency" has become the talisman of the power
holders.
Not only do the efficiency and power models elucidate basic
principles of corporate law, but they are useful in understanding
recent developments in corporate law. The efficiency model's
contract perception of the shareholder-management relationship
provides the basis for state legislatures adopting various opt-out
or opt-in provisions which permit shareholders to decide the law
to be applied to each corporation. For instance, some states per-
mit shareholders, through voting, to relieve directors of certain
fiduciary duties owed shareholders."' 7 These laws have been
passed in response to the directors' and officers' insurance crisis
spurred by the plethora of litigation concerning tender offers. 88
Under the efficiency model, this legislation is difficult to chal-
lenge-shareholders as parties to the contract with managers
should be free to contract for different contractual terms. The
power model, however, offers a different line of analysis. Fiduci-
ary duties of directors may be understood as a response by the
judiciary to shareholders' unequal bargaining position. If this is
the case, the matter cannot be resolved through shareholder vot-
ing. Fiduciary duties may also serve a legitimating role. They
may operate in fact or appearance to protect other segments of
society from ill-considered corporate decisions. If so, they serve
a broader purpose than the efficiency model suggests. Under the
power model then, the fiduciary duties of directors become a
matter for public policy determination rather than a decision to
be made by shareholders on a company-by-company basis.
In conclusion, the conceptual lens that is used to view corpo-
rate behavior, whether adopted consciously or unconsciously,
can lead to different judgments about who controls or should
control the modern corporation, about the operation and effect
of existing corporate law, and about the standards and princi-
ples that should govern corporate decision making. Conse-
387. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986).
388. Lee, Limiting Corporate Directors' Liability: Delaware's Section 102(b)(7) and
the Erosion of the Directors' Duty of Care, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 239, 240-41 (1987); Note,
Statutory and Non-Statutory Responses to the Director and Officer Liability Insurance
Crisis, 63 IND. L.J. 181, 182 n.10 (1987).
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quently, greater attention should be given to developing and un-
derstanding models used in assessing the corporate law.
